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ABSTRACT
THE ATTESTATION OF THE SELF AS A BRIDGE
BETWEEN HERMENEUTICS AND ONTOLOGY
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR

Sebastian Kaufmann
Marquette University, 2010

Ricoeur defines attestation as the “assurance of being oneself acting and
suffering” or as the “assurance – the credence and the trust – of existing in the mode of
selfhood.” In this dissertation I discuss the concept of attestation in Ricoeur’s philosophy
in relation to the main dimensions of the self: Capacities, personal identity, memory and
otherness. I state that attestation is the key to the three dialectics of Ricoeur’s
hermeneutics of the self: The dialectic between reflection and analysis, the dialectic
between idem-identity and ipse-identity and the dialectic between oneself and other. In
these three dialectics, attestation, as the assurance of being oneself acting and suffering,
allows the self to appropriate its otherness: The otherness of its capacities, the otherness
of its identity, the otherness of its body, of other people and of its conscience. In other
words, the self gains the confidence of being a self through the confidence that the
actions it performs and the words it says are its own actions and words; the confidence
that the narratives it tells express its own identity; the confidence that the body is its own
body; the confidence that the esteem of others mediates its own esteem and that the
values that it embraces are its own values. This analysis is made in the first four chapters
of this dissertation. In the fifth chapter I explore the relationship between attestation and
recognition.
Attestation is not only necessary to understand the self at a hermeneutical level,
but at the same time attestation shows a main ontological trait of the self: The self is
attestation in the sense that the self is the confidence of existing as a self, confidence that
is gained by appropriating its otherness. Thus, the concept of attestation along with
providing an understanding of the self through otherness (hermeneutical level) shows us
that to become a self we need to attest to our self by appropriating our otherness
(ontological level). Then, as a conclusion, we can state that attestation serves as a bridge
between hermeneutics and ontology in the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur.
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Introduction

1.

Objective of the dissertation

The goal of this dissertation is to analyze the concept of attestation in the context
of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self. Although attestation, according to Ricoeur, is the
key concept linking the essays in Oneself as Another, the literature on Ricoeur has not
paid enough attention to it.1 I will analyze attestation by trying to discover the
hermeneutical and ontological implications of this concept, proposing the thesis that
attestation is the bridge between a hermeneutics and an ontology of the self. In order to
defend my thesis I will analyze the role of attestation as it relates to the four main
dimensions of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self – capacities, identity, memory,
otherness. The first four chapters of the dissertation will be devoted precisely to this task
in that very order. So, the first chapter will analyze attestation in relation with the
phenomenology of the capable being, that is, the phenomenological analysis of the main
human capacities (to speak, to act, to narrate and to be imputable). The second chapter
analyzes attestation in relation with personal identity. The third chapter discusses
attestation in relation with memory. The fourth chapter explicates the notion of attestation
as it relates to otherness. In the fifth chapter I complement the analysis of the first four

1

Among the few studies dedicated to this topic, we find “Testimony and Attestation” by Jean
Greisch (Greisch 1996); “Ricoeur’s Ethics. Another Version of Virtue Ethics? Attestation is not a Virtue”
by Mark Muldoon (Muldoon 2007); “Agnosticism and Attestation: An Aporia concerning the Other in
Ricoeur’s ‘Oneself as Another’” by Pamela Sue Anderson (Anderson 1994) and “The Concept of
Attestation of Paul Ricoeur” by Josué Pérez (Pérez 2001).
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chapters by analyzing the relationship between attestation and recognition. Finally, in the
conclusion, I try to show how attestation serves as a bridge between a hermeneutics and
an ontology of the self.
In what follows, I will situate the problem of attestation in three main contexts.
The first one concerns the prevalent philosophical views about the self. In this regard, we
can say that with the idea of attestation Ricoeur responds to the main challenges that we
have found in the history of philosophy with respect to the self. The second context is
that of the hermeneutics of testimony that will help us understand why Ricoeur uses a
juridical term – attestation – to explain his idea of the self. The third context will be the
hermeneutics of the self. The hermeneutics of the self grafts Ricoeur’s philosophical
response to the traditions of the self and the hermeneutics of testimony on to his own
philosophical project: A hermeneutics of the self in which attestation is at the core. In this
sense we could say that the hermeneutics of the self is not just a context but it is where
attestation finds its natural space and ground.
2.

Attestation in the context of the crisis of the cogito

The idea of attestation must be understood in the context of the two main
traditions that have concerned themselves with the idea of the cogito. The first is the
modern tradition initiated by Descartes and followed by Kant and Fichte and continued in
the 20th century, by Husserl, among others. In this tradition the cogito is evident and
serves as a primary and transparent truth of thought (Ricoeur 1992, 4). To that view is
opposed what Ricoeur calls the “shattered cogito,” which finds its best expression in
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Nietzsche (Ricoeur 1992, 11-16). In this second tradition, the self is a mere illusion or at
most a construction.2
Although Ricoeur agrees with this criticism directed against the Cartesian
tradition, he is not satisfied with the mere dissolution of the cogito.3 He believes it is
possible to have some certainty about the cogito, not an absolute certainty, but a certainty
nonetheless that Ricoeur calls “attestation.” This certainty is less than the unshakable
certainty Descartes wanted but is more than the skepticism of Nietzsche (Ricoeur 1992,
16-23). Thus, attestation is a kind of belief, but not a belief in the sense of doxa when it is
opposed to episteme. It is a belief that has the form of a credence, a “belief in” and a trust.
Although Ricoeur states that attestation is “placed at an equal distance from the apology
of the cogito and from its overthrow” (Ricoeur 1992, 4), Greisch reminds us that for
Ricoeur “this equal distance” is not an exact midpoint between two extremes, but it
occupies an epistemic and ontological place beyond these alternatives (Greisch 1996, 8485).What does it mean to go beyond these alternatives? In my understanding, Ricoeur’s
claim that attestation occupies a place beyond the alternatives is meant to stress the idea

2

According to Van Den Hengel, Ricoeur’s concern about the crisis of the cogito is linked with his
diagnosis of the crisis of the contemporary human being: “His venture into practical philosophy must be
seen in the light of his perception of the current crisis of Western civilization. For Ricoeur, a pivotal event
marks our era, which calls for a new thrust in philosophy. He identifies this event at the level of human
consciousness as the shattering of the Cartesian cogito” (Van Den Hengel 2002, 72). Indeed it is not hard to
see how the idea of a shattered cogito constituted a major crisis for humanity. Without a consistent idea of a
self, the problem of the meaning of life and the ethical dimension is shattered as well.
3

The consequences of accepting the dissolution of the cogito are significant, as Van Den Hengel
points out: “If the ego is no longer the radical origin or foundation, what role does the human self play in
relation to the world or, to put it otherwise, in the ascertaining of truth?” (Van Den Hengel 1994, 470). As
Hall points out, “Ricoeur was unwilling to follow the inheritors of Nietzsche’s campaign against the
rational faculty in reducing the self to a mere confluence of external or internal forces” (Hall 2007, 21).
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that attestation is not just a kind of “soft belief” in the self that would be mid-way
between Cartesian certainty and the Nietzschean overthrow of the self, but that it is a
belief belonging to a realm different from that of epistemic certainty and of Nietzschean
skepticism.4
This idea of attestation will be crucial to understanding the hermeneutics of the
self that Ricoeur develops in Oneself as Another. In addition, the idea of attestation5 can
also be used as a clue to understand several important topics in his late philosophy up to
his death in 2005.6
Attestation is mainly attestation of the self (Ricoeur 1992, 22). Through
attestation the self presents itself as a being with the power to say, the power to do, the
power to have an identity and to be responsible for its actions. Attestation can thus be
defined as “the assurance of being oneself acting and suffering” (Ricoeur 1992, 22). Here
we have the epistemological sense of attestation which helps to answer the question:
What kind of knowledge does the self have about itself? The self is thus the being that is
certain that it is an agent and a patient. However, attestation also has an ontological
import and in that sense it can be defined as the “assurance – the credence and the trust –

4

Another way of expressing the same idea is to say that the cogito of attestation is a wounded
cogito, but not a crushed cogito, as Greisch affirms: “But this wounded cogito is not a cogito crushed by
the weight of a relentless suspicion. For the credence which characterizes attestation is also the ‘trust’
which copes with suspicion, thus making an ‘attestation of the self’ out of attestation” (Greisch 1996, 86).
5

Attestation appears as an important philosophical concept in Ricoeur’s work for the first time in
Oneself as Another in 1990.
6

In this sense Oneself as Another is linked to three of his late works: The Just (2000), Memory,
History, Forgetting (2004a) and The Course of Recognition (2005).
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of existing in the mode of selfhood” (Ricoeur 1992, 302). In this sense attestation helps
to answer the question: “Who is the self?” The self is the confidence of existing in the
mode of selfhood.
What do these two senses have in common? In both cases it is a confidence, a
trust, a credence, but in a sense other than that of a scientific certainty. As we can see,
attestation possesses a very peculiar epistemological status. The status of this confidence
can be understood only if we relate attestation to the hermeneutics of testimony.
3.

Attestation in the context of the hermeneutics of testimony

The word attestation has the same root as the word testimony. To attest is to give
a testimony. Ricoeur himself proposes this link by stating that the kind of belief
attestation implies is similar to the belief we have in the “the speech of the one giving
testimony” (Ricoeur 1992, 21). Therefore, in order to understand the concept of
attestation it is important to focus on the idea of testimony. Testimony, properly speaking,
is given in court during a trial. By extension, we can also speak of the testimony of a
historian who attests to a historical fact on the basis of some evidence. The object of a
testimony is, in general, to ascertain facts, when they are not evident. The witness is
supposed to have a privileged access to the facts, as we can imagine in the case of
travelers who came back from a distant trip with fresh news about the places they had
visited. Here the traveler has a privileged access to those facts and we have to rely on his
testimony. However, the attestation of the self is a very particular type of testimony. It is
not a testimony that is given in a court of law. It is not the report of historical facts by a
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historian. Rather, it is a very peculiar kind of testimony that can be understood only in the
context of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of testimony. In this regard, Greisch proposes a
connection between the hermeneutics of the self and the hermeneutics of testimony
through the idea of attestation: “[We find] on the hand the hermeneutics of testimony, and
on the other the hermeneutics of the self, whose hidden core is, in my opinion,
attestation” (Greisch 1996, 81). For Greisch it is in attestation that the hermeneutics of
the self and the hermeneutics of testimony come together. The key to the hermeneutics of
the self is attestation in the sense that the self becomes a self only through the attestation
of its own self. Attestation, in its turn, can be the key of the hermeneutics of testimony
insofar as the attestation of the self can be well explained in the context of Ricoeur’s
hermeneutics of testimony.
Ricoeur develops his hermeneutics of testimony in dialogue with Jean Nabert.
The main essay where Ricoeur discusses this hermeneutics is the “The Hermeneutics of
Testimony,” a presentation he made at the Castelli symposium on testimony in Rome in
1972. In this essay Ricoeur starts by asking what “sort of philosophy makes a problem of
testimony?” It is, he answers, a philosophy for “which the question of the absolute is a
proper question, a philosophy which seeks to join an experience of the absolute to the
idea of the absolute” (Ricoeur 1980, 119). Thus, the problem of testimony is related to a
philosophy of religion where the absolute and its manifestations to a consciousness are
relevant. Can we, then, apply this philosophy of testimony to the problem of attestation?
Despite the fact that this philosophy arises in the context of a philosophy of religion, we
find in this notion of testimony many elements that can be applied to the problem of
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testimony in general (especially in what Ricoeur calls a “semantics of testimony”) and to
the problem of attestation in particular.
One of Ricoeur main contributions to the philosophy of testimony is the
amplification of the idea of testimony beyond its legal or historical boundaries.
Testimony, traditionally understood, is the report that somebody gives before a court of
law about what she has seen or is the report given in a narration in order to establish the
veracity of historical facts. Ricoeur, following Jean Nabert, amplifies this traditional idea
of testimony in several ways:
Testimony should be a philosophical problem and not limited to legal or historical
contexts where it refers to the account of a witness who reports what he has seen.
The term testimony should be applied to words, works, actions, and to lives which
attest to an intention, an inspiration, an idea at the heart of experience and history
which nonetheless transcend experience and history. (Ricoeur 1980, 119-120)
Here we observe first that, not only can a person give a testimony, but also some words,
some actions or some lives give a testimony. Secondly, the object of a testimony is not
only facts, but the witness can attest to ideas, intentions and inspirations. What we have,
then, is an amplification of the idea of testimony, beyond facts and into words, works,
actions and lives. The content of those testimonies can be an idea, an inspiration or an
intention. To understand fully the paragraph quoted above we would have to delve into
Nabert’s philosophy of religion, but this exceeds the purpose of this introduction.
However, we can take this idea of testimony and see to what kinds of phenomena it can
be applied. Ricoeur explains that the object of attestation is an intention, an inspiration or
an idea that is at the heart of experience and history but transcends them. In my opinion,
Ricoeur refers to phenomena that are crucial to human experience but whose meaning
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goes beyond what is lived in a given moment. At the same time, they are phenomena that
need to be attested to, because their existence cannot be empirically proven. I think that
we can apply this idea of testimony to issues such as forgiveness or the meaning of life.
These types of things can be said to be at the core of human experience, but their reality
can only be attested to. I can never be completely sure if forgiveness happens. However,
some people attest to the existence of forgiveness. Moreover, some words (as “I forgive
you”) and actions (like the act of forgiveness) attest to the existence of forgiveness. The
same is the case with the idea of the meaning of life. Can I prove that life has a meaning?
I cannot prove it. However, the lives of some people attest to the existence of a meaning
in life, as the life of people completely devoted to a cause (I am thinking of people like
Mother Teresa). It seems that the idea of the self is also a phenomenon of this kind: It is
at the heart of human experience but transcends the experience and can only be attested
to. The self is the kind of thing whose existence cannot be empirically proven; rather, we
can only attest to its existence. I cannot demonstrate that there is a self, but the life,
actions, and words of people attest to the existence of the self. The self is at the core of
experience (indeed, without the idea of a self it would be hard to speak of an experience)
and history, but at the same time it transcends experience and history in the sense that the
self can project itself beyond the present experience and time (for example in promises).
Thus, it makes sense to say that the self can only be attested to.
That the idea of the self fits well in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of testimony can be
confirmed when we link the idea of the attestation of the self with what Ricoeur calls the
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semantics of testimony. In what follows I will present some basic traits of the semantics
of testimony and I will link them to the idea of the attestation of the self.
The hermeneutics of testimony is precisely a hermeneutics, that is, to say, a
philosophy of interpretation, as Ricoeur points out: “I would like to try to show that such
a philosophy can only be a hermeneutics, that is, a philosophy of interpretation...”
(Ricoeur 1980, 143). Although testimonies are based on facts, those facts must always be
interpreted. Within the problem of the interpretation of testimonies we find what Ricoeur
calls the dialectic between meaning and event:
Testimony demands to be interpreted because of the dialectic of meaning and
event that traverses it… It signifies that interpretation cannot be applied to
testimony from without as a violence which would be done to it. Interpretation,
however, is intended to be the taking up again, in a different discourse, of an
internal dialectic of testimony. (Ricoeur 1980, 144-145)
The events that must be interpreted are not independent of the interpretation that the
witness makes of them. Interpretation cannot be applied to testimony from outside.
Interpretation belongs to testimony in the sense that interpretation is part of the very
nature of a testimony. It is not the case that we first have a testimony and then the
testimony is interpreted. Rather, the event is appropriated with a meaning. We see the
same phenomenon in attestation. In attestation the self attests to itself with an
interpretation of its actions, narrations, words and other manifestations of itself that
cannot be separated from those actions, narrations and words. The latter are appropriated
by the self under a given interpretation.
This helps us move to the second main trait of testimony: The idea of suspicion. A
testimony can always be challenged and one of its main traits is precisely the possibility
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of its being contested. The image of a trial expresses this idea very aptly. A testimony is
given before a judge who decides whether it is credible or not:
This juridical coloration of judgment is important to qualify testimony. The
testimony which constitutes it has as its aim an act which decides in favor of…,
which condemns or acquits, which confers or recognizes a right, which decides
between two claims. (Ricoeur 1980, 125)
A testimony can be believed or suspected. It is not possible to give a testimony that is
completely immune to suspicion. The idea of a testimony is associated with the idea of a
trial in which the testimony will be accepted or rejected. The same holds for attestation.
The attestation that the self gives of itself is always under suspicion and can always be
accepted or rejected, even by the self itself, although not as Cartesian doubt, but rather as
a lack of confidence in its own actions, narrations and words or as a crisis of identity.
Trust in the witness plays a crucial role in the decision to accept or reject a testimony.
Thus, it is not in vain that Ricoeur uses a juridical term to represent the certitude that we
have about the self.
The third feature of the hermeneutics of testimony that connects it with attestation
is the relationship between testimony and witness. There is a strong and necessary
relationship between witness and testimony. In order to believe in a testimony, the
witness must be reliable. This is true of any kind of testimony and trial. In the following
passage Ricoeur expresses well the relationship between witness and testimony, referring
particularly to the case of the devoted disciple of God:
[T]he witness seals his bond to the cause that he defends by a public profession of
his conviction, by the zeal of a propagator, by a personal devotion which can
extend even to the sacrifice of his life. (Ricoeur 1980, 129)
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In the witness’ profession of faith (particularly in the case of religion) we find a “total
engagement not only of words but of acts and, in the extreme, in the sacrifice of a life”
(Ricoeur 1980, 131). Here, the idea of witness gains its strongest expression: “…the
witness does not testify about isolated and contingent facts but about the radical, global
meaning of human experience” (Ricoeur 1980, 131). We find the same close relationship
between the witness and testimony in the idea of attestation. Attestation, by definition,
supposes a total and complete engagement of the self. In the belief that I am a self my
whole existence as a self is at stake.
The last service that a hermeneutics of testimony can render us is to help us
understand the epistemological status of attestation. We have seen that a testimony can
always be contested. Are testimony and attestation then a lower kind of knowledge, a
kind of doxa? Ricoeur explicitly states that attestation is not doxa and thus not at a lower
level with respect to science:
Attestation presents itself first, in fact, as a kind of belief. But it is not a doxic
belief, in the sense in which doxa (belief) has less standing than epistēmē (science,
or better, knowledge). (Ricoeur 1992, 21)
Then, what is the epistemological status of attestation? The key is that attestation is not a
theoretical knowledge, but rather a practical knowledge about the self. The categories of
episteme and doxa, traditionally understood, belong to theoretical knowledge, whereas
the categories of attestation belong to a practical level that is more closely related to
personal commitment than to states of affairs of things. To judge testimony by the
standards we use to judge scientific truths would be to misunderstand the epistemological
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status of testimony and attestation, which belong to a different epistemic realm, as
Ricoeur points out:
In terms of the modality of judgment, the interpretation of testimony is only
probable, but it only appears as such when compared to a scientific ideal which
governs only one of the different requirements of thought, which reigns in only
one of the centers of reflection, namely knowledge of objects. (Ricoeur 1980,
150)
However, it would be a mistake to think that the truth of testimony (and consequently of
attestation) is not subject to criticism. Testimony and attestation must be criticized and
analyzed, but not with the criteria that we use to measure empirical truths.
4.

Attestation in the context of the hermeneutics of the self

The last context in which I want to place attestation is the context of Ricoeur’s
hermeneutics of the self. In a way we can say that Ricoeur’s whole project is a
“hermeneutics of the self” in the sense that his philosophy is a hermeneutical effort to
make sense of human existence. However, the philosophical scope of what Ricoeur calls
a hermeneutics of the self is more specific. Indeed in Ricoeur we find many works that
touch on an enormous diversity of topics that in a way are related to the self but that are
not specifically about the self (as his work on narrative, metaphor, legal research, etc.).
Ricoeur proposes a specific hermeneutics of the self in Oneself as Another, where he
develops the idea of attestation more thoroughly. The main questions of the hermeneutics
of the self are “who is speaking?,” “who is acting?,” “who is telling his or her story?” and
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“who is the moral subject of imputation?” (Ricoeur 1992, 169).7 However, the general
question – and the most important one – is “who is the self?” Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of
the self is developed through three main kinds of dialectics, the dialectic of reflection and
analysis, the dialectic of ipse/idem and the dialectic of sameness and otherness.8
In what follows I will present briefly the three main dialectics that Ricoeur
develops in his hermeneutics of the self and I will explain summarily how each chapter of
this dissertation concerns these dialectics and what the role of attestation is in each
dialectic. Although the chapters are not completely structured around these dialectics,
each chapter (particularly the first four) is an effort to unveil the role of attestation in the
dialectics of the self. My hope is that by the end of the dissertation it will become clear to
the reader what Ricoeur means when he states in Oneself as Another that attestation is the
password for his hermeneutics of the self. In addition to this, I will show how attestation
can serve as a bridge to an ontology of the self. I will now proceed to present each
dialectic.

7

Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self is closely linked with the problem of practical philosophy, as
Van Den Hengel points out: “…the concern of a practical philosophy has become the question of selfhood
in all its obviousness, as in the question ‘Who am I?’ or in all its opaqueness, as in the question ‘What is
the ‘I’?’ or ‘What is the self?’” (Van Den Hengel 1994, 458-459). We could say that the hermeneutics of
the self is contained in practical philosophy, whose main topics are the human self and human action.
8

The fact that Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self is developed through three main dialectics is a
direct consequence of the fact that hermeneutics is a philosophy of detours, as Van den Hengel points out:
“Hermeneutics is a philosophy of detours, seemingly endless detours, unraveling the question ‘who,’ that
is, ‘Who is the self?’” (Van den Hengel 2002, 73).
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a) The dialectic of reflection and analysis9

Ricoeur states that the first philosophical intention of Oneself as Another “was to
indicate the primacy of reflective meditation over the immediate positing of the subject,
as this is expressed in the first person singular: ‘I think,’ ‘I am’” (Ricoeur 1992, 1). This
first dialectic is the immediate consequence of Ricoeur’s idea of the self. Since the self is
not self-transparent, we cannot pretend to have an immediate access to the self. The main
analytical tools are provided by analytic philosophy, mainly the philosophy of action and
language developed in the Anglo-Saxon world. Through analysis we can have an indirect
access to the self. For Ricoeur, the “recourse to analysis… is the price to pay for a
hermeneutics characterized by the indirect manner of positing the self” (Ricoeur 1992, 17,
Ricoeur’s emphasis). Hermeneutics is a philosophy of detours. There is not a specific
reason to choose analytic philosophy. Ricoeur chooses it simply because he considers
that it is the richest in promise and result (Ricoeur 1992, 17).10 This detour of analysis
can be explained as the detour through the what of experience in order to access the who
of the self. Analysis in general and analytic philosophy in particular, allow us to take the

9

Van den Hengel summarizes this dialectic in the following way: “According to Ricoeur, the self
is mediated by a dialectic of explanation and understanding. The self is only mediately available. Hence he
insists that access to the self demands the effort of working through the analytical explanations of the self…
Ricoeur’s explanation of the self is derived from Ordinary Language Philosophy, pragmatics, and
narratology. There is no understanding of the self without using explanatory procedures” (Van den Hengel
1994, 466).
10

The tools of analysis are applied mainly to human actions. Here Van den Hengel emphasizes
some of the dimensions of Ricoeur’s philosophy of action: “The theory of human action, underpinning
practical philosophy as part of its analytical detours, is constituted out of fragments from the analysis of
action in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of action, narrative theory, and ethical, moral, and
political determinations of action” (Van den Hengel 2002, 73).
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detour of the what of the action in order to have access to the who of the agent. The self
cannot be immediately posited. We have to take the detour of the objectifications of the
self.11 The detour chosen in Oneself As Another is the detour of analysis.
This dialectic appears mainly in Ricoeur’s analysis of the capacities of the self.
The indirect approach to the self is seen in the analysis of the different capacities of the
self. The analysis of the capacities of the self will be presented in the three first chapters
of this dissertation. In the first chapter, I will analyze the capacity to speak, to act, to
narrate and to be imputable. In the second chapter (within the topic of personal identity) I
will analyze the capacity to make promises. In the third chapter, I will analyze the
capacity to remember. These analyses will make explicit the dialectic between analysis
and reflection. The analysis of these capacities will help us reflect on their meaning.
The purpose of this analysis of the capacities of the self is to discover the role of
attestation in them. We will find that without the idea of attestation, namely, the belief
that I am myself acting and suffering, the capacities of the self would remain external to
the self. Through attestation we make it possible to connect fruitfully the self to its
capacities. Attestation as a belief in being a self, allows the self to appropriate its own
capacities, to claim and reclaim them in the form, for example, of “it is me, speaking,
acting, narrating.” Thus, at the level of this first dialectic of analysis and reflection,
attestation allows the self to appropriate its own capacities. In this way, attestation

11

It is important to note that it is only a “detour” in the sense that at some point we need to
“return” to the self by an act of appropriation, as Van Den Hengel states: “The human self is appropriated
by way of an analysis of the “What?” and the “Why?” of action” (Van Den Hengel 1994, 466).
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completes the dialectic of analysis and reflection.12 While the use of analytical tools helps
us analyze the capacities, attestation works as the reflective moment when we try to make
full sense of what it means to be capable. Attestation helps us realize that to be capable is
mainly to believe, to trust in our own capacities. Without attestation, the dialectic
between analysis and reflection would not be complete in the sense that we would lack
the link connecting the self to its capacities.
b) The dialectic of ipse/idem

The second dialectic of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self is the dialectic between
ipse/idem (Ricoeur 1992, 2). Ipse and idem are two forms of identity. Each identity
corresponds to a different model of permanence in time. The identity characterized by
idem is what we in general assign to things and it is based on the permanence of some
qualities or in the uninterrupted continuity over time, among other criteria. Human
identity is more aptly depicted by what Ricoeur calls ipse identity. Ipse identity is based
on the capacity of the self to affirm its identity despite changes, as it is evidenced, for
example, in promises, where the self affirms that it will be the same (“I will be there”)
despite any change in its character.
What is interesting to note here is that ipse identity is built into a dialectical
relationship with idem identity. This means that the affirmation of our identity over time

12

It is important to note that when we speak of the dialectic between reflection and analysis we are
not stating that the self needs to analyze and to reflect on their capacities. The dialectic of reflection and
analysis is a requirement of the hermeneutical analysis of the self. We need analysis because the self is not
self-transparent and we need reflection to make full sense of the meaning of the self.
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needs to find “support” in some permanence of traits over time, in some uninterrupted
continuity or in the identification with some values, ideals, etc. This dialectic, as we will
see, is well evidenced in narrative identity, where the self constructs its identity (as ipse
identity) by affirming that a given narrative configuration, that is, a specific way of
narrating a life, expresses its identity. That act of narrative configuration is made in a
dialectical relationship to idem identity, insofar as many of the elements that we take into
consideration when we give a narrative account of our life are based in some of the
criteria of the idem identity, such as the permanence of some traits of character or in the
uninterrupted continuity of our life. Attestation, here, appears as the trust and the
confidence that a given narrative configuration expresses who I am. Without this
confidence the self would not be able to affirm that a given narrative configuration
expresses its identity better than another one. Thus, attestation is the belief/trust that a
given narrative configuration expresses the self’s personal identity. This dialectic
between ipse/idem identity and the role of attestation in it will be analyzed in the second
chapter of the dissertation.
c) The dialectic of sameness/otherness

Ricoeur states that the “third philosophical intention [of Oneself as Another] – this
one explicitly included in the title – is related to the preceding one, in the sense that ipseidentity involves a dialectic complementary to that of selfhood and sameness, namely the
dialectic of self and the other than self” (Ricoeur 1992, 3). Thus, the third dialectic is the
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dialectic of self and the other or the dialectic between sameness and otherness. This
dialectic is the most important of the three.13 The self is constituted in a dialectical
relationship to what is other than self. At the core of the self there is a threefold
otherness: The otherness of the body, the otherness of other people and the otherness of
conscience. How is it possible for the self to be constituted by an otherness? This can
only happen because the otherness of the self is in a dialectical relationship to the self. It
is an otherness that is assumed as part of the self. It is an otherness that expresses the self.
It is not something alien to the self. The otherness of the self can be assumed as part of
the self thanks to attestation. The self attests to its own self by attesting to its otherness.
The self believes in being a self (attestation) by assuming the otherness of its own body
as expressing its own self, by assuming the otherness of other people as expressing its
own esteem (in the figure of self esteem) and by assuming the otherness of conscience as
expressing its own values in the phenomenon of conviction. Thus, through attestation the
self assumes its otherness as expressing its self.
In the first four chapters I will explore the hermeneutical role of attestation where
we will see that attestation works as a hermeneutical key insofar it has the three main
functions aforementioned: Appropriation, affirmation and assumption (in the sense of

13

Van Den Hengel reminds us that this dialectic is the most important of the three: “For Ricoeur
this dialectic is by far the most encompassing. It was important enough for it to give rise to the title of the
book. It readdresses the perennial philosophical theme of the Same and the Other. Here the dialectical
opposite of the self is not the temporal sameness or constancy of the human character, but the other in its
various guises” (Van Den Hengel 1994, 467). Ricoeur, along the same lines, states: “[T]he dialectic of the
same and the other crowns the first two dialectics” (Ricoeur 1992, 18).
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assuming what is other for the self). These three functions will be complemented by the
idea of recognition that will be developed in the fifth chapter. In this last chapter, we will
see that the self can attest to its own self only if it is recognized by others in its capacities.
Without the experience of recognition (that is indeed an experience of mutual
recognition), self-attestation is not possible. Indeed, what we can call the hermeneutical
role of attestation – summarized as appropriation, affirmation, assumption – is only
possible through the mediation of others in the form of mutual recognition.
In the conclusion to the dissertation, I will present how these hermeneutical roles
of attestation help us make the transition from a hermeneutics of the self to an ontology
of the self. Indeed, the three hermeneutical functions of appropriation, affirmation and
assumption (in addition to the issue of recognition that makes these hermeneutical
functions possible) place us at the threshold of an ontology of the self. The ontology of
the self that I will present is in many ways along the lines of the ontological remarks on
the self that Ricoeur himself makes in Oneself as Another. My contribution, in this
respect, is to show how this ontology can be derived from Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the
self through the idea of attestation in its three main hermeneutical functions:
Appropriation, affirmation and assumption. I will propose that attestation in its
hermeneutical function shows us that the self is constructed in a dialectical relationship
with otherness: The otherness of the capacities of the self, the otherness of the identity as
sameness, the otherness of its body, of other people and conscience. In this sense, the self
is its own otherness. At the same time I will propose, as an ontological trait, that the self
constructs its selfhood by appropriating its own otherness. This will be in line with the
idea of the self as dynamis that Ricoeur proposes. After analyzing the ontological
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implications of attestation I hope that we will be able to make complete sense of the main
thesis of Ricoeur’s Oneself as Another: We are a self constructed in relation with
otherness in a process of becoming ourselves through otherness.
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Chapter One

Attestation and the Phenomenology of Capable Being

1.1.

Introduction

Ricoeur introduces the notion of attestation as an alternative to the idea of the self
as certitude (as it is proposed in the Cartesian tradition) and the dissolution of the self (as
it is suggested in the Nietzschean tradition). Attestation appears as a kind of middle
ground. The self is not self-evident nor is it a mere illusion. Rather, the self must be
attested to in the form of belief and trust. Who is the one that attests to the self? The self
is attested to by the very self in an act of trusting in its own existence. Thus, attestation is
mainly self-attestation.
The attestation of the self finds a privileged expression in the attestation of its
capacities. The self attests to its own self by recognizing itself in the capacities it has.
This is consistent with Ricoeur’s claim that it is not possible to have a direct access to the
self. There is a fundamental opacity at the heart of the self that makes necessary the
detour through what he calls “the ‘object’ side of experience” which is expressed
precisely through the capacities of the self (Ricoeur 2005a, 93). Because the self is not
transparent to itself, the self must be grasped in action, that is, in its main expression: Its
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capacities.14 However, the self is not only attested to in the actions of the self. The self is
also attested to in the “passions” of the self.15 In the fourth chapter I will discuss
attestation in relationship to the passivity of the self expressed by the body, other people
and conscience.
In this chapter, I analyze attestation in relation to each of the main capacities that
Ricoeur examines: The capacity to say, the capacity to act, the capacity to narrate and the
capacity to be imputable (Ricoeur 2002, 280). In a conference given in 1999 – a few
years before he died – Ricoeur ventured to offer a kind of summary of his main concern
as a philosopher and mentioned the topic of human capabilities, specifically the four main
capacities mentioned above, as what bestows a unity to his whole philosophy:
When I try to cast a retrospective glance to my work, I agree that it is – for the
sake of a discourse of the second order – a personal reinterpretation offered to my
readers. And I must say that it is only recently that I felt allowed to give a name to
this overarching problematics. I mean the problem of human capability, capability
as the cornerstone of philosophical anthropology, or, to put it in more simple
terms belonging to ordinary language, the realm of the theme expressed by the
verb I can… It can be read in terms of four verbs, which the “I can” modifies: I
can speak, I can do things, I can tell a story, and I can be imputed, an action can
be imputed to me as its true author. (Ricoeur 2002, 280)

14

Hall makes explicit the link between attestation and capacities, stating that selfhood is
evidenced in action: “Ricoeur claimed that selfhood is attested to in the capacity to act and in the abilities
of the will to leave its traces on the course of events in the world” (Hall 2007, 21). Later, Halls adds an
ontological consequence to the link between selfhood and capacities. Because the self is attested in its
capacities we can affirm that “the I is, first and foremost, an agent” (Hall 2007, 21).
15

The articulation between the active and passive side of our experience is nicely explained by
Ricoeur in his book Freedom and Nature. The Voluntary and the Involuntary (Ricoeur 1966). For more on
this topic, see David Hall, Paul Ricoeur and the Poetic Imperative. The Creative Tension between Love and
Justice, pp. 22-25 (Hall 2007).
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In fact, the notion of human capabilities in Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy seems to
cover a whole range of topics. I can speak is related to his investigations in the
philosophy of language and hermeneutics; I can do things, to his research on philosophy
of action; I can tell a story, to narrative; and I can be imputed to ethics. Thus, in
analyzing Ricoeur’s phenomenology of the capable being we will at the same time be
gaining a good perspective on some of the main topics of his philosophy, and this will be
helpful to understand the concept of attestation.
Why does Ricoeur choose these capacities and not others? To answer this
question, it must be noted, first, that Ricoeur does not choose the same capacities in all
the texts where he addresses this issue. At least in Oneself as Another, in The Just and in
the article Ethics and Human Capability, he selects the four capacities of speaking, acting,
narrating and being imputable. However, in The Course of Recognition he adds the
capacity of remembering and promising. Thus, it does not seem that there is any
fundamental reason to select the capacities to speak, to act, to narrate and to be imputable.
All Ricoeur wants is to give a good account of the structure of the capable being, without
denying that there are other very important capacities that can be included in a broad
understanding of the capacity to act. However, these four capacities are not chosen
randomly, either. Actually, they have unity and coherence. According to Ricoeur the four
capacities mentioned have a cumulative function, that is, the more complex capacities
suppose the basic ones. Thus, language is not a capability among others, but the condition
for the possibility of all other meaningful capacities (Ricoeur 2002, 280). The capacity to
act is built upon the capacity to speak, insofar as action is linguistically mediated. The
capacity to narrate has a linguistic structure and presupposes our capacity to act (we tell

24

stories about what we do). Finally, as we will see later in this chapter, the capacity to be
imputed presupposes a being that has language and that is able to act and narrate. In order
to recognize our responsibility in our actions, we have to be able to act and to make sense
of our actions by giving an account of them (telling a story).
The main problem that we will have to solve in this phenomenology of the
capable being (Ricoeur 2005a, 89-134)16 is the relationship between the self and its
capacities. It is not enough to just present some capacities. We also need to show the link
between these capacities and the self. The main thesis I present in this chapter is that
attestation establishes the connection between the self and its capacities. If we look at the
human capacities from the perspective of an observer, we find several actions: Speaking,
doing, narrating, and being imputed. How can we assume that these actions are the
manifestations of a being capable of performing them? To answer this question the
concept of attestation is crucial. We can affirm that an action belongs to an agent only
thanks to a kind of credence or of confidence in its capacity to act. However, this
confidence does not work at the level of the certainty proper to the sciences, because
there is no way to provide an empirical verification of the capacity to act. This knowledge
works as a belief in our capacities, which Ricoeur calls attestation. Of course, this
confidence can always be challenged. “Are you sure that you meant what you said? Can
you really claim ownership of your own words? Are you really committed to what you

16

Ricoeur calls this phenomenology a “phenomenology of the capable being.” However, when he
describes the different capabilities, he uses, in general, the word capacities (capacités) rather capabilities
(capabilités). I do not think that in Ricoeur there is a conceptual difference between capacities and
capabilities. For that reason, I will use the term capacities to refer to both capabilities and capacities.
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said?” The answer can only be given by the agent in the form of a reassurance, not in the
form of a demonstration. “Yes, believe me, I mean that.” Thus, at all levels of capacities
we have to show how the relationship between the agent and the action is forged. As I
said, this relationship has the form of attestation.
Attestation is not the only conceptual device available to show the relationship
between the agent and the action. This relationship can be shown using another important
concept: Recognition. Indeed, the agent can recognize his actions as belonging to him
and the agent can recognize himself in his actions. The path of recognition as a way of
connecting the action to the agent is indeed not very different from the idea of attestation.
A close semantic kinship exists between the two concepts. The connection is so strong
that I will devote a complete chapter (chapter five) to examine the relationship between
attestation and recognition.
In the following pages I will present each of the four main capacities mentioned
above (to speak, to do things, to narrate and to be imputable) and show how in each of
these capacities the concept of attestation makes possible the connection between the
agent and the action.
1.2.

To be able to speak

It is no coincidence that the analysis of capacities starts with the capacity to speak.
This capacity has a privileged place among the other capacities. First of all, the capacity
to speak is the main tool through which persons recognize themselves as capable beings.
Ricoeur gives us the example of the Greek Heroes. The characters of Homer and the
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tragic heroes always speak of their actions and recognize themselves as the “cause” and
the principle of what they do (Ricoeur 2005a, 94). At the same time, we can say that the
capacity to speak is the foundation for all the other capacities. Language is not just a
capacity among others, but, according to Ricoeur, it is the condition for the possibility of
all other meaningful capacities (Ricoeur 2002, 280).
The two studies where Ricoeur discusses the issue of language and the capacity to
speak in Oneself as Another are Person and Identifying Reference. A Semantic Approach
and Utterance and the Speaking Subject. A Pragmatic Approach. It is important to note
that in these studies the concept of attestation is not mentioned except in a note.17
However, as I will try to demonstrate here, the idea of attestation is present in the
capacity to speak.
1.2.1. The semantic and the pragmatic approach

Ricoeur’s analysis of the capacity to speak in Oneself as Another uses the tools of
semantics and pragmatics. The semantic approach allows us to analyze the capacity to
speak from the manner in which the speaking subject appears in language. The main
claim is that persons (as speaking subjects) are entities about whom we speak (Ricoeur
1992, 40). We can speak about persons because we can identify them with an operation

17

This leads Greisch to say: “…at first sight, the first two studies… do not refer to attestation at
all” (Greisch 1996, 86).
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that Ricoeur, following Strawson, calls “identifying reference” (Ricoeur 1992, 27).18
Ricoeur mentions as the main tools to identify individuals, definite descriptors, proper
names and indicators (Ricoeur 1992, 28).
From the semantic approach, again following Strawson, we learn that persons are
basic particulars (Ricoeur 1992, 31). Basic particulars are primitive concepts that cannot
be defined but have to be simply presupposed (Ricoeur 1992, 31). Strawson mentions
two main basic particulars: Persons and physical bodies (Ricoeur 1992, 31). The fact that
persons are designated as basic particulars gives them the possibility of being identified
and re-identified in language (Ricoeur 1992, 32), thanks mainly to physical predicates
(Ricoeur 1992, 36). In addition to the physical predicates, persons have mental
predicates.19 Ricoeur notes that mental predicates have the quality of keeping the same
meaning, independently of the person to whom they belong (Ricoeur 1992, 38). This kind
of indeterminacy is what allows these predicates to be ascribed to “oneself” and to
“someone else” (Ricoeur 1992, 39).20

18

As Meech says, this semantics “brackets the speaker and situation. At this level the person is not
yet a self (i.e., is not self-designating) but is something referred to in sentences” (Meech 2006, 75).
19

The problem of attestation, according to Ricoeur, emerges precisely in the “discussion of the
relation of imputation of mental predicates to the entity of the person” (Ricoeur 1992, 45, note 6). Indeed,
the problem of ascribing psychic predicates to a subject seems to be about the confidence (attestation) that
the self has in the fact that those predicates belong to itself.
20

Meech offers a good summary of the semantic approach: “First, a person is at the same time a
body; second, the physical and the mental properties of a person are attributed to one and the same entity;
third, the mental predicates maintain the same meaning as they circulate among the personal pronouns (I
hurt, you hurt, she hurts, etc.). There is thus double attribution (physical and mental predicates to a person)
without double reference (as in the Cartesian body and soul)” (Meech 2006, 76).
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This semantic approach, which we can call the “path of referentiality,” gives us
only a limited idea of the person. The main problem is that the semantic approach only
refers to a person as someone whom we can identify in our discourse (with some mental
and physical predicates) but without a fundamental trait of personhood: Without the
capacity of self-designation, understood as the capacity of the person to refer to herself as
the true author of her speech. Thus, if we want to have a complete idea of person, we
have to follow a new path that we can call the “path of reflexivity,” which is developed in
pragmatics (Ricoeur 1992, 32).
The reflexivity of statements is particularly well evidenced in what, following
John Searle’s speech acts theory, is called the illocutionary act that is implied in a
statement. The illocutionary act “consists in what the speaker does in speaking” (Ricoeur
1992, 43). For Ricoeur this element of speech acts shows the reflexive aspect of a
statement. It is always someone who is doing something through speech. Thus, thanks to
pragmatics, the reflexivity of the utterance is evidenced, although it is not always
transparent in the statements. In some acts, the commitment of the self to the utterance is
clear, like when somebody says “I promise.” In those cases it is evident that it is that
person who promises. In other speech acts, the self is not as apparent. For example, in
phrases like “it is raining.” In these cases, in order to show the commitment of the utterer
we have to rephrase it in the form “I affirm that it is raining” (Ricoeur 1992, 43).
In the pragmatic level of speech, we could find attestation easily since in each
utterance the subject is present, as Ricoeur shows following the speech acts theory.
However, Ricoeur claims that in these cases we are dealing with a “reflexivity without
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selfhood: A ‘self’ without ‘oneself’” (Ricoeur 1992, 47). This reflexivity without
selfhood seems to be due to the fact that pragmatics concentrates on the “factualness of
the utterance” more than on the speaking subject.21 The “one” speaking can be
“everyone;” the commitment proper to attestation does not appear.
1.2.2. Attestation and the capacity to speak

So far, we have analyzed two approaches to the capacity to speak, the semantic
and the pragmatic. The referential approach (semantics) focuses on the person as
somebody about whom we speak. The reflexive approach emphasizes the first person as a
subject who designates himself in speech and for whom a world is opened. We could say
that in one case we have a first person perspective and in the other a third person
perspective. These two perspectives seem to collapse into each other. If we take the third
person point of view, that is, the point of view of an observer, the speaking subject is a
content of the world. If we take the perspective of the speaker, we find that the person
talks about the world but she, as speaking subject, is not part of the world. It is true that
she can speak about herself, but in that case she becomes part of the discourse in a
reflexive way, not in a direct manner. We cannot at the same time be the content and the
subject of a discourse. Ricoeur calls this problem of the world unfolding from a
perspective that never becomes directly part of the world of the speaker the “aporia of
anchoring.” He summarizes the problem in these words: “The privileged point of

21

Greisch expresses the same idea in a very succinct manner: “[Pragmatics] puts the main stress
on the factualness of the utterance, which in its turns creates new aporias that Ricoeur analyzes at
length…” (Greisch 1996, 87).

30

perspective on the world which each speaking subject is, is the limit of the world and not
one of its contents” (Ricoeur 1992, 51). We could say the ego of the speaking subject is
in some respect not in the world because it is the point of view from which a complete
world is unfolded, but at the same time it is in the world insofar as it can be identified and
addressed by others.
The solution to the seeming conflict between the two perspectives can be found in
combining these two approaches, semantic and pragmatic. Ricoeur thinks that the
convergence between the idea of a subject as the world-limit and the idea of a person as
the object of identifying reference is possible thanks to a process of the same nature as
the process of inscription of our names in public records (Ricoeur 1992, 53). When a
name was given to me at birth, this name was inscribed in records. I received a location
in a family, a place and a time. Thus, I became simultaneously a subject from whose
perspective a world is unfolded and an entity identifiable in discourse by a community, or,
as Meech states, the “social institution of naming inscribes the I within a social map of
persons in the world” (Meech 2006, 76). Greisch sees in this inscription a place where the
phenomenon of attestation can be grounded:
This inscription itself presupposes a special act of utterance, appellation… As a
hypothesis, I propose to say that this new phenomenon, appellation, also contains
the place of attestation engraved within itself. (Greisch 1996, 88)
Although Greisch does not explain in greater detail why appellation contains the place of
attestation engraved within itself, his claim makes sense. As we will see in the fifth
chapter, attestation is very much related to recognition by others. So, the appellation of
others can very well be one of the grounds of attestation at the linguistic level.
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However, Ricoeur claims that the phenomenon of inscription does not solve the
aporia between semantics and pragmatics. He goes beyond this process to refer to a more
fundamental reality that can be the ground for the conjunction of these two paths. For him,
the foundation of this conjunction can only be discovered by stepping outside the
philosophy of language and inquiring into what kind of being we are, that allows us to
identify ourselves as an objective person and as a reflective subject (Ricoeur 1992, 54).
This strange constitution of the human being is related to the fact that we possess
a lived body which “belongs” to two dimensions. Our body, as a basic particular, can be
identified and re-identified in discourse and at the same time our body refers to an “I”
that is an irreplaceable center of perspective on the world and in that sense not a content
of the world (Ricoeur 1992, 55). For Ricoeur, this problematic of one’s body is related to
the ontological status of a being (us) that comes into the world in its own incarnation
(Ricoeur 1992, 55).
Since we are incarnated beings we have a dual nature: We are one of the objects
of the world at the same time that we are a point from which a world is unfolded.
However, incarnation is not enough to explain how despite this dual nature we live with
the certainty that we are one and the same self. From a semantic point of view, we are
objects of discourse. From the pragmatic point of view we are subjects of discourse. The
fact that these two apparently opposite perspectives are united in the core of the self is
made possible by the certainty we have that the individual who appears in public and the
individual who is a pole of reference – from whom a whole world unfolds – is actually
the same. This certitude works as an act of attestation of the self. Thus, thanks to
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attestation I can believe that the one that appears in the public sphere as a speaking
subject is the same as the one from whom a world is unfolded. Thus, in attestation the
semantic and the pragmatic come together.
Along the same lines, Josué Pérez, explains that the lived body offers a way of
solving the paradox of the dual status of the person whereby it is both part of an
identifying reference and reflexive. With the phenomenon of the lived body, we are, he
writes, “at the threshold of attestation” (Pérez 2001, 96). However, Pérez does not
explain how the phenomenon of attestation arises from the phenomenon of the lived body.
1.3.

To be able to do things22

The capacity to do things summarizes all the other capacities discussed in this
chapter. In fact, the capacity to speak, to narrate and to be imputable, are expressed in
actions that can be understood as part of the general capacity to do things. Ricoeur
explicitly reminds us of the famous phrase of Austin that to speak is to do things with
words (Ricoeur 2006, 18). In addition, the analysis of the capacity to do things shows that
for Ricoeur the idea of human capacity is not restricted to the capacities he focuses on but
includes every kind of capacity.
Ricoeur devotes several articles and chapters of books to the analysis of the
capacity to do. These texts, mostly written in the 1980s and 1990s, constitute what we
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For a complete analysis of the idea of action in Ricoeur see John Van Den Hengel “Can There
be a Science of Action?” (Van Den Hengel, 2002).
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can call Ricoeur’s theory of human action.23 In the following paragraphs I will present
the main components of his view on human action. In addition, I will show how the
concept of attestation helps us to gain a more complete idea of the capacity to act.
1.3.1. Ricoeur’s concept of action

Ricoeur’s reflection on human action is consistent with his methodology of going
through the objective side of human experience in order to complement reflection with
analysis. Here we see how the resources of semantics and pragmatics are helpful in
achieving a good understanding of human action but also why they are at the same time
not enough for a complete grasping of this topic.
According to Ricoeur, the capacity to act can be defined as the ability “to make
events happen” (Ricoeur 2006, 19) or the “capacity to generate changes at the physical,
interpersonal and social level” (Ricoeur 2006, 19). We will see that despite the simplicity
of these definitions, to try to define and understand human actions is a very complex task.
From these definitions, we realize that there are two elements in human actions that need
to be articulated and understood simultaneously. On the one hand we have what we can
call the “external side” of actions, i.e., the changes in the world that are produced as a
result of an action. On the other hand, the “internal side” of action, i.e., the fact that an
action is the result of a human will that is exteriorized. Ricoeur calls the articulation of
these two aspects of action the problem of ascription, and it is one of his main concerns in

23

Let me mention, among others, Oneself as Another (Ricoeur 1992), Initiative (Ricoeur 1991c),
Explanation and Understanding (Ricoeur 1991a) and Practical Reason (1991b).
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his theory of action. He holds that the idea of ascription is contained in the very meaning
of an action:
[The] ascription of action to an agent is part of the meaning of action as a capacity.
It characterizes as “agency” this tight link between action and agent. We may then
say that the action belongs to the agent who appropriates it and calls it his own.
(Ricoeur 2006, 19)
Ascription is a problem because the two dimensions of action mentioned above
(the external and the internal) seem to belong to two different realms. Action as an event
in the world appears as part of what Kant calls the world of appearances, the realm of
causality. Action, as an initiative of the agent belongs to the realm of freedom, as a free
intervention in the world. Can these two realms be reconciled? Ricoeur offers an
interesting way of reconciling them. Before discussing his attempt at a solution, I will
present the position of Anscombe and Davidson, as discussed in Oneself as Another. I
will thus rely on Ricoeur’s exposition and focus on what Ricoeur sees relevant.
Anscombe and Davidson represent a valid and complete attempt to show the link
between the agent and the action. Nonetheless, for Ricoeur both positions fall short of
offering a solution. His criticism of these two theories will lay the ground for an
understanding of his own views.
1.3.2. Intention as the link between the agent and the action

Anscombe chooses the notion of intention as what distinguishes an action from
other events in the world. She distinguishes three possible uses of the word intention:
Having done or doing something intentionally, acting with a certain intention, intending
to (Ricoeur 1992, 68). She chooses the first use, i.e., the intention in the adverbial form
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(to do something intentionally) to explain actions. This use of the word intention allows
her to analyze the action from a descriptive point of view independently of any
consideration of the relation of possession between the action and the agent (Ricoeur
1992, 68).24 This method has the advantage of providing us an idea of action that can be
analyzed in terms of its grammatical structure.
For Anscombe an intentional action is an action about which I can answer
successfully the question “why?” In answering the question concerning the “why” of an
action we cannot distinguish clearly between causes and reasons-for. In some cases, our
justifications for actions take the form of a cause (why did you march? Military music
excites me). This is particularly the case when we refer to backward looking motives
(like in cases of vengeance) (Ricoeur 1992, 69). However in forward-looking motives
intention acts more as a “reason for.”
Another aspect of Anscombe’s theory of action that is important for Ricoeur is
her notion of knowledge without observation. For her, intentional action constitutes a
subclass of things known without observation (Ricoeur 1992, 70). How can I know that I
am doing something? I do not know it by observing it, but I know it by doing it. It is what
she calls practical knowledge.
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A common trait in the analytical approach to action is that it focuses more in the action that in
the agent, as Van den Hengel points out: “The analytic philosophers of action have trained their eyes to
look for action among the events in the world. In order to determine what counts as an action, analytic
philosophy looks for an explanation for the action taken as what happens” (Van Den Hengel 2002, 76).
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These elements could lead us to think that in Anscombe’s framework the relation
between the action and the agent could find a good articulation. However, Anscombe, in
focusing on the question “why?” and the acceptable answers to that question, privileges
the objective side of action, and this, according to Ricoeur, obliterates the agent (Ricoeur
1992, 70). Thus, the excessive concern with the truth of the description (the objective
side of action) diminishes any interest in ascribing the action to the agent (Ricoeur 1992,
72).
For Davidson, as for Anscombe, what distinguishes an action from other events in
the world is intention. He also chooses the adverbial form of intention (to do something
intentionally), because with intention taken in the adverbial form, actions can be more
easily explained (Ricoeur 1992, 75). The explanation of an action has the form of a
rationalization. Someone has a reason to do something if she has a certain “pro-attitude”
(a favorable attitude, an inclination for the specific action) and a kind of belief that the
action belongs to the category of action that the agent wants to perform (Ricoeur 1992,
76). An intentional action is an action done “for a reason.” For Davidson, to know the
reason for an action is equivalent to knowing the intention with which the action was
done. Finally, according to Davidson explanation by reasons is a subset of causal
explanation (Ricoeur 1992, 76), and this is confirmed by the fact that we usually ask
someone what led or caused him to do it.
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The main objection Ricoeur has to both Davidson’s and Anscombe’s idea of
action is that in choosing the adverbial form of “intention” they overlook three main
phenomenological characteristics of action (Ricoeur 1992, 81):25
a) The orientation to the future: The idea of “doing something intentionally” usually
accounts for a past action, but most actions, indeed, are oriented toward the future,
particularly when we plan them.
b) The delay in accomplishing: In action there is a logical sequence where the intention
precedes the action. This “delay in accomplishing” is lost in the adverbial form of
intention.
c) The implication of the agent: With the adverbial form the agent does not appear clearly,
because it leads us to focus our attention on the “what-why” of the action more than on
the “who.”
For Ricoeur in order to explain the nature of action, we have to focus on the third
sense of the concept of intention that Anscombe describes, that is, the “intention to…”
(Ricoeur 1992, 79-87). In the idea of intention as “intention to” there clearly appears the
idea of a future, for example, when we are discussing our plans (I have the “intention to”
take a vacation). In the “intention to,” the delay in accomplishing also becomes clear. I
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Ricoeur’s criticism here is specifically directed at Davidson. However, since Anscombe chooses
the same type of intention as Davidson, we can apply the criticism to her as well.
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have an intention and then I perform an action. Finally, in this use of intention the agent
is manifest, because it is always somebody who has the “intention to” do something.26
In giving preference to this use of the concept of intention the problem of action is
no longer about the truth of a description but about the veracity of an action, i.e., a
problem about the implication of the agent in the action and about the fact that the agent
is the true author of the action (see Ricoeur 1992, 72-73).27 The problem of veracity
pushes us away from analytic philosophy toward the realm of phenomenology and
particularly toward the problem of attestation. However, before entering that terrain, I
will show how Ricoeur tries to sort out an idea of action that can do justice to both the
agent and the action.28
1.3.3. Ricoeur’s theory of action

As it is the case with other topics in Ricoeur, it is hard to speak of a unified theory
of action. However, through an analysis of several texts in which he reflects on human
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For Ricoeur analytic philosophy when it deals with actions as what we “intend–to” misses its
essence by treating them as mere events, as Van den Hengel points out: “According to Ricoeur, analytic
philosophy seems constantly tempted to let these actions be dealt with in the same manner as past actions.
Actions intended to be done, however, are not events. They are not “something” that I can describe. If we
seek an explanation of such projected actions, we must look for it in the motivation, the expression of
intention, and the ability of the agent” (Van Den Hengel 2002, 77). According to Reagan, “only a
phenomenology of attestation can account for ‘intending-to’” (Reagan 2002, 11).
27

Van den Hengel points out that the priority of the agent in Ricoeur’s account of action does not
undermine the importance of taken the detour of the objective side of the experience: “The priority of the
agent is not such that it can bypass the analysis of the “what” of actions by way of their “why” (Van Den
Hengel 2002, 79).
28

In Ricoeur there is a shift to the primacy of the agent: “This shift of emphasis toward the agent
does not mean that action is some sort of internal (contemplative) event, modeled after external
observation, which can then be called volition, desire, or wanting” (Van Den Hengel 2002, 77).
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actions we can conclude that there is a unity: An attempt to reconcile what I have called
the external with the internal side of action.
An interesting exposition of his theory of action is found in an article called
Explanation and Understanding. Here Ricoeur emphasizes the need for understanding
the two aforementioned dimensions of action in a dialectical way. Motives (which can be
understood as the “inner dimension of action”) and causes (which can be interpreted
more as the “external dimension of action”) are not logically independent and do not
belong to two different language games (Ricoeur 1991a, 134). We can find actions that
can be explained from an almost purely causal model in cases where a kind of external
force makes the agent react (for example in cases of “unconscious motives”) and we can
find cases where there is a pure rational motivation, for example in cases of intellectual
games, like chess (Ricoeur 1991a, 134).29 However, for Ricoeur human actions lie mostly
“in between” these two models. Motives are also motions and justifications, especially
when we give an account of a past action. Causes, in order to be taken into consideration
as an explanation for a human action must be considered as motives. Ricoeur concludes
that “human being is as it is precisely because it belongs both to the domain of causation
and motivation” (Ricoeur 1991a, 135) or, as Reagan explains, human beings “are
susceptible of explanation in terms of both force and meaning” (Reagan 1995, 339).
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Reagan describes in this regard, the extremes across which human actions range: “…we have a
spectrum which ranges from causality without motivation – all the experiences of constrain or force – to
motivation without causality – best exemplified by intellectual games or strategies” (Reagan 1995, 339).
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A second approach to the same problem can be made through the analysis that
Ricoeur offers of Aristotle’s idea of action and of rational desire. He emphasizes the fact
that in Aristotle there is no break between desire and reason (Ricoeur 1991b, 191). Desire
can be seen as close to the language of causes, insofar as desire appears as an “irrational
force.” However, in Aristotle desire must be rational as well. The origin of the virtuous
action is a rational desire. Thus, action belongs to that intermediate level between reason
and desire.
A third way of presenting the same phenomenon is by appealing to the idea of
wanting. According to Ricoeur the category of wanting offers a “mixed category”
(Ricoeur 1992, 65). The idea of wanting to act involves a certain passivity that is well
expressed in our affects and passions. This passivity can be seen in the type of answers
that we give to some classical questions that describe prototypical situations. For example
to the question “What prompted you to do this or that?” (Ricoeur 1992, 65), we usually
answer by appealing to an incidental impulse or drive. To the question “what usually
makes you act this way?” (Ricoeur 1992, 65) we respond by referring to a disposition or
a tendency. Finally, to questions like “what made you jump?” we usually respond by
mentioning a physical element like a “dog frightened me” (Ricoeur 1992, 65). All these
examples show that, in the realm of actions, the motivations for our actions are
intertwined with causes, so that it is very hard to separate one from the other. Thus, to
want to do something cannot be reduced to a pure rational motive. That would be “an
action without any element of desire!” (Ricoeur 1992, 66). The rational motivations that
are present in the act of wanting are at the same time causes. Ricoeur synthesizes this

41

idea as follows: “[M]otives would not be motives for action if they were not also its
causes” (Ricoeur 1992, 66).
1.3.4. Attestation and to be able to do things

Despite the theoretical efforts to combine the two dimensions of human actions
(the external and internal) it is impossible to give a complete account of action without
appealing to a reality that serves as its phenomenological support.
Human actions are ultimately founded in a “primitive datum,” which is the
“assurance that the agent has the power to do things, that is to produce changes in the
world” (Ricoeur 1992, 112). This assurance that can always be challenged cannot be
demonstrated with empirical evidence.30 Only at the level of this assurance it is possible
to pass from what Ricoeur called the disjunctive to the conjunctive stage. In the
disjunctive stage we observe the “necessarily antagonistic character of the original
causality of the agent in relation to the other modes of causality” (Ricoeur 1992, 102). In
other words, here we have the Kantian antinomy between causality and freedom. The
conjunctive stage refers to the need to coordinate in “a synergistic way the original
causality of the agent with the other forms of causality” (Ricoeur 1992, 102).
The word “assurance” clearly refers to the main topic of this dissertation: The
concept of attestation. Our being able to act can be wholly understood at the level of
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Hall points out that the attestation of my own initiative implies the attestation of my power to
act: “To attest to my power of initiative is, at the same time, to testify to a power that precedes me and
makes my power possible” (Hall 2007, 63).
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attestation, as a belief in our power to do things in the world, to “make things happen.”
As we know, this belief or confidence can be challenged and this is more than clear in the
world of actions. The capacity to do things as free agents has been challenged not only at
the theoretical level, but also at the experiential level, where sometimes, following
Ricoeur’s language, we can experience that our actions are more the product of causality
and necessity that the product of “motivations” and “reasons for acting.”
For Ricoeur this “power to do” has an ontological foundation, as he explains in
this passage:
What would make this discourse based on the “I can” a different discourse is, in
the last analysis, its reference to an ontology of one’s own body, that is of a body
which is also my body and which, by its double allegiance to the order of physical
bodies and to that of persons, therefore lies at the point of articulation of the
power to act which is ours and of the course of things which belongs to the world
order. It is only in this phenomenology of the “I can” and in the related ontology
of the body as one’s own that the status of primitive datum accorded to the power
to act would be established definitively. (Ricoeur 1992, 111)31
This crucial passage shows how our own ontological constitution is the fundamental
cause of the tension that we find in the theory of action. As incarnate beings we
experience the duality of having a body that is, on the one hand, part of the world and as
such subject to the causal laws and on the other hand, we experience our body as
referring to a core, which is our self and is a center of decisions and initiatives. Thus, the
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This ontology of the “I can” is borrowed from Merleau-Ponty as Pellauer points out: “…Ricoeur
adopts the French’s philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s argument that our most basic lived experience is
that of a lived conviction that ‘I can.’ This way of speaking not only expresses this capability; it links it to
something more basic than itself. Even at this most basic level, though, Ricoeur notes that there is a
reflexive aspect to every decision: I make up my own mind to do something. This is not something I
observe, but something I do…” (Pellauer 2007, 15).
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duality of action is the expression of the dual nature of our body. How can we account for
this duality at the center of the unity of human experience? Again it seems that only
through attestation can we conceive of ourselves as beings belonging to the sphere of
causes and sphere of motives without contradiction or separation between the two.32
An alternative to this interpretation of the role of attestation in the idea of action is
given by Van Den Hengel’s article Can There Be a Science of Action? (Van Den Hengel
2002). Van Den Hengel links the problem of attestation with the epistemological status of
the action. He situates Ricoeur’s analysis of action in the context of episteme and doxa.
For Van Den Hengel, Ricoeur’s idea of action as attestation, that is, as the confidence of
being an agent, shows an intermediate path between the idea of epistemic certitude proper
to the sciences and the idea of doxa. As he explains here:
Where does this leave us with the question of a science of action? For Ricoeur,
the dialectic between epistémé and doxa will never be completed. What he seeks
therefore is a space between “mere” opinion and science. That is the space of
Aristotle’s doxazein, that is, the space of the dialectic. (Van Den Hengel 2002, 88)
Although Van Den Hengel’s interpretation is appealing, he misses one important point.
For Ricoeur attestation does not lie just between the alternatives of doxa and episteme but
rather lies beyond these alternatives, as he implies: “Whereas doxic belief is implied in
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Meech refers to the same idea by showing that through attestation Ricoeur addresses the third
Kantian antinomy: “Any attempt to give conceptual clarity to this power runs into Kant’s third antinomy:
first, that agents have to be able to initiate their own actions to be held responsible and, second, that for the
agent to remain free the search for causes has to remain open. Such a power to act is thus a primitive datum
– something attested” (Meech 2006, 77). Bourgeois offers a good account of Ricoeur’s reinterpretation of
Kant’s solution to the third antinomy: “Ricoeur’s adjustment in the Kantian doctrine means first that
sensibility must be capable of a relation to willing as a motive for decision which inclines without
compelling; and second, a rational principle must be capable of touching me in a manner analogous to that
of sensible goods” (Bourgeois 1995, 553). For more on Ricoeur’s reception of Kant see Anderson 1993 and
Piercey 2007.
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the grammar of “I believe-that,” attestation belongs to the grammar of ‘I believe-in’”
(Ricoeur 1992, 21). Here Ricoeur suggests that the kind of belief that is constitutive of
attestation belongs to a different realm than doxa. Attestation is not just a more certain
belief, but it belongs to a different epistemic realm, that is, the realm of practical certitude.
Greisch sees the role of attestation in Ricoeur’s theory of action in “[t]he
confidence which characterizes the initiatives of the agents” (Greisch 1996, 89). He
places the idea of attestation in the context of the relationship between the action and the
agent and grounds it in the power of the agent to act. Although I do not disagree with
Greisch’s interpretation, its shortcoming lies in the fact that he is not able to show how
attestation responds to the aporias of action. As I stated above, attestation is necessary
because of the dual nature of our actions: A principle and an external manifestation.
Without addressing the problem of the dual nature of our actions, an account of
attestation in the context of Ricoeur’s theory of action is incomplete.
1.4.

To be able to tell a story

The human capacity to tell a story or to narrate, which is the third capacity that
Ricoeur mentions in Oneself as Another, is related to Ricoeur’s work on narrative theory.
A complete account of this large project exceeds the purpose of this dissertation.
However some basic aspects of Ricoeur’s narrative theory must be addressed here. In this
section, I will concentrate mostly on our capacity to narrate in order to articulate and
understand the problem of human agency, especially in relation to the ascription of the
action to the agent. In the next chapter I will describe the problem of the threefold
mimesis that needs to be addressed in order to grasp the problem of narrative identity.

45

The capacity to narrate can be understood from many perspectives: We create
fictional stories (fiction), we retell actions and narrate the events of the past (history) and
we can narrate our own life. Among these three possible perspectives, I will focus on our
capacity to narrate our own life. The choice of this particular kind of narrative is based on
Ricoeur’s claim that it is through the narration of our life that we reach a very particular
and rich understanding of our actions.
1.4.1. The narrative unity of life

The link between action and narrative is well explained in Oneself as Another. In
this book Ricoeur shows this link by appealing to what he calls the narrative unity of life,
that is, the fact that we understand our own life as a narrative. The understanding of life
as a narrative unity constitutes the broadest possible understanding of action. It attempts
to see our whole life as part of a single narrative that bestows it with sense and meaning.
However, this understanding of action presupposes the understanding of lower units that
in some respect support and anticipate the narrative unity of life. What is interesting to
note here, is that for Ricoeur action is not an atom, but it is rather a kind of complex net.
This net can be seen from its basic components (single specific actions, like to sing) or
from broader units like life practices, life plans or the narrative unity of life. In what
follows I will present first the idea of practices, then the idea of life plans and finally the
idea of narrative unity of life. Practices and life plans help to understand the narrative
unity of life insofar as they show an increasingly complex and broader understanding of
actions.
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a) Practices: The notion of practice goes beyond a basic understanding of action insofar
as it encompasses several actions in a basic unity. The unity is based on a criterion that
allows us to understand a manifold of actions as being part of a single “practice.” A
practice can be a profession (the practice of medicine, the practice of law, the practice of
philosophy), an art (painting, sculpture) or even a game (soccer, football, baseball). The
notion of practice supposes a criterion that allows us to identify several actions as being
part of a single unity. The criterion is based upon a particular relation of meaning
expressed by the notion of constitutive rule (Ricoeur 1992, 154). A constitutive rule is a
precept that defines what can be “counted as” something. In the case of practices, a
constitutive rule defines what can be counted as being part of, for example, the profession
of medicine. The notion of constitutive rule helps to stress the social dimension of
practices, since a constitutive rule is not the invention of a particular performer, but is
always built in a community that recognizes the validity of a rule (Ricoeur 1992, 155).33
Can we say that with the notion of practice we are already in a narrative? According to
Ricoeur, practices are not ready-made narrative scenarios, but their organization has a
pre-narrative quality (Ricoeur 1992, 157).
b) Life Plans: The notion of “life plans” is the second unit of praxis that Ricoeur presents
as the basis for the narrative unity of life. “Life plans” are the practical units that make up
a professional life, family life, leisure time, etc. (Ricoeur 1992, 157). As we can see, it is
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As Van Den Hengel formulates it, these “practices are meaningful and comprehensible only in a
pragmatic social context, which means in interaction with others even when they are solitary practices”
(Van Den Hengel 2002, 80). For more on the notion of practice, see Paul Ricoeur and the Poetic
Imperative. The Creative Tension between Love and Justice, 58 (Hall 2007).
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a unity of action that is bigger than practices. In “life plans,” we have a kind of division
of the life of an individual in several areas, each one possessing its own unity. Even if we
can find some overlapping between practices and life plans, life plans are more oriented
toward the manner in which a person segments his life. At the base of life plans we find
basic actions and practices. Actions and practices make sense in the context of a set of
ideals and projects (Ricoeur 1992, 158) and, in turn, ideals and projects are built on
several practices and actions.34 According to Ricoeur, this notion is very close to that of
narrative. In fact this dialectical structure of life plans resembles very much the
hermeneutical comprehension of a text through the exchange between the whole and the
part (Ricoeur 1992, 158).
c) The Narrative Unity of Life: The two notions mentioned above (practices and life
plans) find their culmination in a more complex and complete concept: The narrative
unity of life. Ricoeur borrows this expression from MacIntyre (Ricoeur 1992, 158) and
endorses the same thesis that MacIntyre wants to propose through this idea: Our life is
understood and evaluated through an understanding that has the form of a narrative. We
have a narrative pre-comprehension of our life that takes the actual form of a narrative
when we tell it.
It is important to note that these three units (practices, life plans and the narrative
units of life) cannot be understood separately. Life plans are specifications of the
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Hall stresses the mediating role of life plans: “A life plan serves to mediate between a lower
limit of action considered in terms of practices and an upper limit of a projected unity of a life which serves
as both horizon of possibility and limit idea for discreet actions” (Hall 2007, 59).
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narrative unity of life and practices are specifications of the idea of life plans. Among the
three aforementioned units, the most important for the purpose of this investigation is the
idea of the “narrative unity of life.”35 Thanks to this notion, we can enrich the idea of
action as it is given in the analysis of the capacity to act, and we can have a more
complete understanding of the relationship between the agent and the action. However, in
order to apply this third unit of action to the problem of agency, we have first to present
one important criticism Ricoeur addresses to MacIntyre.
According to Ricoeur, MacIntyre overlooks the difference that exists between
narrative in fiction and in life (Ricoeur 1992, 158-159). By overlooking this difference,
MacIntyre misses some of the crucial elements of life stories, particularly, the active role
of the subject in making sense of her own story. The “author” of a life story, that is, the
one that leads a life, is not equivalent to the author of a fictional story. This point affects
the idea of authorship, the problem of the beginning and end of a story, the relationship
with other stories and the projection of the story into the future, making us, at a first
glance, to doubt whether in life stories we can properly speak of a narrative. However, we
will see that the four elements that are transformed in life stories indeed do not suppose a
departure from narrative but rather a flexible use of the categories of authorship,
beginning and end, unity of the story and temporality. This will make the problem of
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Narratives enrich actions, among others, by making more clear and explicit their goals, as Van
Den Hengel explains: “…narrative… plays the role of gathering together into a whole the real beginnings
that constitute our initiatives with an anticipation of an ending of the course of our action” (Van Den
Hengel 2002, 81).
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attestation come to the fore. According to Ricoeur, the main differences between life
stories and fictional stories are the following:
a) Authorship: In a fictional story, usually we can distinguish with some precision the
author, the narrator and the character. In life stories I can distinguish a narrator (that
usually is oneself), characters, but I cannot distinguish precisely an author. I cannot claim
that I am the author of my life story in the form that a writer can claim that he is the
author of his novel. With respect to my life I can claim at most that I am the co-author
(Ricoeur 1992, 160).
b) Beginning and End: A second difference between fictional stories and our life in a
narrative unity is the notion of beginning and end. In fiction, the beginning and the end
are those given by the narrative (for example, in the form of a present, a past or a
mythical beginning). In the narrative account of our life, we lack both a beginning and an
end (Ricoeur 1992, 160). My birth, my early childhood belongs more to the story of my
parents that to my own story and my death will be recounted through the stories of others.
c) Entangled in stories: Ricoeur uses the title of Wilhelm Schapp’s book In Geschichten
verstrickt (“caught up or entangled in stories”) to express the idea that our stories are
entangled with the stories of others. Our life story is part of the story of the life of others
and the life stories of others are part of my life story (Ricoeur 1992, 161). In fictional
narratives we can find some references between different narratives, however in most
cases each one keeps some independence and their plots are rather incommensurable with
one another.
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d) While fictional stories cover mainly past actions, life stories are always projected in
the form of an existential project (Ricoeur 1992, 161).
In spite of these important differences between life stories and fictional stories,
for Ricoeur these distinctions do not prevent us from assigning to our life a narrative
unity, particularly because each of these differences is compensated by some similitude
with a fictional narration. With respect to the problem of the authorship, although it is
true that I am not the author of my own life, Ricoeur contends that “by narrating a life of
which I am not the author as to existence, I make myself its coauthor as to its meaning”
(Ricoeur 1992, 162). In other words, the lack of control that I have over my life as the
author is compensated with the active role that I have over it in the production of its
meaning. In fact, although we do not have a complete control over many facts of our life,
finally we have to give the definite interpretations of our own life. In relation to the
problem of the lack of beginning and end of our life stories, our life story can, with the
help of fictional stories, achieve to some extent a sense of a beginning and of an end
(Ricoeur 1992, 162). Borrowing models from literature we can give to our life a
provisional beginning (for example using some important moments of my life that mark a
“new beginning”). Literature can help us represent outlines of our own end as well.
Ricoeur designates this with a beautiful word: Literature as the “apprenticeship of dying”
(Ricoeur 1992, 162). With respect to our being entangled in stories, if we look closely at
fictional narratives, we find that they provide models for making sense of our
entanglement with the stories of others (Ricoeur 1992, 162). Thus, through literature I
can understand the relationship of my own story to the story of others. Finally, against the
claim that a narrative lacks the projection into the future that a life has, Ricoeur explains
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that literary narrative is retrospective only in the eyes of the narrator (Ricoeur 1992, 163).
Indeed, among the facts recounted we find projects, expectations and anticipations by
which the characters are oriented toward the future.
What can we conclude from these parallels between fictional narratives and life
stories? First, we can conclude that at first glance life stories have specific features that
make them different from fictional stories. Life does not have an identifiable author; in
life stories there is not a definitive beginning and end; life stories are entangled with the
life stories of others and life stories have a projection to the future that fictional narrations
lack.
Secondly, we can conclude that if we look at both narratives and life stories in
more detail we find that these differences are not as deep as to prevent us from assigning
to life a narrative structure. The fact that life does not have an identifiable author is
compensated by our active role in being the true author of the meaning of our life. The
fact that our life does not have a definitive beginning and end is compensated by our
capacity – with the help of literature – to find models that give our life story a kind of
beginning and end. The fact that our life is entangled with other life stories is
compensated by the models of entanglement that fictional stories give us. Finally, the
projective nature of life stories is also found in fictional narrations in characters who
anticipate the future just as each of us does. Thus, we can say that life stories have
enough similarity with narrative stories to assign to them a narrative structure.
There is a third conclusion that we can derive from this parallel between fictional
and life stories. It is my contention that the specific features of life stories that Ricoeur

52

describes endows them with a particular quality that reveals to us the relationship
between the narrative unity of life and attestation. I will devote the following section to
explain how this is the case.
1.4.2. The narrative unity of life and attestation

The fact that we are active in the production of the meaning of our life, that the
beginning and the end of our life story are never completely given, that we are entangled
with other stories and that our life story is not only about the past but projected into the
future, gives to a life story a very important feature that we can call the indeterminacy of
life stories.
Ricoeur does not refer specifically to this feature. However, he implicitly
mentions it when he says that “learning to narrate oneself is also learning how to narrate
oneself in other ways” (Ricoeur 2005a, 101).36 In other words, there is some freedom in
our capacity to narrate ourselves. There is not just one possible story that we can tell
about ourselves. We can always give a new meaning to our life, we can find new

36

The idea that we use the possible narratives to make sense of our life is grounded in an
important philosophical point that Ricoeur makes: We do not create meaning out of nothing, but we appeal
to the meanings that are already available. We mix them, we interpret them and we appropriate them. The
different narrative possibilities are in a way the meanings available for us in order to configure our own life.
Hall expresses this idea very well: “In advancing the claim that human understanding is grounded in
receptivity, I simply claim that humans do not make up meaning ex nihilo…Humans come to understand
their existence within the realm of meaning to which they are receptive; however… human receptivity to
the realm of meaning is not absolute passivity. This receptivity is an active receptivity. In other words,
humans actively understand on the basis of the meanings they receive: they create new meaning out of
received meaning” (Hall 2007, 38).
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beginnings and possible ends to our life,37 we can find new ways of understanding our
life in relation to others and finally we can always project our life story in different ways.
The indeterminacy of our life story makes it possible for us to find several
competing narratives about ourselves. How, then, is it possible to arbitrate between them?
Which life story will we prefer? Is it possible to be completely indifferent to all possible
life stories? At a certain point I can find the need to commit to some interpretation of my
own story and to believe that a particular interpretation of my life is better than another.
This commitment, this belief in, in my opinion, corresponds to what Ricoeur calls
attestation. The self that understands itself through the stories about itself, needs to
commit to some life story.38
This attestation through narrative is important for the identity of the self (as we
will see in the next chapter), but it also helps to solve one of the problems in this chapter:
The problem of ascription, i.e., of the relation of the self to its actions. In the introduction
to the chapter, I mentioned that one of the main challenges that the phenomenology of
capable being has to face is the relationship between the agent and the action. People
speak, do things, tell stories and recognize responsibility. However, at the same time,
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Hall links the idea of the narrative unity of life with the idea of a project in life: “This narrative,
however, remains a project, a task. The narrative unity of a life is a unity to the extent that it is a unified
totality; but, the unified totality of my life remains a task so long as I am in the midst of it” (Hall 2007, 61).
A narrative acts as a kind of bridge between the past and the future, through which the self projects its
ownmost possibilities.
38

Hall makes explicit the relationship between narrative understanding and self-understanding in
this way: “Thus, narrative understanding crosses over into self-understanding: I gain perspective on myself
by gaining perspective on the narrative. In this sense, narrative understanding is practical understanding”
(Hall 2007, 55).
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people say that they do not mean what they said; people sometimes argue that they do not
recognize themselves in what they do or in the stories that they tell and finally people
deny their responsibility in some acts. In my opinion, narrative is one of the main tools
that human beings have in order to recognize or to reject their authorship and
involvement in actions. When we tell a story of ourselves, we are giving an interpretation
about our own involvement in the actions. To say, “after a while I decided to leave” is not
the same as to say, “the circumstances forced me to leave.” Through the stories we tell,
we recognize or we deny our involvement in some actions. In addition, through the
stories we tell we ascribe responsibility to others. It is analogous to the work of a judge.
In reconstructing the facts, we are implicitly or explicitly asserting who did what. If this
is true in the ascription of responsibilities to others through narrations, it is especially true
in the recognition of our own responsibility through stories.
Thus, we can say that through the narrative of our own life we attest to our own
self as being capable of several actions, those actions that are recounted in our stories. To
narrate our own life and to attest to our own self are parallel notions. The capacity to
narrate oneself is a specific way of attesting to oneself, ascribing to oneself several
actions as one’s own or, on the contrary, denying one’s involvement in some. To choose
one instead of the other is a matter of commitment, an act of our freedom, a problem of
attestation. The attestation of our own self through narrative leads us to the last capacity
that Ricoeur discusses in detail in Oneself as Another, i.e., the capacity of being
imputable. In the following paragraphs I will analyze it.
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1.5.

To be imputable

With the capacity of being imputable, we reach the last of the four capacities that
are mentioned in Oneself as Another. Ricoeur works with a specific and narrow concept
of imputability, equivalent to moral imputation. For him moral imputation consists in “a
kind of judgment saying that humans are responsible for the proximate consequences of
their deeds and for that reason may be praised or blamed” (Ricoeur 1989, 97-98).39 Then,
imputation is not just the attribution of an action to an agent, but in addition involves the
idea of praise or blame in a moral sense. In moral imputation we are not just assigning an
action to an agent, but we are judging the agent as good or bad in relation to the action.
Imputability is built into the other capacities analyzed here. In order to have an
imputable being, we need the subject to be able to designate himself in discourse
(Ricoeur 1989, 98). To recognize myself as responsible for an action I need to be able to
designate myself in language. The capacity to act and to recognize ourselves as the true
authors of our actions is also required here in order to impute an action. How could we
judge an action as good or bad if we were not able, in the first place, to ascribe an action
to an agent as the true author? For that reason, the same aporia that we found in the
capacity to act is found in imputability, that is, the problem of conceiving a free agent in
the midst of a world dominated by causalities. Imputability supposes a favorable
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In Oneself as Another Ricoeur gives the following definition: “the ascription of action to its
agent, under the condition of ethical and moral predicates which characterize the action as good, just,
conforming to duty, done out of duty, and, finally, as being the wisest in the case of conflictual situations”
(Ricoeur 1992, 292).
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resolution of this aporia, since only an agent capable of acting in the world can be held
responsible for his actions.
Finally, the capacity of being imputable is built into the capacity to narrate. Here
the link is not as evident as in the other two capacities mentioned above. However, for
Ricoeur it is clear that only through the enrichment of action articulated in narrative, can
we ascribe moral qualities to action. First of all, through the narrative unity of life I
assign to actions a goal and a purpose. This purpose gives to action a moral quality
through the idea of a good life (see Ricoeur 1989, 98). Secondly, the practices and life
plans (that are at the basis of the narrative unity of life) are ruled by precepts (technical,
aesthetic, moral and political) that allow these actions to be evaluated by a “standard of
excellence” (Ricoeur 1989, 99). These “standards of excellence,” i.e., patterns that
determine whether an action is good or bad, are the basis for the moral evaluation of an
action and, consequently, for imputation.
1.5.1. Imputability and reflexivity

In the concept of imputation, the idea of reflexivity that is present in the concept
of the self reaches its highest intensity:
Thus, with imputability the notion of a capable subject reaches its highest meaning,
and the form of self-designation it implies includes and in a way recapitulates the
preceding forms of self-reference. (Ricoeur 2005a, 106)40

40

Ricoeur, in his analysis, does not distinguish expressly between imputability and selfimputability. Although that there is a difference between the two, for Ricoeur it seems that one suppose the
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The idea of reflexivity has been present in the analysis of all capacities. We find it
already in the pragmatic approach to the capacity to speak that shows a subject able to
designate himself in discourse. Then, we find it in the idea of action, through the
ascription of an action to the agent and the capacity of the agent to recognize herself as its
true author. In the capacity to narrate our own life, we find the idea of reflexivity as well
when we are able to recognize ourselves in our own narrations. The capacity to impute an
action supposes the previous levels of reflexivity. In order to be imputable I need to be
able to apply to myself the moral predicates of my actions, which is a reflexive act. For
that reason, Ricoeur asserts that in this capacity the idea of reflexivity is present in its
highest intensity.
This reflexivity can be evidenced through an analysis of the meaning of a concept
that is closely related to imputability, i.e., the idea of being accountable. This concept
involves the idea of an account, a balance, a report, a dossier, a summary of our merits
and faults (Ricoeur 2000b, 14). In other words, our actions become so attached to us that
they are registered in our self in an almost material form. Thus, the analysis of this related
concept (to be accountable) confirms the reflexivity of the idea of imputation. In order to
be accountable I need to be able to take responsibility for my actions, what implies an act
of self-designation similar to the one presents in imputability.
The notion of self-esteem also confirms the reflexivity of the idea of imputation.
According to Ricoeur, self-esteem is the interpretation of ourselves mediated by the

other. I am imputable because I have the capacity of recognize the authorship of some actions. I can
recognize the authorship of some actions because others recognize me as the responsible of actions.
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ethical evaluation of our actions (Ricoeur 1989, 99). So, we do not only attribute to
ourselves the moral predicates of our actions, but even more we understand ourselves in
and through the ethical evaluation of our actions that we and others do. In some respect,
we could say that we are what we do. We value ourselves in relationship to the value of
our actions.
1.5.2. Imputation and attestation

After this exposition, we can ask about the relationship between imputation and
attestation. Since the idea of imputation supposes a moral judgment over a subject, we
have to find the relationship between imputation and attestation in the moral capacity of
the subject. To attest, to believe in my capacity of being imputable supposes first of all a
belief, a trust in my capacity to make moral judgment, because when we impute an action
to a subject, praising or blaming, we assume his capacity of moral judgment (indeed in
the criminal system the incapacity of a moral judgment usually makes somebody unable
of being imputed). Thus, the attestation of imputability must be found indirectly through
the attestation of our moral capacity, as Ricoeur suggests in the following paragraph:
This experiential evidence is the new figure in which attestation appears, when
the certainty of being the author of one’s own discourse and of one’s own acts
becomes the conviction of judging well and acting well in a momentary and
provisional approximation of living well (Ricoeur 1992, 180).
We can conclude that the attestation of imputability is the attestation of our moral
capacity, which includes the capacity to make a moral judgment and the capacity to have
a right idea of the good life. Indeed, is the conviction of judging and acting much
different from the idea of a good life? I think that these two elements cannot be separated.
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In my act of judging and acting, there is always explicitly or implicitly involved an idea
of the good life. Then, if these two elements are part of a unity, attestation is not only the
conviction of acting and judging well but the conviction of having the right idea of the
good life. Thus, attestation is found at the core of ethics.41
1.6.

Conclusion

After this exposition of the main capacities in relation to the problem of
attestation, we can ask about the role of attestation in the phenomenology of the capable
being. My thesis is that this role is twofold: Attestation is the link between the external
and the internal side of experience and attestation works along with the affirmation of the
self in each capacity, i.e., to attest to a capacity is to attest to my own self.
The problem of the relation between the external and the internal side of
experience is related with the dialectic between reflection and analysis that Ricoeur
develops in Oneself as Another. As I stated in the introduction, since for Ricoeur it is not
possible to have a direct access to the self, we have to follow the detour of the
manifestations of the self. This detour is made mainly by using the tools of analysis.

41

There is a strong relationship between ipseity and moral responsibility, as Hall sees it:
“Establishing the structure of agency is important for many reasons, but most especially for ethical
reflection. Ethics depends upon an account of the agent for two reasons. First, the topic of agency allows an
approach to the subject to whom one can ascribe moral predicates. There must be a subject who is an agent
in order to be able to engage in ethical reflection at all. For this reason, Ricoeur’s philosophical project was
most profoundly a philosophical anthropology. His was a project that sought to address the nature and
character of acting selves. In a second way, agency designates the subject of ethics to the extent that ethics
is a discipline concerned with the question of morally responsible agency” (Hall 2007, 21-22). Along the
same lines, Hall establishes the link between ipseity and moral responsibility: “[T]o locate an agent is to
locate one who is responsible and, therefore, subject to moral injunctions” (Hall 2007, 22).
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Analysis bears on the external side of experience, with what is observable. In the capacity
to speak, the external side of experience is mainly the capacity of being able to identify a
subject in discourse. In the capacity to act, the external side of experience is given by our
understanding of actions as a cause as well as an event in the world. In the capacity to
narrate, the external side of experience seems to be constituted by the stories we tell
about ourselves. In imputability, the external side of experience is the set of norms that
constitute the moral realm. At the same time that we discover all these external
manifestations, we realize that there is another dimension that can be called the internal
side of experience. In the case of the capacity to speak this internal side is constituted by
our capacity for self-designation; in the case of the capacity to act it is constituted by
actions understood as the reasons and the motives of the actions; in the capacity to narrate
it is constituted by the narrative unity of life, i.e., our effort to give unity to our life
through narrative; and in the capacity to be imputable, it is constituted by our capacity to
apply reflexively the moral qualifications of the action to the self.
Thus the problem is how to join the two sides of experience, the external and the
internal. My thesis is that attestation is for Ricoeur the link between these two aspects. In
the case of the capacity to speak, attestation is the conviction of being oneself the same
subject able to be identified in discourse as well as the subject with the capacity of self
designation. In the case of the capacity to act, attestation is the conviction of the power to
act, i.e., the power to intervene with my actions that are reasons and motives in the world
of causes. In the case of the capacity to narrate (ourselves), attestation is the conviction
that a given narrative expresses the meaning and the interpretation of my own life as a
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unity. Finally, in the case of imputability, attestation is the conviction of judging and
acting well by applying moral norms to my actions and to me.
In other words, attestation works as a kind of appropriation of what is “already
there” for the self. This phenomenon can be explained with the idea of inscription and
ascription. The self is “inscribed” in different expressions that in some respect precede it.
The self is inscribed in a language, in some social patterns that constitute actions, in some
narrations that possess a specific semiotics and norms. All these manifestations of the self
in which it is inscribed, corresponds to what I am calling here the external side of
experience. If we remain in that dimension, we will end up with an incomplete idea of the
self. We do not just speak, but we designate ourselves in speech; we do not just act, but
we assume some actions as ours; we do not just tell a story about ourselves, but we think
that these narratives account for who we are; we do not just follow some norms but we
think that we are good or bad insofar as we engage in good or bad actions. In other words,
there is a degree of reflexivity in our actions. So, once our actions are inscribed in a kind
of “grammar” that we have not created, how can we claim that these manifestations
belong to us? Here we find the problem of ascription that is somehow the reverse of
inscription. We have to ascribe actions to ourselves, assuming that it is I who am
speaking, acting, narrating and being imputable. How can we be sure of that? We can
never reach the certainty of a science in this respect. At most, we are confident that we
are the true author of our words, of our actions, of our narrations and morally responsible
for them. This confidence is at the core of the ascription of the words, actions, narrations
and norms to the self and it has the form of attestation, i.e., of a trust, a certainty that can
always be challenged.
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What is the object of attestation? When I trust in my capacity of being the true
author of my words, my actions, my narration and when I assume the moral responsibility
for my actions, I am attesting to my very self, I am affirming that I am a self, that
“behind” my words, my actions, my narrations it is I who am speaking, acting, giving
unity to my life and assuming the moral responsibility of my actions. This “I” is the self.
Thus, the object of attestation is mainly the self. Attestation is attestation to the self. It is
a self that exists in and through its capacities and a self that cannot be evidenced directly,
because it is a self with a radical opacity. Thus, when I act and when I recognize myself
as capable, I am affirming my own self through an act that has the form of attestation.
This idea of a self that is present in actions opens up a new range of very
important questions. What is the identity of the self? Is it the same self in each action?
What happens with the temporal element? Does time threaten the identity of the self?
What is the basis for that identity? All these important questions in relation to the
problem of attestation will be addressed in the next chapter, through the discussion of the
problem of the identity of the self.
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Chapter Two

Attestation and Personal Identity

2.1.

Introduction

In first chapter we discussed the main capacities of the self and the role of
attestation in each of these capacities. In describing the main capacities of the self, we
encountered the problem of identity several times. In the analysis of each capacity, we
can ask who speaks, who acts, who narrates and who is imputable. As we saw, these are,
for Ricoeur, the most important questions regarding the self. Now it is time to turn our
attention to the problem of identity in relation to attestation.
When referring to the self, Ricoeur distinguishes two main kinds of identity:
Identity characterized by idem and identity characterized as ipse.42 These two kinds of
identities refer to two models of permanence in time. Idem-identity, the identity proper of
things, refers to the mode of permanence in time that is based on the permanence of
certain features. Ipse-identity, the identity proper of the self, is based on self-maintenance,
that is, on the capacity of the self to stay the same despite changes. These two models of
identity of the self will be at the core of the analyses of this chapter. The analysis of
personal identity will be performed in several steps. First, I will start with the notion of

42

We refer to them as idem-identity and ipse-identity, for short. Ricoeur also refers to idemidentity as sameness and ipse-identity as ipseity and selfhood.
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identity as sameness. Next, I will analyze the notion of character. For Ricoeur, character
is the “set of lasting dispositions by which a person is recognized” (Ricoeur 1992, 121).
Character is first associated with identity as sameness, because it expresses the
permanence of certain features in a person. However, at the same time we will see that
character expresses the ipseity of a person, insofar as the permanent traits of a person
express not only the “what” of somebody but also the “who.” Thus the notion of
character will serve as a transition in order to explain in detail the idea of ipseity, which is
for Ricoeur a form of identity that goes beyond the permanence of some traits in a person.
Ipseity will be fully developed by the analysis of its privileged manifestation: Promises.43
The analysis of the idea of sameness, character and ipseity will prepare the ground
for understanding of Ricoeur’s main contributions to the problem of personal identity:
The concept of narrative identity, which, according to Ricoeur, is the kind of identity that
best defines the identity of the self. In narrative identity we find identity as sameness and
identity as ipseity in a dialectical relation. In narrative identity, there are elements of the
person that remain the same through time (sameness) and there are elements that are
changed. Despite those changes, the self keeps a unity (selfhood) thanks specifically to
the operation of narrative configuration.
The concept of narrative identity will show the role of attestation in personal
identity. Narrative identity is a fragile identity that can always be configured differently.

43

The dialectic between sameness and ipseity is a development of the two modes of being that
Heidegger distinguishes: Vorhandenheit and Dasein (Ricoeur 1992, 309). To compare the notion of the
self in Ricoeur and Heidegger would exceed the goal of this dissertation. For more on this issue, see the
brief remarks that Dauenhauer makes on this point (Dauenhauer 1997, 130).

65

Attestation, as a kind of credence and belief in the self, permits the arbitration between
different possible plots of our own life through an act of commitment to a specific selfinterpretation. Narrative identity presupposes the commitment that attestation provides.
Otherwise, the self would be fragmented by the different plots about itself, without
having any specific identity.
2.2.

Identity as sameness

The first of the two main senses of the concept of identity is “identity as
sameness” or identity in the sense of idem (Ricoeur 1991d, 73). In order to explain this
concept, Ricoeur presents four different way of understanding sameness: Numerical
identity, qualitative identity, uninterrupted continuity and permanence in time. Although
each of these ways of understanding sameness is different, they are connected and refer
to the same phenomenon: The idea of a basic feature that remains constant in a thing.
Numerical identity is the kind of identity that we have in mind when we say that
two items actually constitute “one and the same thing” (Ricoeur 1991d, 74). It is the
notion of identity that is present when we recognize a person: “I already met you, you are
Mr. Smith.” It is the same person. The idea of numerical identity encompasses the idea of
uniqueness, plurality being its contrary. To ascribe numerical identity is to affirm that
something is unique.
Qualitative identity refers to the identity that is present in two different things that
have an extreme resemblance (Ricoeur 1992, 116). For example, if we say that two ladies
are wearing “the same dress,” we are implying that the dresses are extraordinarily similar
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(Ricoeur 1991d, 74). Thus, the opposite of this idea of identity is difference. This
criterion of identity can help us sort out cases where the criterion of numerical identity is
not clear. It is possible that I am not sure that two appearances correspond to “one and the
same thing” (numerical identity). Afterwards, to be sure, I can appeal to qualitative
identity and see whether there is a resemblance between the two appearances (Ricoeur
1991d, 74).
If we compare something in a given year and the same thing ten years later, it
could very well be impossible to recognize it as the same thing. The third criterion of
identity (uninterrupted continuity), that is, identity as “the uninterrupted continuity in the
development of a being between the first and last stage of its evolution” (Ricoeur 1991d,
74), addresses this problem. In spite of the fact that some things change, we can still say
that they are the same thanks to an uninterrupted continuity that can be traced back from
the present moment to the beginning of the thing (Ricoeur 1992, 117). It is the case of an
acorn that becomes a tree. In the tree there is nothing that resembles the acorn, but we can
still say that it is the same thing because there is a temporal continuity between the acorn
and the tree. The opposite of this criterion of identity is discontinuity. This criterion of
uninterrupted continuity through time has the advantage of allowing changes through
time. However, relying only on continuity through time is usually not enough to ascribe
identity. It is hard to ascribe identity to a thing in which I do not recognize the
permanence of any characteristic.
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The fourth sense of identity as sameness, that is, identity as permanence in time is
similar to identity as uninterrupted continuity, but it adds the idea of a principle that
remains (Ricoeur 1992, 117). Ricoeur gives the following example:
This will be, for example, the invariable structure of a tool, all of whose parts will
gradually have been replaced. This is also the case, of supreme interest to us, of
the permanence of the genetic code of a biologic individual; what remains here is
the organization of a combinatory system. (Ricoeur 1992, 117)
Identity as permanence in time is the most complete idea of sameness. The first two
senses of identity (numerical identity and qualitative identity) do not take into
consideration the threat of time. The idea of uninterrupted continuity is linked to the
problem of time, but it gives a very fragile idea of identity, because it is not always easy
to follow the trajectory of a thing through time. The advantage of identity as permanence
in time is that it adds to the temporal aspect of identity, a principle that stays constant
through time, for example a structure.
According to Ricoeur, the idea of a person possessing a character expresses well
the kind of sameness that is present in personal identity. The character, as the set of
permanent dispositions, gives to personal identity the stability proper to identity as
sameness. At the same time, the idea of character will serve as a transition to the notion
of identity as ipseity, insofar as the self through the traits that are present in its character,
answers to the question “who are you?” The self, through the identification with its own
trait of character, finds its own identity, its own selfhood. For this reason, Ricoeur holds
that the idea of character exhibits an overlap between sameness and ipseity. Character is
sameness, because it contains the sedimentation of habits, traits and customs. However
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character is also ipseity because the self affirms its own selfhood through its character
insofar as the self identifies itself with those character traits.
2.3.

Character and the dialectic between sameness and ipseity

For Ricoeur, all the senses of identity as sameness are present in the notion of
character. He does not explain exactly how each of the ideas of sameness is contained in
the idea of character. Here I attempt an explanation. Numerical identity is contained in
the fact that our character can be identified and re-identified as “one and the same thing.”
This idea of numerical identity allows us to tell an acquaintance, “I think you are the
same person I saw at the convocation three years ago ” or, on the contrary, to note
changes in a person. The qualitative identity can be seen in the characteristics that make it
possible to compare one character to another and to classify them. Thus, thanks to
qualitative identity we can say to a friend from a long time ago, “After all these years you
are the same dreamy chap I once knew.” The uninterrupted continuity across time is
evidenced in the character’s history that makes it a unity that develops through time.
Without the idea of an uninterrupted continuity we could not assert that a friend is the
same person despite the many changes in his character. Finally, the idea of identity as
permanence in time is contained in the character as the “set of distinctive marks”
(Ricoeur 1992, 119) that are stable through time.
“Character” can be defined as “the set of lasting dispositions by which a person is
recognized” (Ricoeur 1992, 121). These dispositions either come from acquired habits or
identifications. Habits are the sedimentation of practices that form in the person a kind of
“second nature.” Identifications are those values, norms, ideals, models and heroes
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(Ricoeur 1992, 121) that the character assumes as proper. Through identification, what is
alien becomes part of the self. These dispositions and identifications constitute the
sameness of a character that allows us to identify and re-identify it. However, the idea of
character does not only express sameness. The habits that are part of the character are not
just a set of characteristics; they are characteristics that express the who of the self. There
is a “certain adherence of the ‘what?’ to the ‘who?’” (Ricoeur 1992, 122). Ricoeur claims
that “precisely as second nature, my character is me, myself, ipse; but this ipse announces
itself as idem” (Ricoeur 1992,121). The who of the character (ipseity) is revealed through
the what of the character (sameness) or, as Ricoeur puts it: “Character is truly the ‘what’
of the ‘who’” (Ricoeur 1993, 106). We can note here that in character we find the
overlapping of these two forms of identity: sameness and ipseity. However, some
commentators claim that character is rather the expression of sameness. For example
Dauenhauer, after enumerating the constituents of character states that “[b]y contrast with
this idem-identity, identity of self (ipse-identity) consists in the permanent capacity to
make and keep promises regardless of whether they support or undercut permanence of
character,” (Dauenhauer 1997, 130) implying by this sharp contrast between character
and promise, that character is equivalent to idem-identity. However, in my opinion,
Ricoeur is clear about the ipse-idem dialectic in character when he states that in character
“ipse announces itself as idem.” If character were just sameness, the person could not feel
that her character expresses her own self. We could not even speak of her character. The
character is the expression of ipseity, what can be noted in statements as “do not ask me
to change at this point of my life, this [this character] is the person that I am.” For that
reason, in this respect I agree with Hall who states:
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Character represents not the absence of ipse-identity, but the “over-lapping” of
idem and ipse to the point where the latter becomes indiscernible from the former.
In a metaphorical sense, selfhood remains hidden behind sameness as the
principle around which dispositions and identifications cluster. But, selfhood is
also the potential for initiative, which can spring forth from character. (Hall 2007,
27)
It is hard to give a straightforward definition of ipseity. Summarily, we can say
that ipseity is the very self that remains despite the changes in life. Thus, ipseity is a
principle of permanence in time different from sameness. While sameness is based in
features that do not change, ipseity is based in the capacity of being oneself despite the
changes. Thus, ipseity is the identity of the self that is manifested in its self-maintenance,
that is, in the act of the self to affirm its own identity thorough its life. Venema points to
Ricoeur’s insistence that “selfhood has a meaning beyond ‘its contrast with sameness’”
(Venema 2000a, 143), that is, selfhood is not just characterized negatively as a principle
that goes beyond sameness, but it has a positive definition. According to McCarthy “ipse
identity finds its fullest expression in the notion of self-constancy” (McCarthy 2007, 126).
McCarthy stresses that for Ricoeur these two senses of identity are distinguishable
“logically, epistemologically, and ontologically,” giving as evidence the following
passage from Oneself as Another:
The ontological status of selfhood is therefore solidly based upon the distinction
between two modes of being, Dasein and Vorhandenheit. In this regard, the
correlation between category of sameness in my own analyses and the notion of
Vorhandenheit in Heidegger is the same as that between selfhood and the mode of
being of Dasein. (Ricoeur 1992, 309)44

44

Cited by McCarthy 2007, 129.
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As we can observe in this passage, there is an ontological difference between sameness
and selfhood. Sameness has the mode of being of things, while selfhood points to the
mode of being of Dasein, that is, of human beings. Things and human beings have two
different modes of permanence in time. While the identity of things is based on sameness,
that is, on the permanence in time of some traits, the identity of human beings is not
based in the continuity of some traits but in an act of assurance of the self that guarantees
that it is itself the same through time despite the changes. With respect to the
epistemological differences between sameness and selfhood, McCarthy has the following
to say:
Idem-identity can be verified by Cartesian certainty or objective criteria (for
example, taking fingerprints), while ipse-identity is verified by what he calls
“attestation.” (McCarthy 2007, 130)
While idem-identity is verified through observation, measurement and empirical evidence,
ipse-identity is verified through the act of assurance that the self provides of itself,
guarantying that despite the changes, she is the same person. It is an act of self-assurance
that has the form of attestation.
McCarthy’ emphasis on the ontological and epistemological differences between
sameness and selfhood are accurate and useful. However, they can be misleading if we
simply assume that sameness is the identity proper to things and ipseity the identity
proper to human beings, because, by doing so we would be forgetting that the identity of
the self is based on the dialectic between sameness and ipseity. Thus, in order to
understand the role of sameness and ipseity in human identity, rather than simply take
sameness to be the identity of things and ipseity the identity of human beings, we should
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make it clear that both sameness and ipseity are modes of being that apply to the self. As
Hall states it:
The principal question to ask here is the manner in which the identity of the agent
perseveres in time and how agency is configured within time. Posing the identity
of the self in terms of sameness and selfhood, therefore, is Ricoeur’s attempt to
account for the permanence in time of the self both as a body and as an agent.
(Hall 2007, 26)
Hall’s approach to the dialectic between sameness and selfhood has two main advantages.
First, like McCarthy, he recognizes the ontological and the epistemological difference
between sameness and selfhood, by acknowledging that sameness accounts for the
permanence in time of the self as a body and selfhood accounts for the permanence in
time of the self as agent. However, while McCarthy emphasizes that sameness accounts
for the identity of things, Hall stresses that sameness accounts for the identity of the self
as a body. Indeed, sameness is not the identity of things in contraposition to the identity
of the self, but sameness accounts for a mode of identity that is present in the self as well.
For that reason, the identity of the self is a dialectic between identity as sameness and
identity as selfhood, insofar as the self is also a body, that is, a thing among things.
The problem of the who of the self or ipseity is also present in the identifications
that are part of its character. The different things with which a character identifies itself
form part of the sameness of that character, insofar as they are traits that can be identified
and re-identified. However, these things with which the character can identify itself need
to be accepted and integrated by the self. Through this act of acceptance, the notion of
identity as ipseity appears, as Ricoeur explains in the following passage:
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[W]e may relate to the notion of disposition the set of acquired identifications by
which the other enters into the composition of the same. To a large extent, in fact,
the identity of a person or a community is made up of these identifications with
values, norms, ideals, models, and heroes, in which the person or the community
recognizes itself. Recognizing oneself in contributes to recognizing oneself by.
(Ricoeur 1992, 121)
Thus, when we refer to persons, there is no ipseity without sameness because the
self needs to affirm its own self through the different traits of its character.45 At the same
time, there is no sameness without ipseity.46 Just to have a set of characteristics without a
self that assumes them as its own does not constitute self-identity at all. For this reason,
Ricoeur claims that the “permanence of character expresses the almost complete mutual
overlapping of the problematic of idem and of ipse” (Ricoeur 1992, 118). This dialectical
relationship between sameness and ipseity, however, is not kept with the same intensity
at all the levels of personal identity. There are situations when ipseity seems to rule over
sameness. For example, this could happen when we want to enact changes in our lives
that will affect our character and start something radically new in our life. In these
situations, for a moment, ipseity seems to become uncoupled from sameness, as it
happens in the capacity of “keeping one’s word” (Ricoeur 1992, 118). A promise can be
related to our past, but it can inaugurate something completely new in our life.

45

We will see later that there are particular cases in which there seems to appear a “naked self”
without the support of sameness. However, here I am speaking at the level of character. At this level, the
ipseity that is present needs the support of sameness.
46

Ricoeur is very explicit on this point: “This proves that one cannot think the idem of the person
through without considering the ipse, even when one entirely covers over the other” (Ricoeur 1992, 121).
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2.4.

Promises and ipseity

Usually ipseity and sameness are found together. If we are asked who we are, we
answer by telling about some features of ourselves. “I am a person who likes to…; in my
life I have taken these options, etc.” We answer the “who of ourselves” by appealing to
the “what of ourselves.” However, we are aware that the “what of ourselves” (our
characteristics, our history, our traits) does not express completely the “who of ourselves”.
We know that there is a difference between the two. One of the moments where this
difference is particularly experienced is in promises. When I promise I affirm that despite
the changes in my life (disruptions in sameness) I will stay firm. What element of me will
stay firm? My very self, my ipseity. In promises, ipseity appears very pristine and for that
reason promise is for Ricoeur the “paradigmatic example of ipseity” (Ricoeur 2005a,
127).
The capacity to make promises is built upon and presupposes all the other
capacities (Ricoeur 2005a, 128). In fact, to be able to make promises presupposes the
ability to speak; to be able to make a commitment; to be able to give a narrative unity to
one’s life through time and to be able to be responsible for one’s acts (imputation). Thus,
promises express the highest manifestation of selfhood, and this is evidenced in some
languages, like French, in which a promise can be made by saying: “Je m’engage à”
(Ricoeur 2005a, 129): “I commit myself to…”
While in character the identity of self finds its support in habits and identifications,
in promising the self is affirmed without the need for a principle of permanence based on
dispositions of character. Even more, the strength of promises is built into the capacity to
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remain firm through changes, as Ricoeur states “keeping one’s promise… does indeed
appear to stand as a challenge to time, a denial of change: Even if my desire were to
change, even if I were to change my opinion or my inclination, ‘I will hold firm’”
(Ricoeur 1992, 124). Does this mean that in promising there is no principle of
permanence in time? No, promises are founded upon a principle of permanence in time,
but a principle that is not grounded in sameness, but in ipseity. It is a principle of selfconstancy (Ricoeur 1992, 103).47
When we emphasize this principle of self-maintenance that is not grounded in
sameness, we can ask ourselves what happens to the dialectic between ipseity and
sameness, which as I have mentioned before, is crucial to Ricoeur’s philosophy of the
self. At first glance, it seems that in promises we find ipseity without sameness. The very
idea of a promise suggests a challenge to sameness. While sameness refers to the
sedimentations of the self, to habits, attitudes that are already a part of us, promises can
break with the past and affirm an identity that is grounded in what has been constructed
during a life. Many promises imply a break with the past, particularly promises that imply
a deep conversion in the person’s attitudes and habits. At the same time, promises imply
a challenge to the future. The promise maker affirms that despite the disruptions in
sameness, “I will hold my word.” Thus, we could think of promises as a paradigmatic
example of ipseity without the support of sameness (sameness being a principle of
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Ipseity is not only relevant for promises, but it is also relevant for any ethics. Without a
principle that stands despite the changes in the self, it is hard to maintain the idea of responsibility. For
more on this see Van den Beld 2002, 51.
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constancy). Indeed, Ricoeur seems to support the idea that in a promise sameness is not
relevant when he, for example, argues that promise is the “paradigmatic example of
ipseity.” However, as I will explain in what follows, Ricoeur does understand and even
emphasizes the importance of sameness in promises.
First, sameness matters at the moment of making a promise. A promise is not
made out of the blue. Generally it reflects some dispositions of character, which motivate
a person to make a commitment. Promises often express the desire of giving a
continuation to some traits of character that are already present. Thus, friends through
promises make explicit a favorable disposition to each other that is already present in
each of them. When somebody tells a friend “I promise that whatever happens I will
stand by you,” she is just making explicit a favorable disposition that is in her character.
Thus, here we find that promises are anchored in sameness in the sense that promises
give a continuation to some traits that are already present in the character of a person.
Ricoeur seems to agree with the idea that promises are a kind of projection of sameness
to the future by agreeing with Hannah Arendt’s claim that promises supplement the
weakness of human action. For Arendt, by its binding power, “the promise offers a
response to the unpredictability that threatens confidence in some expected course of
action, in grounding itself in the reliability of human actions” (Ricoeur 2005a, 132).
Using Ricoeur’s concepts, we could rephrase Arendt’s by stating that promises
supplement the weakness of the habits and dispositions, i.e., of the sameness of character.
The choice of the verb “supplements” indicates that the possibility that promises can be
built without the initial support of sameness is ruled out.
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Secondly, in my opinion, sameness seems to matter after a promise is made as
well. Once the act of promising is made, the person can make decisions that will
transform his character in such a way that he will end up breaking the promise. How is it
possible to faithfully live a promise if the character is not in a way “attuned” to what a
promise requires? A promise is not something that is made once and for ever. A promise,
in order to remain such, needs a continued renewal. That renewal is made in a dialectical
way with sameness. If I promised to serve my country, I have to try to develop a
character that helps me to serve it.48 This can be found in the remarks Ricoeur makes on
the fragility of promises.49 Promises are fragile in part because ipseity needs the support
of sameness.50 Maybe for this reason Ricoeur warns us “not to presume” too much about
the power of promises, not to “promise too much” (Ricoeur 2005a, 133). Since to
promise is a risky act where the self goes beyond the safety of mere sameness (Ricoeur
2005a, 103), we have to find ways by which the sameness could help the self to keep its
word. One of the ways in which the self can gain the support of sameness is by appealing
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Here I use the idea of character in two senses: what underlies someone’s actions and behaviors
and what actions and behaviors mold. These two complement one another. My actions are shaped by my
character and my character is shaped by my action.
49

Ricoeur refers to this fragility by stating that the “power not to keep one’s word is an integral
part of the ability to make promises” (Ricoeur 2005a, 127).
50

Hall links the idea that there is no promise without sameness with the relationship between the
voluntary and the involuntary: “Nevertheless, human freedom is not pure volition; human action is not pure
act. Human capability is embodied, incarnate, and as such one’s action is limited by the obstacles both
within and outside of the body. Actions arise within the interconnected systems of cause and effect. Thus,
initiative is not an absolute beginning, but the initiation of a series of events within a larger series. Even at
the level of keeping one’s promises, where the capability of the self announces itself at its most profound,
individual initiative is a limited one. Therefore, one cannot reasonably promise to do something that is
beyond his/her capability. Selfhood finds its structural support within sameness, even if selfhood lays claim
to itself beyond structures of sameness” (Hall 2007, 27-28).
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to memory. We find a powerful example of this in the history of the biblical Israel, where
the people need to remember the deeds of God in order for them to renew their own
commitment. When the people of Israel became unfaithful to God (when they broke their
promises), the prophets reminded them of what God had done in their favor. Those
memories produced a reactivation of the commitment of the people of Israel. Through
those memories, the prophets reminded them that their close relationship with God was
part of their own “character” (sameness).
Finally, we can find the dialectic between ipseity and promises by appealing to a
different dialectic: The dialectic between the self and the other. Even if we have a hard
time finding the support of sameness for ipseity, otherness can support the act of
promising and in so doing confers another kind of sameness, the sameness that is built
upon the recognition of the other. Indeed, for Ricoeur promises have a very important
dialogical dimension, as is seen in this sentence: “The relation to the other is so strong in
the case of promises that this feature can serve to mark the transition between the present
chapter and the one that will follow, on mutual recognition” (Ricoeur 2005a, 127-128).
According to Ricoeur, the ethical dimension of promises arises in this dialogical
dimension. Promises consist in a “commitment to ‘do’ or ‘give’ something held to be
good for him or her” (Ricoeur 2005, 129). Promises not only have a receiver but a
beneficiary as well. Here Ricoeur links the idea of promises with Gabriel Marcel’s
concept of creative fidelity (Ricoeur 2005, 133-134). Marcel emphasizes that fidelity to
someone else is not static, but supposes an openness to change in order to be faithful. The
otherness that is present in promises comes to strengthen the pole of sameness in the
dialectic between ipseity and sameness. How can this happen? As we will see in the
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fourth chapter, otherness becomes part of the self in a dialectical way. My thesis is that in
becoming part of the self, otherness comes to be part of the sameness of its character as
disposition to fulfill one’s word, to honor a promise. When I promise something I
develop a favorable disposition to fulfill that promise. Otherwise the promise is not
sincere. That disposition is a disposition towards the other. Through the disposition
towards the other, the other becomes part of the self as a beneficiary even with the right
to complain if I do not fulfill my word. In the fourth chapter this idea will be expanded in
the thesis that for Ricoeur the self can be sustained as a meaningful entity only in a
dialectical relationship with otherness. As we will see, there is no self without the other.
We can apply the same formula to promise: There is no promise without the recognition
of the other who becomes part of the self’s commitment. Thus, in a promise the other
becomes part of the self in the sense that to promise is a particular way of being affected
by otherness.
To conclude this section, we can say that even if it is true that in promises there is
an undeniable gap between ipseity and sameness, this gap is not equivalent to an abyss.
The dialectic between ipseity and sameness is also maintained in promises, as we can see
in the role of sameness in the making of a promise, in the keeping of one’s word and in
recognizing the other as the beneficiary of a promise. However, promises still manifest
the crucial distance between sameness and ipseity, while character manifests the overlap
of sameness and ipseity. An adequate understanding of personal identity must be built
upon a more fruitful and balanced articulation of sameness and ipseity. This is what
narrative identity provides.
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2.5.

Identity and narrative

Idem and ipse are two ways of responding to the challenges that time presents to
human identity. They are two models of permanence in time that belong to the self,
sameness being an identity built on the idea of stability and ipseity being a dynamic
identity. According to Ricoeur, the challenges that the articulation of change and
permanence in time introduces can only be successfully approached with the idea of
narrative identity:
My thesis from this point on is a double one: the first is that most of the
difficulties which afflict the contemporary discussion of personal identity result
from the confusion between two interpretations of permanence over time; the
second is that the notion of narrative identity offers a solution to the aporias
concerning personal identity. (Ricoeur 1991d, 76)
It is not a coincidence that it is precisely in narrative that we can find an adequate
articulation of the problem of identity. Our existence is temporal and therefore only a
concept of identity essentially temporal, as narrative identity is, can give a good account
of the problem of identity.51
Let us therefore introduce this idea of narrative identity laying out the main
assumptions it involves. To speak with Ricoeur:
It is therefore plausible to affirm the following assertions: a) knowledge of the
self is an interpretation; b) the interpretation of the self, in turn, finds narrative,
among other signs and symbols, to be a privileged mediation; c) this mediation
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Meech expresses the same idea: “Narrative identity articulates what cannot be said in a purely
descriptive discourse, namely, the dialectical relationship between ipse and idem, selfhood and sameness”
(Meech 2006, 89). See also McCarthy 2007, 168.
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borrows from history as much as fiction making the life story a fictive history or,
if you prefer, an historical fiction, comparable to those biographies of great men
where both history and fiction are found blended together. (Ricoeur 1991d, 73)
The most important of these assumptions is that life is a self-interpretation mediated by
narrative.52 Ricoeur goes even further when he claims that his notion of narrative can
result in a significant reformulation of Socrates’s well known dictum, the “unexamined
life is not worth living" (Apology 38a), as “a life examined… is a life narrated” (Ricoeur
1986, 130). Although Ricoeur recognizes that narrative is not the only mediation for selfunderstanding, he holds that narrative is an essential mediation without which we could
not make sense of our life: “[D]o not human lives become more readable [lisibles] when
they are interpreted in function of the stories people tell about themselves?” (Ricoeur
1991d, 73).53
This thesis supposes that between narrative and life there is an essential
relationship. Narratives are fulfilled through their reception by the reader and life is
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Hall explains this rather well: “Narrative, Ricoeur argued, is a fundamental structure of selfunderstanding. It casts both a retrospective glance and a prospective glance over one’s existence, and in so
doing, erects a configuration around what are otherwise random events” (Hall 2007, 52). In another text,
Ricoeur amplifies the mediating role of narrative in three fundamental senses: “From an hermeneutic point
of view, that is, from the point of view of the interpretation of a literary experience, a text has an entirely
different significance from that which a structural analysis, deriving from linguistics, accords to it; it is a
mediation between man and the world, between man and man, between man and himself. Mediation
between man and the world is called reference; mediation between man and man is communication;
mediation between man and himself is self-understanding. A literary works brings together these three
dimensions of reference, communication, and self-understanding” (Ricoeur 1986, 126-127).
53

We have stated in the introduction of this dissertation that Ricoeur’s idea of the self is not a self
that occupies the foundational places as in the philosophies of the cogito. The importance of narrative in
Ricoeur’s work is a direct consequence of his idea of a mediated self: “Allow me to conclude by saying that
the subject is never given at the beginning. Or, if it were so given it would run the risk of reducing itself to
a narcissistic ego, self-centered and avaricious – and it is just this from which literature can liberate us. Our
loss on the side of narcissism is our gain on the side of narrative identity. In the place of an ego enchanted
by itself a self is born, taught by cultural symbols, first among which are the stories received in the literary
tradition. These stories give unity – not unity of substance but narrative wholeness” (Ricoeur 1986, 132).
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understood narratively. Ricoeur recognizes the objections that such thesis can invite,
since it seems to go against the intuitive idea that “stories are told, life is lived” (Ricoeur
1986, 126).54 In order to analyze the possibility and lay down the foundation of this thesis
that supports narrative identity, I will start with Ricoeur’s theory of the threefold mimesis.
The choice of this theory is governed by its central position in Ricoeur narrative theory.
Indeed, this theory is formulated in Time and Narrative, a three volume work. The
threefold mimesis, in its turn, is the core of this monumental work.
2.5.1. The threefold mimesis

The main goal of the theory of threefold mimesis is to demonstrate the essential
relationship between time and narrative in the sense that time becomes human through
the narrative function and the narrative function is structured and articulated through
time:
[T]ime becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative
mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of
temporal existence. (Ricoeur 1984, 52, Ricoeur’s emphasis)
Lived time can only be understood through narration. Narratives, in other words, are an
essential mediation of temporal experience. At the same time, narratives are essentially
temporal. Thus, there is no experience of time that is not mediated in narratives and there
is no narrative that is not temporal. By demonstrating this thesis Ricoeur wants to face

54

As expected, the issue of the relationship between life and narrative is controversial in the
secondary literature. Some scholars go further than Ricoeur claiming that life more than having just a prenarrative quality is narrative itself. Others, on the contrary, deny that life has a narrative or pre-narrative
quality at all. For more on this discussion see Carr et al. 1991, Kemp 1989, 73–77 and Pellauer 1991.
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down the inscrutable aporias of time that so bothered Augustine and other philosophers
after him. Ricoeur is not looking for a theoretical solution to the aporias but for a “poetic
solution,” by showing how this aporia can be reconciled through narrative. Although the
main aim of Ricoeur with the threefold mimesis is to show the relationship between time
and narrative, he does that by showing how human actions are prefigured, configured and
refigured through narrative. Thus, the broad thesis of the articulation of time through
narrative is demonstrated by a more specific topic: The articulation of action through
narrative. However, through the demonstration of this specific issue, a larger issue is at
stake: The relationship between life and narrative, where Ricoeur holds that life is
understood through narrative55 and narrative reaches its fulfillment in life. Thus, from the
outset, we can realize that this theory is crucial for a good understanding of Ricoeur’s
idea of narrative identity.
Ricoeur borrows the idea of mimesis from Aristotle. In Aristotle, story
(“mythos”) is defined as an “imitation of action, mimesis praxeos” (Ricoeur 1986, 127).
Analogously, Ricoeur focuses on the process of imitation of action through the narrative
configuration. Thus, the threefold mimesis shows the activity of narrative composition in
three stages. Mimesis2 is the central stage where we find the core of narrative
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As Vandevelde rightly points out “Ricoeur’s challenge is thus to show, among other things, that
the level of life and experience, of action and suffering, is already in some sense a narrative order”
(Vandevelde 2008, 147).
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composition. Mimesis1 is what narrative composition supposes (the world of action) and
mimesis3 is the reception by the reader of the narrative composition.56
Mimesis1

Mimesis1 is the world of actions that is presupposed in every narrative
composition. We can compose, understand and follow a narrative because we have a preunderstanding of the practical field that narration makes explicit. Without such
understanding, it would be impossible to understand a narrative.57 Here we find two main
claims: Narrations are built on a preunderstanding of the world of actions
(epistemological claim) and the world of action has a narrative quality (ontological claim),
as Vandevelde explains:
Narratives are thus not mere descriptions of something that would be otherwise
available independently of description, but are ontological layers, part and parcel
of the paste of actions and experiences. (Vandevelde 2008, 141)
Thus, it is not only that narrations are built on a preunderstanding of action (which would
be quite obvious) but that the world of actions is essentially narrative. This last thesis is
more controversial. We will return to this point later by analyzing some of the critical
remarks that commentators have made on this theory.

56

Hattingh and Van Veuren summarize the model of mimesis stating that it “gives rise to three
corresponding moments of understanding, namely prefiguration (world of action), configuration
(emplotment), and refiguration (appropriation)” (Hattingh and Van Veuren 1995, 63).
57

See Venema 2000a, 98. Jervolino offers us a good summary of this idea: “Hence, the ultimate
meaning of Mimesis1 is that in order to imitate or represent action, it is necessary to pre-understand human
acting in its semantic, symbolic and temporality. Literature would be incomprehensible if its role were not
that of configuring that which already has its figure in human action” (Jervolino 1990, 129).

85

For Ricoeur our understanding of narratives presupposes the mastering of the
basic structure of actions in its semantic, symbolic and temporal structures. Without that
understanding, it would not be possible to narrate actions and to understand those
narratives. The semantic structure of action refers to the basic components that constitute
an action and allows us to distinguish it from physical motion (Ricoeur 1984, 54-55).58
Thus, in every action we find some basic elements such as “project, goal, means,
circumstances, and so on” (Ricoeur 1986, 128). Thanks to the understanding of the
semantic structure of action we can act meaningfully. Every action follows this kind of
grammar. Otherwise, it could not be considered an action. In every action the agent is
inspired by a project (the agent wants to achieve something), has a goal (there is a direct
purpose in what is done), some means are chosen, and there are some circumstances that
surround the action (other agents, a time, a place). As we cannot meaningfully speak a
language without knowing its grammar, we cannot act if we do not follow this basic
structure. Ricoeur summarizes these ideas in this way:
Actions imply goals, the anticipation of which is not confused with some foreseen
or predicted result, but which commit the one on whom the action depends.
Actions, moreover, refer to motives, which explain why someone does or did
something, in a way that we clearly distinguish from the way one physical event
leads to another. Actions also have agents, who do and can do things which are
taken as their word, or their deed. (Ricoeur 1984, 55)
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Ricoeur stresses the idea that actions and passions are meaningful because they belong to a net
of meaning that we master: “We understand what action and passion are in virtue of our ability to utilize in
a meaningful way the entire network of expressions and concepts which the natural languages supply us
with in order to distinguish “action” from simple physical “movement” and from psycho-physiological
‘behavior’” (Ricoeur 1986, 128).
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It must be noted that the knowledge of the semantics of action that we need to have in
order to act meaningfully is not a theoretical knowledge, but a practical one. We do not
need an awareness of a theory of action in order to act. Secondly, it is important to note
that these components of action constitute a network in the sense that the mastering of
one of these concepts supposes and requires the mastering of the others (Ricoeur 1984,
55).
The second anchorage that the narrative composition finds in the world of actions
is the “symbolic mediation of action” (Ricoeur 1984, 54). Human actions are articulated
by signs, rules, and norms (Ricoeur 1984, 57). While the semantics of action allows us to
understand the basic components of human actions (goals, motives, agents), the
symbolics of action confer an initial “readability on action” (Ricoeur 1984, 58), that is, it
provides the rules that permit us to interpret the meaning of an action or behavior. Thus,
when an agent does something, what he is doing must be interpreted in the context of the
meaning of the symbols that are present in his action. Thus, for example, certain gestures
are interpreted differently in different cultures depending upon the symbolic net available
in that culture. Ricoeur gives the example of the gesture of raising a hand which can be
interpreted as greeting, voting or hailing a taxi depending on the symbolic rules and
norms of a culture and the context (Ricoeur 1984, 58).59 While the semantic structure of
an action allows us to distinguish what is and what is not an action, the symbolic
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As Ricoeur states, the meaning cannot be dissociated from the context: “In other words, it is ‘as
a function of’ such a symbolic convention that we can interpret this gesture as meaning this or that. The
same gesture of raising one’s arm, depending on the context, may be understood as a way of greeting
someone, of hailing a taxi, or of voting” (Ricoeur 1984, 58).
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structure of an action is related to the meaning of an action.60 For example, if somebody
draws a swastika on a wall in a Jewish community, the meaning of his action cannot be
dissociated from the strong symbolism that is present in that sign. Thus, the symbolism of
an action is related to the complete set of symbols available in a culture, as Ricoeur
explains:
To understand a ritual act is to situate it within a ritual, set within a cultic system,
and by degrees within the whole set of conventions, beliefs, and institutions that
make up the symbolic framework of a culture. (Ricoeur 1985, 58)
Ricoeur here holds that the symbols that are present in a specific kind of act must be
understood in the context of the whole set of symbols available in a society. While the
semantics of an action refers to the minimum elements that constitute an action, the
symbolics of an action refers to the meaning of the symbols that are present in it. Those
symbols, as Ricoeur explains, are given in the context of the symbolic net of a culture. In
the symbolic structure of actions we find ethical evaluation of actions as well. Actions are
already evaluated within a symbolic net of values. Since a narrative is grafted onto this
symbolic structure, there are no ethically neutral narratives.61
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This aspect of action is related to the public dimension of an action, to a meaning that is
publically available, as Jervolino points out: “It is a structured symbolic system, a public one, which
furnishes single actions with a context and makes them, in a certain sense, readable” (Jervolino 1990, 128).
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Ricoeur emphasizes here that the moral evaluation of the action can be transferred to the agent:
“As a function of the norms immanent in a culture, actions can be estimated or evaluated, that is, judged
according to a scale of moral preferences. They thereby receive a relative value, which says that this action
is more valuable than that one. These degrees of value, first attributed to actions, can be extended to the
agents themselves, who are held to be good or bad, better or worse” (Ricoeur 1984, 58). See also Ricoeur
1992, 115.
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Finally, we have the third element by which narrative is anchored in life. Ricoeur
calls it the “pre-narrative quality of human experience” (Ricoeur 1986, 129, Ricoeur's
emphasis). In our understanding of actions, there is a comprehension of their temporal
structures in a way that we can speak of “life as an incipient story” (Ricoeur 1986, 129).
This “pre-narrative quality of human experience” is evidenced in the need that we have to
narrate our stories. Action possesses “temporal structures that call for narration” (Ricoeur
1984, 59). Ricoeur provides two examples to show that our actions need to be narrated
and, therefore, posses a “narrative pre-quality.” The first one is the patient who turns to a
psychoanalyst in order to make his story “more intelligible and more bearable” (Ricoeur
1986, 129). The patient makes sense of her own story by telling it to the analyst. This fact
would demonstrate that our experience has a narrative component that is made explicit
when we narrate it. The second case that would demonstrate the “narrative pre-quality” of
life is the case of a trial where “a judge tries to understand a suspect by unraveling the
knot of complications in which the suspect is caught” (Ricoeur 1986, 129). The fact that
we need different narratives about an incident in which the suspect was involved in order
to make sense of it demonstrates that our actions have a narrative quality before they are
told. Ricoeur here is claiming that some events in our life can only make sense when we
narrate them. Thus, a demand for meaning makes our life worthy of being narrated. We
could say that our life possesses an inchoate meaning that can only be made explicit
through narration. Finally, Ricoeur offers an additional reason why our life should be
narrated:
We tell stories because in the last analysis human lives need and merit being
narrated. This remark takes on its full force when we refer to the necessity to save
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the history of the defeated and the lost. The whole history of suffering cries out
for vengeance and calls for narrative. (Ricoeur 1984, 75)
By narrating the story of the vanquished we do justice to those whose history has not
been narrated or whose point of view has not been taken into consideration. However, in
addition, by narrating the history of the losers, we do justice to history itself, recounting
the past “such as it was.”62 Thus, through narrative we do fulfill a moral duty to the truth
and to others. Not any narrative satisfies this demand. Usually history is made by the
victors and does not take into consideration the point of view of the lost.
Mimesis2

Mimesis2 is found between mimesis1 and mimesis3 and it possesses a mediating
function. It mediates between the world of action (which precedes the narrative
configuration or mimesis1) and the reception of the narration by the reader (what follows
the narrative configuration, mimesis3) (Ricoeur 1984, 65). Mimesis2 corresponds to the
configuration of action accomplished by narratives. The configuration of an action is
what Ricoeur calls “emplotment.”63 The notion of emplotment is borrowed by Ricoeur
from Aristotle’s concept of “composition,” mythos in Greek, “which means both ‘fable’
(in the sense of imaginary story) and ‘plot’ (in the sense of ‘well-constructed history’)”
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See Vandevelde 2008.

The word “emplotment” is given by Ricoeur as the translation of the concept “mise en
intrigue.” This concept is also found in Hayden White: “…by emplotment I mean simply the encodation of
the facts contained in the chronicle as components of specific kinds of plot structures…” (White, 2001).
Ricoeur was well aware of White’s works and he relates the notion of mise en intrigue with emplotment
precisely while he engages in a discussion with White (see Ricoeur 1983, 231).
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(Ricoeur 1986, 122). Ricoeur’s notion of emplotment follows the second idea of mythos
(a “well constructed history”). Emplotment is mainly an operation that consists in the
synthesis of the heterogeneous elements that are found in a story, such as agents, actions,
accidental confrontations or expected ones, interactions, means, results and so on
(Ricoeur 1986, 122). This synthesis of the heterogeneous happens mainly through three
functions of the narrative. First, the narrative produces a synthesis of heterogeneous
elements in giving the story a unity. It is this synthesis that gives the story the quality of
being a singular, complete and intelligible whole (Ricoeur 1986, 122).64 As a
consequence, a story has a theme. Secondly, through narratives the story gains a greater
coherence (Ricoeur 1986, 123). In most narratives the different characters, actions, times
can give the idea that there is no coherence in a narration. The events appear
disconnected and contradictory to one another. The reader could ask “what is the
connection between these events?” However, even in those cases, there is a primacy of
concord over discord. Otherwise, we could not call it “a story” but just a series of
disconnected facts. Thus, narrative configuration confers a coherence to facts. Finally,
emplotment is a synthesis of the heterogeneous by deriving configuration from a
succession. In a story we always find an undefined succession of incidents. This
succession of incidents that are present in a story reaches a unity once the story is
completed and acquires a kind of necessity. What was just a mere succession of events
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Or, in more simple words, borrowed from Kearney: “By narrative configuration he [Ricoeur]
means the temporal synthesis of heterogeneous elements – or to put it more simply, the ability to create a
plot which transforms a sequence of events into a story” (Kearney 1989, 18).
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becomes a necessary configuration. Thus, emplotment configures succession by
providing integration, culmination and an ending (Ricoeur 1986, 123).65
What is the relationship of mimesis2 (emplotment) to mimesis1? According to
Ricoeur it is a relationship of presupposition and transformation (Ricoeur 1984, 55). As I
stated above, mimesis2 presupposes mimesis1 in the sense that it works on the same
practical understanding of action that is described in mimesis1. In other words, mimesis2
is built on the semantic, the symbolic and the temporal elements of action described in
mimesis1. However, mimesis2 at the same time transforms these elements: Mimesis2 is
not a mere repetition of the world of action or a redundancy of mimesis1 (Ricoeur 1984,
73). But, how is mimesis1 transformed in mimesis2?
In relation to the semantics of action proper to mimesis1, Ricoeur asserts that
while mimesis1 offers the paradigmatic level of action, mimesis2 offers the syntagmatic
level. The paradigmatic level of action refers to the basic semantic structure of action that,
we find the in mimesis1 such as an agent, a goal, other agents or patients, and
circumstances. However, at the level of mimesis1, those elements do not have a specific
order. These elements reach a specific order only in mimesis2, which, according to
Ricoeur, is the syntagmatic level. Thus, the organization of those elements in the process
of emplotment is the “passage from the paradigmatic to the syntagmatic” and “constitutes
the transition from mimesis1 to mimesis2” (Ricoeur 1984, 66).
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Ricoeur summarizes these three elements: “…we may retain three traits: the mediation between
multiple incidents and the singular story accomplished in the plot; the primacy of concord over discord;
finally, the struggle between succession and configuration” (Ricoeur 1986, 123).
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This transformation has very important ontological consequences. The world of
actions configured by the emplotment possesses the ontological status of “being-as”
(Ricoeur 1984, 80) in the sense that the understanding of the world through narrative is
more that an exact copy of the world of actions, but a world that is understood narratively
with its own ontological status. The idea of “being-as” could make us think that the world
narrated is not the “real” world but a world that is “as it were real,” a representation of
the world. However, this is not what Ricoeur has in mind. The world narrated is how the
world is given to us or in Husserl’s terms, it is the “noema” of what is the case.66 For that
reason, Ricoeur says with confidence that literature shapes our understanding of the
world. However, this ontological status of a “being as” is only fully reached when the
texts are “received” by the reader, and this only happens in mimesis3.
Mimesis3

Ricoeur describes the transition from mimesis2 to mimesis3 with the analogy of
sensation:
And if emplotment can be described as an act of judgment and of the productive
imagination, it is so insofar as this act is the joint work of the text and the reader,
just as Aristotle said that sensation is the common work of sensing and what is
sensed. (Ricoeur 1984, 76)
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Hohler expresses the same idea: “[A]s the time of the plot holds together the dialectic of the
chronological and the achronological, the configurational act produces a figure; it is mimetic. The narration
is a “telling as”; for it is not an experienced immediacy nor a Xerox-like reproduction. The plot, whether
applied to literature or history, breaks from a living experience and produces a ‘telling as’” (Hohler 1987,
295).
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The analogy of sensation is very illustrative. Sensation supposes what is sensed (a color,
smell, etc.) but only happens when the color or smell is perceived. Likewise, the narrative
intelligibility that is produced as the result of the configuration only happens through the
act of reading, through the reception of the work.67 Thus, mimesis3 refers to the moment
when the narrative is heard or read. In other words, it refers to the reception of the work.
According to Ricoeur, this level is equivalent to what Gadamer calls the “application” of
the narrative. Narratives achieve their full development only in the intersection of the
world of the text and the world of the reader (Ricoeur 1986, 126). This can be seen from
the perspective of the text and from the perspective of the reader. From the perspective of
the text, it means that the text can only unfold its world through the mediation of the
world of the reader. The reader “fulfills” the meaning of the text by “dwelling” in the
world of the text (Ricoeur 1986, 126).68 At the same time the reader is enriched by the
text by finding in it a world of possibilities: “[W]hat is interpreted in a text is the
proposing of a world that I might inhabit and into which I might project my ownmost
powers” (Ricoeur 1984, 81). As Venema mentions, reading “transforms our imagination,
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Venema explains how narrative configuration transforms experience and personal identity:
“Narrative configuration is completed through an act of reading that produces a possibility for experience
which, when taken up through decision and action, refigures experience and therein personal identity”
(Venema 2000a, 103). Muldoon stresses how the operation of emplotment is completed in the reader:
“…the effect of emplotment does not end with the text but with the reader. The significance of a story finds
its springboard of change in what the reader brings to it” (Muldoon 1997, 41).
68

The full meaning of a narrative can only be reached in the reader, as Fodor explains: “the
reception of a work is an integral part of the constitution of its meaning. Meaning is always the joint
product of the text and its reader or recipient; the two emerge together synergetically” (Fodor 1997, 156).
Fodor stresses the idea that narrative disrupt our world-view and by doing that open up new possibilities for
us: “Indeed, any encounter with the text’s imaginary world disrupts in some sense the reader’s everyday
moral actions; but in so doing it challenges the reader to find ever new and interesting ways of ordering the
actual world, thereby enhancing her powers of moral discernment and extending her ethical vision over a
greater portion of the practical domain” (Fodor 1997, 157).
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refigures our world of experience, and contributes to the narrative texture of our identity,
our sense of self” (Venema 2000b, 238).Thus, for Ricoeur, narrative is the “privileged
means by which we re-configure our confused, unformed, and at the limit mute temporal
experience” (Ricoeur 1984, xi).69 In this mutual exchange between the reader and the text
a “fusion of horizons” is produced between the world of the reader and the world of the
text. The reception of a work is not just the passive reading of it, but it is an essential
moment of its meaning. For this reason, it is called a mimetic moment, that is, a essential
moment in the production of the work.
To summarize, in mimesis1 we find the world of actions that is structured in a
semantic, symbolic and temporal dimension. In mimesis2, we find that the narrative
configuration is grafted onto the practical knowledge of mimesis1 at the same time that
the world of actions is transformed. Finally, in mimesis3 our experience is transformed
through the encounter with the world of the text. Thus, a prefigured experience
(mimesis1) is configured in mimesis2 and refigured in mimesis3 in a circular manner. The
world that is configured in the reception of the work (mimesis3) transforms our practical
world (mimesis1) in which the narrative configuration (mimesis2) is anchored. Ricoeur is
insistent that what we have here is not a vicious circle but a spiral. The experience that
comes from action that is already mediated by narrative is configured in narration, which
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Venema stresses the idea that through narrative we bridge the gap between language and life:
“Narrative identity tries to bridge the gap between language and life by completing the world of the text in
and through the world of the reader. Understanding is incomplete, wooden, bereft of life, without the
transfiguration of the world of the one who tries to understand” (Venema 2000b, 242).
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in turn refigures the world of experience. In this process there is a continuous enrichment
of the world of action.
After this presentation of the threefold mimesis we are ready to discuss the idea of
narrative identity. As we will see narrative identity presupposes and needs the theoretical
assumptions that are provided by the theory of the threefold mimesis: Our experience is
narrated, mediated, and configured through the notion of emplotment and refigured
through the reception of narratives.
2.5.2. Narrative identity

Narrative identity successfully articulates permanence and change thanks to the
notion of emplotment (composition), already explained in mimesis2. What must be added
here is that for Ricoeur emplotment is not only applied to the actions of a narration, but
the character (the person) “is him- or herself emplotted” (Ricoeur 2005a, 100). Thanks to
the emplotment of the characters, the diverse elements that are commonly present in a
story of a life, such as the interactions with other characters, the actions in which one is
involved, the physical and psychological characteristics, find a unity as belonging to one
single character. Without that unity, it would be impossible to identify the character as
such. We can speak of a character, because all the different moments in which someone
appears in a narrative are united by the configuring operation of emplotment. The notion
of emplotment, in combining elements as diverse as actions, circumstances, and traits of
personality, helps us articulate the dialectic between sameness and ipseity. Thus, thanks
to narrative identity we can give a unity to the different experiences we have in our life.
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Narrative identity helps us to articulate sameness and ipseity by presenting us with
different models for combining these two concepts, as Ricoeur explains:
[T]he imaginative variations generated by the topos “narrative identity” and
supported by the thought-experiments enhanced by literature makes it possible to
display a whole range of combinations between sameness and selfhood: at one
end of the spectrum, we find the characters of fairy tales and of folklore with their
stiffness and stability through time; in between, we have the complex balance of
stability and change of characters in the nineteenth-century novel; at the other
extremity, we encounter the character of some contemporary novels, influenced
by Kafka, Joyce, and Proust, whose identity seems threatened to such an extent
that we are inclined to say that it has been lost. (Ricoeur 1993, 115-116)
Narratives offer us models for articulating our identity. These models offer us different
alternatives for articulating sameness and ipseity. Formed by narratives we can find
better possible articulations of our own identity. It is important to note that even in the
most extreme cases of authors like Kafka, Joyce, and Proust whose writing seem to
render sameness extinct, we can still find a dialectic between ipseity and sameness;
otherwise there would be no narrative identity. Indeed, where ipseity does not find the
support of sameness, usually we do not have a narrative anymore, because to the loss of
the identity of the character corresponds the loss of the narrative configuration (Ricoeur
1992, 149).70 This happens, according to Ricoeur, in some novels such as Robert Musil’s
The Man without Qualities:
Thus, in the case of Robert Musil, the decomposition of the narrative form
paralleling the loss of identity of the character breaks out of the confines of the
narrative and draws the literary work into the sphere of the essay (Ricoeur 1992,
149).
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See Hattingh and Van Veuren 1995, 67.
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Thus, narrative provides models that help us to configure and understand better our own
identity. Ricoeur writes:
[We have a] capacity to appropriate in the application to ourselves the intrigues
we received from our culture, and our capacity of thus experimenting with the
various roles that the favorite personae assume in the stories we love best. And so
we try to gain by means of imaginative variation of our ego a narrative
understanding of ourselves, the only kind of understanding that escapes the
pseudo-alternative of pure change and absolute identity. (Ricoeur 1986, 131-132)
As stated above, in narrative identity the dialectic between sameness and ipseity
achieves its fullest development. This is possible due to the notion of emplotment and to
the different models of articulation that different narrations offer us. Now, we have to go
one step further and ask ourselves how the notion of ipseity and sameness is present in
the articulation that narratives make possible.
2.5.3. The articulation of sameness and ipseity in narrative

The operation of emplotment puts together elements as different as actions,
circumstances, traits of personality, agents, interactions, and influences into a single unity.
In my opinion, the pole of sameness is made up of all these elements that must be put
together in emplotment. We could say that sameness corresponds to the objective side of
the story of the self, to what is given to the self. Once something is given, it becomes an
element that we have to integrate into our personal identity. We could use the image of a
mosaic. What are given are the pieces of the mosaic and what must be done is to put
together those pieces in an act equivalent to the operation of emplotment. As in a mosaic,
the self has to work with the “pieces” that are already there, available. These “pieces”
correspond in our discussion to the pole of sameness, to what is given to the self (a story,
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temporal and spatial coordinates, a culture). Then, the self must make sense of all these
elements that are given, as one has to make sense of the pieces of a mosaic. With what is
given to the self, the self can construct many different possible identities. Thus, sameness
is the source of different possible identities. However, sameness at the same time places
restrictions on the possible identities that can be generated. I cannot construct any kind of
personal identity. The elements that are given to the self (sameness) act as constraint in
the sense that I cannot come up with just any kind of identity. The pole of sameness of
personal identity places some limits on the possibilities of identity. I can change the
meaning of my past and of my circumstances, but I cannot come up with whatever past
and circumstances I want, unless I have lost my mind.
This notion of sameness is obviously broader than the idea of sameness present in
character, where sameness is equivalent to invariability. Sameness in narrative identity is
that with which the self can identify itself. Thus, a single event during a life could be
significant enough to permanently affect one’s identity, thereby becoming a source of
sameness. In the idea of character, only what remains stable can be source of identity,
because character encompasses a static view of the self. However, if we see the self in its
history, everything that happens to the self could become part of it thanks to memory.
This element can be clearly seen in the identity of countries, where some founding events
are part of the national identity. This broader idea of sameness is also consistent with
Ricoeur’s idea that the self is mediated through stories, traditions, symbols and even
through its own interpretation. All these mediations, in my opinion, correspond to a
narrative kind of sameness. Yet, where does the idea of ipseity enter in narrative identity?
Ipseity appears in narrative identity mainly in the operation of emplotment by which the
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self puts together the manifold of sameness into a coherent and intelligible unity. The
operation of emplotment is an expression of ipseity, because narrative identity is that
intelligible unity that results from the act of configuration.
This interpretation of narrative identity as an articulation of sameness and ipseity
is consistent with Ricoeur’s understanding of identity, where he always emphasizes that
identity is the result of the articulation of sameness and ipseity. However, in Time and
Narrative, Vol. III, Ricoeur states that narrative identity is ipseity, dismissing, in a way,
the importance of sameness.71 He makes a sharp contrast between sameness and ipseity,
implying that sameness belongs to the identity of things and ipseity to the identity of the
self, ipseity being the narrative identity: “The difference between idem and ipse is
nothing more than the difference between a substantial or formal identity and a narrative
identity” (Ricoeur 1988, 246). Narrative identity, in this text, instead of articulating
sameness and ipseity, articulates sameness and otherness, change and permanence:
“Unlike the abstract identity of the Same, this narrative identity, constitutive of selfconstancy, can include change, mutability, within the cohesion of one lifetime” (Ricoeur
1988, 246). Is this idea of ipseity different from the idea of ipseity presented in Oneself as
Another and in the Course of Recognition where Ricoeur insists that ipseity is in a
dialectical relationship with sameness? Not necessarily, since narrative identity by
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Some commentators emphasize the same fact. For example for Stevens the “narrative identity of
a person or a community answers the question: Who performed these actions? Who is the hero of the story?
The answer is not the definition of an idem: a permanent substantial and formal support that can only prove
to be an illusion proper to the metaphysics of subjectivity. The answer rather comes from a description of
the ipse: the account of the various narrative configurations that determine a subject as being the one who
acted in such and such a way” (Stevens 1995, 503).
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combining different elements in a narrative unity is not negating the model of
permanence in time based on sameness. There is nothing in a narration that is allergic to
the notion of the presence of some sameness in the self that can be expressed through the
permanence of physical or psychological traits in a narration. So, then, why does Ricoeur
say in Time and Narrative that narrative identity is in contrast to identity as sameness? In
my opinion, the difference, which we found in Time and Narrative, more than being the
result of his notion of ipseity, is based on a different understanding of the notion of
sameness. While in Oneself as Another and in The Course of Recognition the idea of
sameness is the idea of a model of permanence in time that is found in the self, in Time
and Narrative sameness appears just as a the “substantialist illusion” that philosophers
like Hume and Nietzsche have criticized (Ricoeur 1988, 246). However, this dismissal of
sameness is corrected in Ricoeur’s later texts. For example, in a conference given in 1992,
Ricoeur states explicitly that narrative identity articulates sameness and ipseity: “The
notion of narrative identity provides the appropriate occasion for an explicit dialectic
between the idem and the ipse poles of personal identity” (Ricoeur 1993, 114). Later, in
the same text, he goes even further by claiming that narrative identity is found in between
ipseity and sameness:
Narrative identity may be seen as an intermediary stage between the stability of a
character (in the psychological sense of the word) and the kind of selfmaintenance exemplified by the promise. (Ricoeur 1993, 115)
However, the fact that he does not recognize fully the importance of sameness in
Time and Narrative, may show that in his narrative theory, at least as formulated in Time
and Narrative, the self has a fragile status, as I will show in what follows.
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2.5.4. Fragile identity

For Ricoeur personal identity is a fragile identity. Ricoeur stresses the idea that a
narrative opens multiple possible narrative configurations in order for, in Venema’s
words, “being other-wise in the stories of others” (Venema 2000b, 238), that is, through
others’ stories we can explore new possible identities for us. This dialectic between the
possible “imaginative variations” of the self and some given elements can be seen in the
dialectic between fiction and history, as Ricoeur points out in this text:
[N]arrative identity is not a stable and seamless identity. Just as it is possible to
compose several plots on the subject of the same incidents (which, thus, should
not really be called the same events), so it is always possible to weave different,
even opposed, plots about our lives. In this regard, we might say that, in the
exchange of roles between history and fiction, the historical component of a
narrative about oneself draws this narrative toward the side of a chronicle
submitted to the same documentary verifications as any other historical narration,
while the fictional component draws it toward those imaginative variations that
destabilize narrative identity… A systematic investigation of autobiography and
self-portraiture would no doubt verify this instability in principle of narrative
identity. (Ricoeur 1988, 248-249)
As Ricoeur states it, it is always possible to weave different plots about our lives.
This element gives to narrative identity a very fragile and unstable nature.72 As in fiction,
we can make multiple variations of our own life. However, our life is not just a pure
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The fragility of narrative identity can be seen as a consequence of the partial nature of the
narratives involved in the constitution of identity. Dauenhauer describes three main ways in which
narratives are partial: “They are partial (a) because they exclude some items that they could include, (b)
because they make contestable distributions of emphasis among the items they do include, and (c) because
there are always alternatives with different inclusions and emphasis that could be told. Hence the
convictions they can yield can never be exhaustively considered. However well–considered they may be,
they always remain subject to reform in the light of further reflection” (Dauenhauer 1997, 131).
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collection of possible narratives. Those variations always have an underlying principle of
invariability. There are thus some constrains on the way we can configure our identity.
First of all, we are determined by a place and a time. Secondly, although we can change
and “negotiate” the meaning of our past, we cannot change what has happened. Our body
and the material conditions of our existence also work as givens. This pole of
invariability is analogous to the “documentary verifications” with which a historian
works in so far as our attempt to find some “evidence” to ground our life-events helps us
to configure our identity. We can appeal here to the dramatic cases of Argentinean
children who were taken away from their parents at a very early age (usually while their
parents were held as political prisoners) in order to be given away to military families
that could not conceive children. Some of these children found themselves later on trying
to find out who their real parents were. As a consequence, their identities experienced
traumatic transformations. The same can happen to adopted children once they find out
the truth. Our past, our origin does matter in order to configure our identity and in a way
provides an element of invariability and stability for the construction of our identity.
However, Ricoeur seems unwilling to concede enough strength to the restrictions that a
person must encounter when it comes to articulating her own past in order to construct
her own identity. As the historian does not have many restrictions in his interpretation of
the past in Ricoeur’s model (as we will see in what follows), the self does not have many
restrictions in the way that it configures its own identity. The reason for this instability
can be traced back to the relationship between mimesis1 and mimesis2. To approach this
complex problem I will present some of the criticisms that have been recently made by
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Pol Vandevelde to Ricoeur’s theory of the threefold mimesis in an article called The
Challenge of the ‘such as it was”: Ricoeur’s Theory of Narratives (Vandevelde 2008).
Vandevelde focuses on Ricoeur’s claim that in our narratives of historical events
we have a kind of “debt” to the past (Vandevelde 2008, 143). Let us remember that for
Ricoeur narratives can be fictional or historical and that the theory of the threefold
mimesis applies to both. The debt of the historian is expressed in the demand that she
tells the event “such as it was”. Vandevelde points out that while Ricoeur recognizes the
importance of paying out that debt to the past, the relationship between mimesis2 and
mimesis1 has some ambiguities that in a way make our repayment of the debt impossible.
The ambiguities are found mainly in the fact that while mimesis1 provides the
paradigmatic level of action, mimesis2 provides the syntagmatic level. In other words, in
mimesis1 we have the level at which actions are yet inchoate and lacking shape. Through
the act of narrative configuration, we pass from the paradigmatic to the syntagmatic level,
where we provide actions with a shape and form in our recounting of it. As a
consequence, “only when told can the action in actuality be an action, clearly identifiable
and meaningful” (Vandevelde 2008. 154). Vandevelde claims that Ricoeur gives too
much leeway to the readers and interpreters of actions (Vandevelde 2008, 155).
Basically I agree with Vandevelde’s criticism. Indeed, if we draw all the
consequences of Ricoeur’s claim that in the level of mimesis1 actions do not possess a
syntagmatic order, but only a paradigmatic one, we have to conclude that the interpreter,
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by the act of narrative configuration can provide almost any kind of order to the action.73
However, it is hard to think that Ricoeur would accept that. Even though Ricoeur claims
that the syntagmatic level is provided by the narrator, I do not think that for Ricoeur
“any” order would do justice to the past. The problem is that Ricoeur does not provide an
account of the kinds of constraints that the narrator has in her narration. Is this lack of
constraint missing in narrative identity as well? According to Vandevelde, we have to
recognize a fundamental difference between the account that a historian gives of the past
and the account that the self gives of itself through the rendering of its identity. While the
historian should be concerned about doing justice to the meaning of the events (what it
was the case?), when we speak of the self it seems that it is more a question of the
meaningfulness of the events (what were the consequences or the significance of the
action?), as Vandevelde points out:
As previously mentioned about the narratives applied to selfhood, we are dealing
more with the meaningfulness of facts, deeds, and events than with their meaning.
(Vandevelde 2008, 152)
For that reason, the problem of the lack of constraint that we find in mimesis2 is a
problem that is relevant particularly in the case of history, according to Vandevelde.
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To illustrate this point, Vandevelde gives the example of Caesar’s murder by Brutus, explaining
that at the symbolics of action (mimesis1) there are not enough constrain to distinguish a murder from an
accident: “Let us imagine our Brutus free from bloody intent just briskly walking and passing by the Senate
consumed in his contemplation of a knife he just bought at the Mausoleum flea market, a knife he was told
belonged to General Nicias; Brutus proudly and firmly holds the knife in his right hand in front of him.
And the next thing Brutus hears is, “Tu qouque, Brute” (“You too, Brutus”) and Julius Cesar falling on
him, apparently having impaled himself on the knife Brutus held when Caesar embraced him. Of this
scenario it is still true that “Brutus killed Caesar on March 14, 44 BC.” But, as we say, it would have been
an accident, not a murder. While it is true that we would have to tell a story to discriminate an accident and
a murder precisely by appealing to the symbolics of action, still the choice of the narrative – accident or
murder – is not constrained by the symbolics of action itself [mimesis1]” (Vandevelde 2008, 159).
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However, in my opinion, the problem of the self is not only related to the meaningfulness
of events. There are some facts that build our identity and act as a kind of constraint for it.
Historical facts have a say in what we are. Are those elements only a problem of
meaningfulness or significance? I do not think so. The identity of the self is not only
related with the consequences of some events or the significance of some events
(meaningfulness), but self-identity is also based in what it was the case (meaning). The
self cannot ascribe just any kind of meaning to those facts. There are some restrictions to
such an ascription. Thus, while I agree in the main with Vandevelde’s criticism of the
lack of restrictions that we find in Ricoeur’s mimesis2, I think that the lack of restrictions
is a problem not only when we are given an account of what was the case in historical
narratives; it is also a problem when we try to understand the constitution of narrative
identity. We cannot expect a complete correspondence between the narrative
configuration of the self and the facts that lie at the basis of our identity, but we cannot
make identity entirely dependent on the configuration of its identity by the self. Maybe it
is the all too powerful idea of configuration that is rightly criticized by Vandevelde, and
which causes Ricoeur not to give enough importance to sameness in the construction of
narrative identity. As I explained above, we can see this in Time and Narrative, where the
role of sameness in the identity of the self is suppressed.
If in the configuration of our identity there are not many restrictions, what is the
criterion for producing such a configuration? What is the nature of the act that makes us
choose to configure our identity in one way over another? In my opinion we can only
tackle this problem successfully by appealing to the notion of attestation.
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2.5.5. Narrative identity and attestation

The difficulty in deciding what possible emplotment we resort to in order to
configure our identity shows the fragility of personal identity and the fragility of the self.
The main fragility of the self is that there is no definitive criterion to arbitrate between the
competing plots. I can tell many stories about myself and I can assign different relevance
and interpretation to the stories that others tell about myself. I can read my own story
from different points of view. These possibilities might give us the impression that there
is no self at all, but just a bundle of influences that can hardly be seen in a unity.
Ricoeur acknowledges the fragility of the self, as I have stated, though he does not
accept the dissolution of it (although the lack of restrictions in his account of narrative
identity puts the self at risk). He believes in the capacity of the self to promise, to commit
and to affirm proudly that “it is me, here.” How, then, can the self reach unity while
being enmeshed in the different stories that constitute it? Here the notion of attestation is
crucial. The self can prefer one narrative account over other based in its confidence that
some interpretations and configurations express better than others its own identity. Thus,
narrative identity is an attested identity, an identity that is built on the confidence of the
self in a specific narrative configuration that for it expresses its self.
Pamela Anderson sees in Ricoeur’s narrative identity a dialectic between selfaffirmation and self-effacement, between attestation and suspicion. According to her,
narrative identity is situated between an idea of the self as self-evidence and the
dissolution of the self (Anderson 1992, 65). Indeed, we can claim that the narrative
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configuration that the self gives to itself is an expression of ipseity and an act of
attestation, as Ricoeur suggests in this text:
[R]eading also includes a moment of impetus. This is when reading becomes a
provocation to be and to act differently. However this impetus is transformed into
action only through a decision whereby a person says: Here I stand! So narrative
identity is not equivalent to true self-constancy except through this decisive
moment, which makes ethical responsibility the highest factor in self-constancy.
(Ricoeur 1988, 249)
For Ricoeur the moment of reading, which he also calls “refiguration,” is a moment in
which the reader appropriates what is foreign.74 This moment corresponds exactly to
attestation. This would be an attestation of the self that happens to be the attestation of
otherness:
Language is for itself the order of the Same. The world is its Other. The
attestation of this otherness arises from language’s reflexivity with regard to itself,
whereby it knows itself as being in being in order to bear on being. (Ricoeur 1984,
78)
Thus, in narrative identity, what comes from the “outside” needs to be assented to by an
act of decision in which the self says “Here I stand!” This is an act of decision, of
affirmation, and is an act of attestation. Just as in the case of an act of attestation,
narrative identity can always be challenged. There is no way to provide a definitive
configuration of the self that could not be questioned. Attestation as a belief in, a
commitment, a confidence in, faces the permanent threat of suspicion.
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Hattingh and Van Veuren emphasize the appropriation of meaning by the reader in the
following way: “To describe the relationship between text and reader, Ricoeur employs a dialectic which
states that ‘the objectification is a necessary mediation between the writer and the reader.’ But at the same
time, this objectification as mediation, ‘calls for a complementary act of a more existential character which
I shall call the appropriation of meaning’ (Ricoeur 1981, 185). Appropriation means to make one’s own
what was initially alien” (Hattingh and Van Veuren 1995, 64).
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The fragility of narrative identity is expressed in its transitory nature. Narrative
configuration is always a work in progress. We never reach a definitive selfinterpretation.75 New events challenge our existing configuration and shed new light over
our past. Our identity is in constant negotiation in part because we do not remember
things the same way at different times. We visit and revisit our past trying to make sense
of it. As I mentioned above, one of the problems with Ricoeur’s account of narrative is
the lack of a definite answer to the question of how to give an account of the past. Thus,
the problem of the attestation of identity announces another related problem: The
problem of the attestation of the past. This will be our topic in the next chapter.
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Along these lines, Dauenhauer stresses the idea that the formation of narrative identity is an
endless process: “…the constitution of one’s personal identity, though it is already underway and has
already received a character of some sort, is a task that should have no determinate terminus. Rather, it is a
task that should continue until death cuts it off” (Dauenhauer 1997, 131–132).
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Chapter Three

Attestation of the Past: Memory

3.1.

Introduction

In the previous chapter we have found that memories play an important role in the
constitution of personal identity. Our identity is shaped, in part, by our past. Now it is
time to analyze the problem of memory in relation to attestation. There are at least two
instances where attestation and memory come together. The first instance, which will be
explained in the first part of this chapter, is what we could call the ontological status of
the past. In order to explain this idea, firstly, I will show the ambiguity of memory, that is,
the fact that memory is something that belongs to the present as well as to the past.
Memories exist as images. These images are present images that represent past events.
Secondly, I will explore the fragility of memory. We will see that memories are
threatened by their confusion with fiction, by the shadow of forgetfulness and by the
possibility of manipulation. These two main aspects of memory, its ambiguity and its
fragility, will help us articulate the first thesis of this chapter: The past is attested. Indeed,
memories rely on testimonies, either on the testimony of the self or on other testimonies.
There is no access to memories that are not mediated by testimonies. As a consequence,
the past is something that I believe in. That belief has the form of credence, of trust, of
attestation.
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In the second part of this chapter I will show how, as a direct consequence of the
first thesis, through the attestation of memory the self attests to its own self. The main
assumption here is that although the past cannot be changed, the meaning of the past can
be changed. The self ascribes and provides a meaning to the past. This meaning is mainly
a matter of attestation to the extent that this meaning cannot be empirically proven but it
is given as a conviction that the interpretation that I give to the past does justice to it.
Through the attestation of the past, I attest to my own self as well. The confidence of
existing in the mode of selfhood (attestation) is gained in part by ascribing a specific
meaning to the past. I will show this by appealing to two paradigmatic examples where
we can see how the self attests to its own self by giving a specific meaning to its own past.
The first example will be mourning. We will see that through mourning the self ascribes a
specific meaning to its own past in an effort to try to face the reality and the truth of the
past. Mourning, in this sense, is the contrary of the repression of the past. The second
example will be forgiveness. Forgiveness will be interpreted as an act through which the
self gives a specific meaning to the past that in a way separates the offender from its fault.
We will see, as a conclusion, that both mourning and forgiving are ways by which the
self attests to its own self insofar as they can help the self free itself from the haunting
power of the past.
3.2.

The ambiguity of memory

Ricoeur presents the problem of what is the ontological status of memory by
pointing out an important aporia: Memories appear to us as present images that represent
the past. Thus, memory has a twofold dimension: It is constituted by present images but
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the present images are of the past.76 As Ricoeur explains, memory is a “present
representation of an absent thing” (Ricoeur 2004a, 494). In Reagan’s words: “[The]
object of the representation no longer exists, but the representation is in the present”
(Reagan 2005, 310).
Ricoeur notes that this distinction is already present in Aristotle in the difference
between mnēmē-memoria (the images that represent the past) and anamnēsis, the active
moment of memory, the process of seeking, of discovering and of rediscovering. Thanks
to this active moment, the images are recognized as belonging to the past, as Ricoeur
explains in this passage:
The past is “contemporaneous” with the present that it has been. Hence, we do not
perceive this survival, but we presuppose it and believe in it. This is the latent and
unconscious aspect of memories preserved from the past. It is also the profound
truth of the Greek anamnēsis. To seek is to discover, and to rediscover is to
recognize what one once – previously – learned. As Aristotle puts it well in
speaking of anamnēsis, “memory is of the past.” (Ricoeur 2005a, 126)77
The phenomenon of memory shows us the ambiguous ontological status of the
past. On one side, the past is what is “no longer,” a past that has been “elapsed, abolished,
superseded” (Ricoeur 2004a, 498). On the other side, the past is there, in the sense that it
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Greisch emphasizes the temporal aspect of the traces that constitute memory, which also make
memory a sign: “The basic difficulty is in understanding the specifically temporalizing function of
memory, which is reflected in Aristotle’s statement: ‘memory is of time.’ This formulation, which Ricoeur
takes as the guiding star of the whole of his investigation, reminds us that mnesic traces refer us
immediately to a temporal horizon. So we avoid the temptation of making memory a mere province in the
vast empire of the imagination and, we might add, of making the trace a mere province in the vast empire
of signs” (Greisch 2004, 85).
77

See also Ricoeur 2004a, 4.
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is available, present to the subject that remembers. Memory attests to this ambiguous
character of the past in the idea of a “present” image of the “past.”
The ambiguous character of the past is a key to understanding Ricoeur’s
reflections on memory and serves as a theoretical framework for this chapter. This
ambiguity explains in part what I call here the “fragility of memory.” This fragility is
manifested in at least three aspects that I will explain in detail. Firstly, this fragility can
be seen in the difficulty that we have in distinguishing between memory and fiction.
Since both memory and fiction appear as images it is sometimes hard to decide whether
an image corresponds to something that indeed happened or is just a fantasy. Secondly,
the fragility of memory is manifested in the shadow of forgetfulness. We remember, but
we also forget. Memory is always at risk of being lost. All the monumental efforts of
keeping archives and records are efforts to fight against the threat of forgetfulness. The
third manifestation of the fragility of memory is seen in the risk of manipulation that
memory faces.
3.3.

The fragility of memory

In this section I analyze the problem of the fragility of memory by appealing to
three phenomena: The possible confusion between memory and fiction, the fact that
memory is always threaten by forgetfulness and the constant risk of manipulation that
memory faces. In these analyses, we will find examples taken from individual memories
and from collective memories. The recourse to these two kinds of memories could raise
the objection that we are ascribing memory to collective entities that do not properly
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remember. For this reason, before entering into this discussion, we have to analyze who
is the subject of memory and whether the examples given at the collective level can be
applied to the personal level.
Ricoeur shows two main traditions with respect to the subject of memory. The
first tradition is what Ricoeur calls, borrowing from Taylor, the “tradition of inwardness”
(see Ricoeur 2004a, 96-132). For this tradition, well represented in Augustine, memory is
basically a personal act. On the opposite side, we find some sociologists who deny the
existence of personal memory, like Halbwachs who claims that all memories are
collective (Ricoeur 2004, 120).
Against Halbwachs Ricoeur sides with the tradition of inwardness and defends the
view that the subject of the act of remembering is the individual: “[The] act of
recollection is in each case ours. To believe this, to attest to it, cannot be denounced as a
radical illusion” (Ricoeur 2004a, 123). However, Ricoeur sides with Halbwachs when
attributing memory to collective entities, such as groups or societies (Ricoeur 2004a, 120).
We can attribute memories to collective entities because our memories, from the outset,
are social: “Starting with the role of the testimony of others in recalling memories, we
then move step-by-step to memories that we have as members of a group; they require a
shift in our viewpoint, which we are well able to perform” (Ricoeur 2004, 121). The
social nature of memory appears clearly in events like 9/11, where the memories that we
have are mediated by what the media told us, how the authorities reacted and by the
testimonies given by the witnesses.
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Thus, when I state in this section, following Ricoeur, that a society represses,
forgets or manipulate memories, I am not using a figurative speech, but I am trying to do
justice to the strong role that society has in the articulation of memory. It is true that in a
strict sense the act of remembering, forgetting or repressing belong to the individual.
However, since our memories are by nature collective (in the sense that others play a
central role in the genesis of our memories) we do not fall in a fallacy of equivocation
when we attribute memories to a society.
At the same time, answering the possible objection that what can be said at the
collective level cannot be applied to the personal level, I argue that personal and
collective memories influence each other. For example, a decree of amnesty, social by
nature, affects personal memories. By the same token, individual memories, like the
memory of the victims of bloody regimes, shape collective memories. Of course, we find
differences between the two, but those differences do not prevent their interconnection.
Ricoeur supports this thesis, stating that our close relations with others mediate between
personal and collective memories:
Does there not exist and intermediate level of reference between the poles of
individual memory and collective memory, where concrete exchanges operate
between the living memory of individual persons and the public memory of the
communities to which we belong? This is the level of our close relations, to
whom we have a right to attribute a memory of a distinct kind. These close
relations, those people who count for us and for whom we count, are situated
along a range of varying distances in the relation between self and others.
(Ricoeur 2004, 131)

115

3.3.1. Memory and fiction

We can only have access to our past through an image of it. The problem is that
these images can be easily confused with mere fictions or imaginings (Ricoeur 2004a, 6).
How can I be sure that the images that come to my mind really correspond to what has
taken place? The images that refer to the realm of the “unreal, the possible, the utopian”
(Ricoeur 2004a, 6) and the images that refer to the realm of “memory, directed toward
prior reality” (Ricoeur 2004a, 6) cannot always be sharply distinguished in our mind.78
One of the main difficulties in distinguishing real images of the past from fictions is that
what happened is always at some distance from what is happening. The older a memory,
the greater the distance that separates it from us. Thus, we experience a constant “danger
of confusing remembering and imagining” (Ricoeur 2004a, 7). This danger affects the
reliability of memory (Ricoeur 2004a, 414).79
Nonetheless, we have “nothing better than memory to guarantee that something
has taken place” (Ricoeur 2004a, 7). If we do not rely on ourselves as true witnesses of
the past, we have to appeal to other witnesses. Those witnesses or documents must be
believed. Thus, there is no way to be absolutely certain about the reality of the past.80 As
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The idea that memory cannot be completely distinguished from fiction is one that appears many
times in Ricoeur’s work. Indeed, one of the main theses of Time and Narrative is that history and fiction
are closely connected (see Ricoeur 1984, 81–82).
79

As Hannoum rightly points out: “The claim of memory to truth is thus a crucial trait to keep in
mind” (Hannoum 2005, 125).
80

Belvedresi explicitly relates the problem of the reality of the past to the problem of the Cartesian
doubt: “After all, memory is a victim of the same Cartesian doubt that affects sensible knowledge. Does it
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a consequence, the belief in the pastness of our images is a matter of trust, of credence, of
attestation. The proud declaration of a witness who affirms and asks to be believed:
“Believe me, I was there” supposes that the person trusts his memories. If I do not trust
that some images correspond to the past, then I cannot ask in good faith to be trusted and
believed.
The possibility of confusing the true with the fake image of the past is not the
only threat and risk that memory faces. There is also the possibility of forgetting what
happened. Not only to think that something happened when indeed it did not, but also not
to have an image at all of what happened. The effacement of traces, that is, forgetfulness,
is the second element that shows the fragility of memory.
3.3.2. Memory and forgetfulness

There is an essential relationship between memory and forgetfulness since to
remember means precisely that we have not forgotten. To remember is not to forget. For
that reason, the main threat to memory is forgetfulness. As betrayal is the enemy of
promise, forgetfulness is the enemy of memory as Ricoeur says: “[F]orgetting is indeed
the enemy of memory, and memory is a sometimes desperate attempt to pull some
flotsam from the great shipwreck of forgetting” (Ricoeur 2005a, 112). In order not to
forget, we keep archives and documents. We want to have a memory of our own life and

not happen sometimes that a very distinct dream, as time passes, cannot be distinguished from the fact that
really happened? Do we not sometimes experience what happens to others so intensely that we cannot
distinguish those events from our own experiences?” (My translation) (Belvedresi 2004, 365).
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a collective memory. As Hannoum states, “[f]orgetfulness is seen as a betrayal of
memory, for after all memory is an effort against forgetfulness, and forgetfulness is the
challenge to memory” (Hannoum 2005, 130).81
Ricoeur distinguishes two kinds of forgetfulness: A passive and an active
forgetfulness. The passive forgetfulness is associated with a deficit in our memory and
with the difficulty to remember. The active forgetfulness is characterized as a strategy of
avoidance, that is, as a will to forget. If forgetfulness is deliberate, the self is equally
responsible for the active and for the passive forgetfulness.82 We can be blamed for not
making an effort to remember or for trying to forget. In what follows, I will focus on
active forgetfulness, since its analysis is more relevant for the purposes of this
investigation, especially with regard to attestation.
Active forgetfulness is related to the problem of a blocked memory, which is the
phenomenon that in some circumstances the subject simply does not want to remember.
Ricoeur analyzes the phenomenon of blocked memory using the tools that psychoanalysis
provides, particularly the concepts of compulsion to repetition and melancholia. The
compulsion to repetition is the consequence of a memory that does not remember. The
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Forgetfulness can have extraordinarily dramatic implications for the human self, as Greisch
points out in the following text: “But what the phenomenologist can apprehend is the terrible anguish that
takes hold of people deprived by a brain trauma of the ability to access their short-term memories, or the
upsetting signs of senile amnesia suffered by people with Alzheimer’s disease, showing just how much
certain forms of forgetting are synonymous with the destruction of the self” (Greisch 2004, 81).
82

Ricoeur emphasizes the idea that we can be as responsible for not remembering as we can be for
forgetting: “Being active, forgetfulness of this kind involves the same degree of responsibility as that
ascribed to acts of negligence or omission, in any situation where action has not been taken, and it appears
after the event to any supposedly ‘right’ conscience that one should have known, and could have known, or
tried to find out” (Ricoeur 1996a, 22).
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patient “repeats instead of remembering” (Ricoeur 2004a, 445).83 The lack of
remembering makes us “repeat” the repressed events that are covered by a blocked
memory. Here we find that the past cannot just be neglected, as Ricoeur states:
[I]n particular circumstances, entire sections of the reputedly forgotten past can
return. For the philosopher, psychoanalysis is therefore the most trustworthy ally
in support of the thesis of the unforgettable. This was even one of Freud’s
strongest convictions, that the past once experienced is indestructible. (Ricoeur
2004a, 445)
The past, in some respect, demands that it be honored and remembered. Freud
analyzes this aspect in relation to the loss of objects that we love. In many cases, we
repress the memory of our losses in order to deny the loss of them. This is not only
related to traumatic events where someone loses a loved one. Also in cases where the
person has been the culprit of an act against another, we can find in the offender a will to
repress the memories in order to avoid the pain of the loss of self-esteem, as has been
observed in many places where interested parties benefiting from political persecution or
racial injustices choose not to remember their association with criminal regimes.84 As a
consequence of that repression, there is a compulsion to “repeat” the past, i.e., to act out
and to redo in a symbolic manner the events that have been repressed. This repetition can
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Although here we are using the language of psychoanalysis that refers to a “patient,” these
concepts can be easily applied to a society or to a group. When a society has not done the work of
remembering, we can see how it tends to repeat some phenomena, for example, in the form of violence, as
Ricoeur explains: “Too much memory recalls especially the compulsion to repeat, which, Freud said, leads
us to substitute acting out for the true recollection by which the present would be reconciled with the past:
how much violence in the world stands as acting out “in place of” remembering!” (Ricoeur 2004, 79).
84

We can mention, among many, the case of Chile during the Pinochet regime and the case of
South Africa during the Apartheid.
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have the form of a violence that happens over and over in societies that have not found
reconciliation with their violent origins.85
The second symptom of a repressed memory is the mood of melancholia, that,
according to Ricoeur, can be described as a situation where the ego “finds itself in
desolation: It succumbs to the blows of its own devaluation, its own accusation, its own
condemnation, its own abasement” (Ricoeur 2004a, 73).86 These two symptoms –
repetition and melancholia – usually are found together. A blocked memory tends to
repeat the past in the compulsion to repetition in some cases and it tends to produce the
feeling of melancholia in other cases. Melancholia is very similar to grief. It is a “sadness
that has not completed the work of mourning” (Ricoeur 2004a, 77).
Thus, there is a price to pay for forgetfulness: Compulsion to repetition as well as
melancholia. Compulsion to repetition is a way in which the past is manifest in the
actions of the subject despite what the subject wants. Melancholia is the price to be paid
for a past with which there is no reconciliation at all. In melancholia the destructive
power of memories is directed against the subject. We could say that in compulsion to
repetition the past remains present in an active way, reappearing again and again, and in
melancholia the past remains present in a passive way, destroying the self. Thus, the
psychological problems of compulsion to repetition and of melancholia remind us that we
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The difficulty we have had in the United States of recognizing the atrocities committed against
blacks can be one of the reasons why the deprivation of civil rights has been perpetuated in renewed forms
of discrimination and social marginalization.
86

1989).

For more on melancholia see Julia Kristeva’s Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia (Kristeva
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should not forget.87 However, our duty not to forget can in some cases be understood
from the standpoint of a debt to our ancestors, especially with regard to traumatic events,
such as the holocaust, as Ricoeur states:
[E]vents like the Holocaust and the great crimes of the twentieth century, situated
at the limits of representation, stand in the name of all the events that have left
their traumatic imprint on hearts and bodies: they protest that they were and as
such they demand being said, recounted, understood. (Ricoeur 2004a, 498)
With this idea Ricoeur introduces us to the moral dimension of memory. We should tell,
recount the history of our ancestors, especially the history of the victims.88 However, this
debt is not felt by all the members of society. On the contrary, there are groups that insist
on denying some events, for example, some groups deny the Holocaust. So, then, if it is
not evident to everyone that we should remember, how then can we justify this duty? In
what follows I attempt an explanation.
Ricoeur relates the duty to remember to traumatic events where people have
suffered. Starting from this point, we can learn that this duty is mainly a duty to those
who have suffered. We can explain this by appealing to the idea of recognition. The
injustice that an individual suffers implies in a sense a refusal to recognize her dignity
and her rights. By remembering the horrors of the past, such as crimes and injustices, we
are at the same time recognizing the injustices committed against the victims. We can
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Here we see an interesting intersection between ethics and psychology. The denial of the past, as
an ethical problem, is manifested in psychological phenomena: compulsion to repetition and melancholia.
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For more on this see The Challenge of the “such as it was” (Vandevelde 2008) and A Return on
the Repressed. The debt of history in Paul Ricoeur’s Time and Narrative (Gerhardt 2004).
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appeal here to the example of the Commissions of Truth and Reconciliation in Chile and
South Africa.89 These commissions, by establishing a shared truth about the past, in the
name of the whole society recognized that what happened to those victims was unjust and
it should never happen again. The idea that the truth about the past grants some justice to
the victims can be confirmed by the fact that for many of the victims and their families
the mere social recognition of what happened is a big relief and, at the same time, part of
their main struggle, which is still today a struggle against oblivion.90
But to be faithful to the past is not just a matter of doing justice to the victims.
The past demands to be told as it was. There is a truth claim in the past that we cannot
overlook:
There could be no good use of memory if there were no aspect of truth. So, in a
sense, what “really happened” must keep concerning us… In a sense we are
summoned by what was… Here we confront problems of historical representation
and reference to the past, but we must never eliminate the truth claim of what has
been. This is for ethical as well as epistemological reasons. (Ricoeur 2004c, 49)91
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For more on Truth and Reconciliation see Nico Schreurs’ Truth and Reconciliation. Is Radical
Openness a Condition for Reconciliation? (Schreurs 2001, 131). In this article the reader can find, in
addition to a good general discussion on the issue of Truth and Reconciliation, some specific remarks on
the South African case.
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It is important to remember, also, as a way of preventing the crimes from happening again, As
Kemp points out: “It follows that the horror attached to these events [like Auschwitz], which we must never
forget, in order to ensure that they will never happen again…” (Kemp 1995, 381).
91

It is important to be faithful to the past in part because memory is a form of knowledge. We do
not just remember, but we want to remember what was the case, as Anderson points out: “Memory is a
form of knowledge. Even when we vaguely remember what has been, memory is at work cognitively”
(Anderson 2003, 109).
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There is an ontological reason to be faithful to the past (the past has some reality that we
must respect) that could be the ground for ethics. We must represent the past in an effort
to be faithful to our ancestors:
Everything takes place as though historians knew themselves to be bound by a
debt to people from earlier times, to the dead. It is the task of philosophical
reflection to bring to light the presupposition underlying this tacit “realism”…
(Ricoeur 1988, 100)
Our representations of the past are an effort of “standing -for” (or “taking the place of”)
the past, which, as the natural consequence of time, is no longer (Ricoeur 1988, 100). To
dismiss the truth claim of memory and the past “would be to announce the suicide of
history” (Ricoeur 1988, 118).
We must remember. However, it is impossible to remember everything. We need
to find a right balance between memory and forgetfulness (Ricoeur 2004a, 413), as
Ricoeur points out in the following text:
Speaking about memory necessarily means speaking about forgetfulness, because
one cannot remember everything. A memory with no gaps would be an
unbearable burden; it is a cliché to say that memory is selective. (Ricoeur 1996a,
21)92
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Ricoeur relates the idea of a memory that is not able to forget with Borges’ short story Funes el
Memorioso that shows the burden of a memory that does not forget anything (Ricoeur 2004a, 413). In
relation to this story, Greisch makes this interesting comment: “Responding to the story Funes el
memorioso by Jorge Luis Borges, I wonder if what threatens us nowadays is not a ‘merciless memory,’ that
is in a sense insomniac, unable to forget anything whatsoever. Far from being the most splendid palace, a
memory like that, which is reluctant to let go of anything at all, is just a waste-bin as vast as the world”
(Greisch 2004, 86).
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The complex balance between memory and forgetfulness opens us to another
phenomenon similar to blocked memory: The manipulated memory, which can take the
form of either an excess of memory or an excess of forgetfulness.
3.3.3. Memory and manipulation

Those who have power in a society can easily manipulate memories. This
problem seems to be one of the main motivations that inspire Ricoeur in Memory, History,
Forgetting:
I continue to be troubled by the unsettling spectacle offered by an excess of
memory here, and an excess of forgetfulness elsewhere, to say nothing of the
influence of commemorations and abuses of memory – and of forgetting. The idea
of a policy of the just allotment of memory is in this respect one of my avowed
civic themes. (Ricoeur 2004a, xv)93
How do the ideologies of power manipulate memory? Ideology provides a symbolic net
that structures action, giving a meaning and a justification to the agents. In this sense,
ideology is inevitable.94 All action is ideologically mediated in the sense that it is
mediated by a symbolic net.95 The problem arises when this basic and necessary
articulation of action becomes an instrument of justification of power or of distortion of
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The problem of the manipulation of memories either by an excess or by a defect is a very
complicated equation. To remember in the right way at the right time seems to require a practical wisdom
not very different from Aristotle’s idea of prudence.
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Ideology has three main functions: “distortions of reality, the legitimation of the system of
power, and the integration of the common world by means of symbolic systems immanent in action”
(Ricoeur 2004a, 82).
95

Ricoeur develops this in detail in Time and Narrative I (see Ricoeur 1984, 57–59), as I
explained in Chapter II.
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reality. Ideologies through the manipulation of memory try to impose a particular identity
on a group. This is possible because identities are in part based on memories, which is
particularly true in the case of collective identities. Persons and societies respond to the
question “who are you?” by appealing to their own story as they interpret and remember
it.96 As we discussed in the second chapter, it is always possible to tell a story differently
and to configure and synthesize in a different way the same heterogeneous elements in a
narrative. Ideologies take advantage of this possibility by giving more importance to
some events that support better the identities they want to impose on a group:
It is, more precisely, the selective function of the narrative that opens to
manipulation the opportunity and the means of a clever strategy, consisting from
the outset in a strategy of forgetfulness as much as in a strategy of remembering.
(Ricoeur 2004a, 85)
The manipulation of memory can be made either by an excess of memory or by
an obligated forgetfulness. Ricoeur points to the phenomenon of forced memory (excess
of memory) mentioning the abuse of acts of commemoration and memorialization
(Ricoeur 2004a, 85). Some societies force onto their members the memorialization of
founding events, of hymns, and of the story of some characters. These abuses of
commemorations and memorializations are used as a way of imposing what Ricoeur calls
“a history taught, a history learned” that becomes a “history celebrated” as well (Ricoeur
2004a, 85).97 Hannoum gives a good example of this, appealing to the story of France
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The connections between memory and narrative are very strong, as Anderson explains: “Story
telling is a significant form of memory; it shapes remembering” (Anderson 2003, 110).
97

Kearney explains well how memory can be manipulated: “Narrative memory is never innocent.
It is an ongoing conflict of interpretations: a battlefield of competing narratives. Every history is told from
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where by stressing the importance of the French revolution, the colonial story has been
silenced, making the French Revolution the founding event of France:
To define itself, France has chosen to eradicate (or rather to forget) over three
centuries from its memory and to recognize as a founding event of its identity not
its expansion in the world, but its bourgeois revolution. (Hannoum 2005, 135)
This particular interpretation of French identity is obviously beneficial to some groups
that want to present France to the French and to the world as the society of the values of
the revolution: Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité. By doing that, France does not have to think
about its duty to provide reparation to its colonies that were exploited for centuries.
Hannoum turns this abuse of memory against Ricoeur himself wondering why he omits
this distortion in the French self-identity from his analysis on memory given the fact that
Memory, History, Forgetting (2000) was read by an audience “in the midst of a debate on
colonial memory, whose author lived the colonial experience and declares, from the
outset, that he has written the book to fulfill a civic theme” (Hannoum 2005, 135).
Ideology can also manipulate identity by imposing forgetfulness. Sometimes the
leaders of society do not want to remember acts that could erode their power. For that
reason, they try to impose silence and to force forgetfulness. Amnesty, although it is a
political tool for reconciliation, certainly can be used as a way of forbidding memory.
Ricoeur realizes that the boundaries between amnesty as a way to reconcile a society and

a certain perspective and in the light of specific prejudice (at least in Gadamer’s sense). Memory… is not
always on the side of angels” (Kearney 2008, 81-82).
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amnesty as a kind of imposed oblivion (amnesia) are diffuse (Ricoeur 2004a, 456). An
example provided by Ricoeur presents this ambiguity very well:
The most ancient [example], recalled by Aristotle in The Athenian Constitution, is
taken from the famous decree promulgated in Athens in 403 B.C. after the victory
of the democracy over the oligarchy of the Thirty Tyrants. The formula is worth
recalling. In fact, it is twofold. On the one hand, the decree [of amnesty] properly
speaking; on the other, the oath taken one by one by the citizens. On one hand, “it
is forbidden to recall the evils (the misfortunes)”; the Greek has a single syntagma
(mnēsikakein) to express this, which indicates recalling-against; on the other, “I
shall not recall the evils (misfortunes)” under the pain of maledictions unleashed
by this perjury. The negative formulations are striking: not to recall. For the recall
would negate something, namely, forgetting. (Ricoeur 2004a, 453–454)
This Athenian decree is an effort to keep the peace and achieve reconciliation.
However, by imposing this oblivion by force, a distortion in the Athenian identity is
deliberatively performed: “A civic imaginary is established in which friendship and even
the tie between brothers are promoted to the rank of foundation, despite the murders
within families” (Ricoeur 2004a, 454). It is hard not to see in an act like this an abuse of
forgetfulness that has a deliberate political purpose. A contemporary example is the case
of the Amnesty Decree given in Chile in 1978 by the Pinochet Government.98 This
amnesty favored mainly the agents who violated human rights after the coup d’état
against the former president, Salvador Allende. Although the “official purpose” of this
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In order to understand correctly what amnesty means, it is useful to distinguish it from a pardon
given by a president or a parliament. While a pardon is a relief from punishment, amnesty consists in
changing the qualification of the event. When an amnesty is granted, the events covered by the amnesty are
not considered crimes any more. In this sense, amnesty is a paradigmatic example of an effort to change the
meaning of the past and by doing that, to “erase the past.” Indeed, since the “materiality” of some events
cannot just be erased from the collective memory, an imposed change of the meaning of those events is a
clever strategy of doing something analogous to erasing the past. Then, it is not hard to see that amnesty
can be easily used as a way to abuse memory by an abuse of oblivion.
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amnesty was to achieve political peace and reconciliation, there was an effort to
manipulate memory and to perform a distortion of the image the citizens had of the
government. Amnesty did not only grant immunity, but by “erasing the crime,” the
country was deprived of the historical truth of the events and of the knowledge of what
happened to the victims. Thus, the Pinochet government used amnesty as a way of
consolidating its power. The government wanted to convince Chilean citizens that it was
the “savior” from communism and not a bloody regime that committed many abuses.99
3.4.

Attestation and memory

The three topics analyzed above (fiction, forgetfulness and manipulation) show
that memory is a task to be accomplished. If memory is a task to be accomplished, we
can ask ourselves what the aim of this task is. The main task of memory is to be faithful
to the past, that is, to give a correct account of what happened. In that sense, memory has
a claim to truth, as Ricoeur explains:
The constant danger of confusing remembering and imagining, resulting from
becoming images in this way, affects the goal of faithfulness corresponding to the
truth claim of memory. (Ricoeur 2004a, 7)
The main difficulty that memory faces is that it is always possible to configure it
differently. As it is always possible to narrate otherwise, it is always possible to
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Today, this decree is challenged in courts. One of the ways by which lawyers have tried to
challenge this decree is by claiming that amnesty can only be given by a judge after the facts have been
established. By doing that, they tried to rescue memory from the deliberate effort of oblivion performed by
the dictatorship.
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remember otherwise. Then, what is the criterion to know whether one account of the past
is better than another? Could we say that it does not matter what account of the past we
give? Clearly for Ricoeur, as I mentioned above, the task of memory is to be faithful to
the past.100 So, not any account of the past is equally valid, but only the one that is
faithful to the past. However, for Ricoeur, this goal of faithfulness is more a horizon and
a wish than an accomplishment, as we can see from this passage:
I can say after the fact that the lodestar of the entire phenomenology of memory
has been the idea of happy memory. It was concealed in the definition of the
cognitive intention of memory as faithful. Faithfulness to the past is not a given,
but a wish. Like all wishes, it can be disappointed, even betrayed. (Ricoeur 2004a,
494)
The words that Ricoeur uses here, like “faithfulness,” “wish,” “disappointment”
and “betrayal” help us realize that the problem of the “happy memory” does not belong to
the certainties proper to the sciences, but to the field of attestation. I cannot be sure that I
am being faithful to the past. Rather, I hope to be faithful, I hope that my memories
correspond to what indeed happened.101 It is a confidence, not an empirical certainty.
Other accounts can help me. I can corroborate my account with documents or other
accounts, but memory cannot escape the problem of trust: I have to give credence to
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Here we find the pragmatic and the epistemic dimensions of memory related to one another.
Memory is an act (pragmatic dimension) and an action with an epistemic aim: the truth. Hannoum points
out: “[M]emory refers to the past and it is in this same reference, or rather, it is its very claim to the truth of
the past that constitutes the epistemic dimension of the issue of memory. For, after all, if memory is not a
thing, it is not an object, it is an act and an action, its epistemic dimension is blended with its pragmatic
dimension, which makes it an exercise. For memory exerts itself” (Hannoum 2005, 125).
101

This attitude of hoping that my memories are accurate and give a good account of what was the
case is not different from the attitude toward truth that Ricoeur describes in his fine article called The
History of Philosophy and the Unity of Truth: “I hope I am within the bounds of truth” (Ricoeur 1965, 55)
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some accounts over others. For that reason, faithfulness to the past is mainly a matter of
attestation.
At first glance, it could seem counterintuitive to say that we can have different
configurations of the past. We could claim that “the past is the past” regardless of our
account of it. However, what it is at stake in our accounts of the past is not only the
reality of the events that happened, but also the meaning of those events. As Ricoeur
points out, “memory establishes the meaning of the past” (Ricoeur 1996a, 14). As we saw
in our analysis of the threefold mimesis (Chapter 2) for Ricoeur we ascribe meaning to
the events by a narrative configuration (mimesis2) of the events, that is, by putting
together (in the operation of emplotment) the diverse elements that constitute human
actions (agents, means, goals, circumstances). In our accounts of the past we have to
decide what emplotment we will give to our memories. In those narratives, what is at
stake is the meaning of the past. Since I can provide different accounts of the past and
confer different meanings to it, the meaning that I finally choose by a specific articulation
of the memories is a matter of attesting that my narration does justice to the past.
The statement that memory is a form of attestation is confirmed by the kinship
between memory and testimony. This kinship is first of all observed in the fact that a
witness has to recall events. To give credence to a witness is equivalent to giving
credence to her memory. In addition, when a witness asks to be believed, she usually
appeals to her memory in the form, “believe me, I remember.” Even more, we can say
that we are witnesses to our own past. How can I know that some events really
happened? “I was there” is the answer that we give ourselves and to others. We are our
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own witnesses and we bear witness to our own past. Our testimony is supported and
confronted with the testimony of others, which sometimes helps us remember better, like
when we are checking memories with others: “She was there, do you not remember that
she sat right there?” “Oh yes, now I remember.”
The possibility of helping our memory through the intertwining of different
testimonies helps us link the work of remembering to the work of a judge in a trial. Just
as in our attempt to remember we have, sometimes, to confront several testimonies, a
judge in a trial must do the same. Ricoeur makes a very similar analogy, but not between
memory and a trial, but between the work of a historian and the work of a judge.102 Both
have to give credence to different testimonies and to give a verdict. Both have a “concern
with proof and the critical examination of the credibility of witnesses” (Ricoeur 2004a,
316). The work that the self does in trying to remember, in my opinion, can be easily
added to this analogy: The self, like the historian and the judge, has to give a kind of
verdict that expresses its own account of its memories. This analogy has the advantage of
showing us the critical moment in the configuration of our past. Just as the judge and the
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This analogy has some limitations. As Pellauer points out, the responsibility of a judge is not
the same as the responsibility of a historian: “[T]he analogy between the judge and the historian begins to
break down in that the trial process is determined by more specific rules and even by a more specific setting
than the historian’s research. Furthermore, the judge’s verdict is more definite in that the judge has to
decide, whereas historians can prevaricate or introduce qualifying terms, or even call for and expect further
research, because they recognize that ‘the writing of history is a perpetual rewriting’ (Ricoeur 2004a, 320)”
(Pellauer 2007, 121). For more of this parallel, see Reagan 2005, 313.
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historian have to critically vet the witnesses and the sources, in the configuration of our
own past we have to critically assess the sources we use in configuring our own past.103
Attesting to our past by giving credence to the images of our past and by making
sense of it, works as a process of recognizing the past. To claim that an image is “of the
past” is equivalent to recognizing such an image as “belonging” to the past. Actually, for
Ricoeur, a happy memory is a memory that accomplishes what he calls the “small
miracle of recognition”:
We come closer to what I like to call the small miracle of recognition if we
discern in it the solution of the oldest enigma of the problematic of memory – that
is, the present representation of something absent. Recognition is the effective
resolution of this enigma of the presence of an absence, thanks to the certitude
that accompanies it: “It’s the one – yet, it is!” (Ricoeur 2005a, 124-125)
Recognition and attestation are two closely related terms. The effort of
remembering is crowned with the certitude of recognizing what I was looking for. This
moment, that Ricoeur calls the “small miracle of recognition,” is the equivalent of a
happy memory. It is a moment of attestation of the past, a moment of certitude of having
found what I was looking for.104 The analysis of the following passage from Ricoeur can
help to expand on the kinship between the recognition and the attestation of memories:
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A fine example of this effort of trying to establish the meaning of the past is found in some
people who having reached adulthood want to try to make peace with their own past and start (sometimes
at the recommendation of their therapist) to ask their parents to tell them about their childhood.
104

Here we can recall the beautiful parable that appears in Luke’s Gospel of the women that finds
the lost coin: "Or suppose a woman has ten silver coins and loses one. Does she not light a lamp, sweep the
house and search carefully until she finds it? And when she finds it, she calls her friends and neighbors
together and says, 'Rejoice with me; I have found my lost coin.' In the same way, I tell you, there is
rejoicing in the presence of the angels of God over one sinner who repents" (Luke 15: 8-10). As we can
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[T]he reflexive moment of memory culminates in the recognition of
oneself in the form a wish. We resisted the fascination with the appearance
of immediacy, certainty, and security likely to be found in the reflexive
moment. This too is a vow, a claim, a demand. (Ricoeur 2004a, 496)
Here we find three main claims. Firstly, to remember is to recognize, as I have stated
above. Secondly, to recognize a memory is to recognize oneself, that is, the act of
recognition is an act of self-recognition. I not only recognize a memory, but I recognize
myself in my memories, because ultimately those are my memories. We will analyze the
relationship between recognition and self-recognition in the fifth chapter. For now, it is
important to note that remembering (recognizing an image as belonging to the past) is an
act where the self recognizes itself. The attestation of memories implies an act of selfattestation, because attestation is ultimately attestation of the self. Thirdly (and as a
consequence of the previous statements), this act of recognition is not given immediately,
but as belief in, that is, as an act of attestation.
The problem of attestation shows us that memory is not just a passive
phenomenon but also an elaboration that involves a commitment to some interpretations
over others. However, not all memories require the same amount of work. We can
distinguish different levels of elaboration of the past. Some memories are almost
automatically imposed on the self, as happens with recent memories (I do not need a
great effort to remember what I had this morning for breakfast). Other memories require
more work, for example, when I try to recall memories of my childhood. Finally, there

observe here, the finding of the coin is an experience of recognition that is similar to the experience of
remembering.
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are some memories that require an enormous amount of work, as in the case of repressed
memories. This whole range of possibilities, from memories that are almost imposed on
the self to memories that can be elaborated only after great effort, shows an arc that
begins with memory as mnēmē (passive memory) and ends in memory as anamnesis
(active memory). In every act of remembrance, both terms are implied. In all memories
there is an image (passive memory) and an act of recognition of the image as representing
the past (active memory). Attestation is found mainly in the active dimension of memory,
where the self recognizes an image as belonging to the past. In the following section I
will analyze a very particular act of remembering, that, following psychoanalytical
terminology, Ricoeur calls the work of mourning. This analysis will help us to understand
better the relationship between memory and attestation. My thesis is that mourning is a
particular expression of memory where attestation is found eminently.
3.4.1. Mourning

For Ricoeur, as I have mentioned, the main task of memory is to be faithful to the
past. A memory that accomplishes that task can be called a “happy memory.” However,
we can wonder if there are other forms of “happy memory.” It seems that a happy
memory has other tasks in addition to being faithful to the past. One of these tasks is to
achieve a “reconciled memory,” which supposes faithfulness, but involves other elements.
In order to understand what is meant by a “reconciled memory,” it is fruitful to discuss
the problem of mourning, as a way to achieve such reconciliation.
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As I explained above, compulsion to repetition and melancholia are the
consequences of a blocked memory, that is, a memory that has not done the work of
remembrance. What is the alternative? The alternative is to remember. The work of
remembering rescues the memory from being trapped. In other ways, remembrance gives
a future to memory, in the sense that frees the past for its haunting power.
However, to remember traumatic events is not easy. We block memories because
it is hard to remember. As a consequence, we experience repetition and melancholia.
When we remember, we overcome those consequences, but we pay another price:
Mourning. Why does the remembrance of a painful memory give rise to mourning?
Because painful memories are usually associated with losses. Thus, mourning, to quote
Freud, “is regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved one or to the loss of some
abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one’s country, liberty, an ideal, and
so on” (Freud, 1958, 243).105 There is a resistance in us to accept the losses as Ricoeur
notes, quoting Freud again:
Reality-testing has shown that the loved object no longer exists, and it proceeds to
demand that all libido shall be withdrawn from its attachment to that object. This
demand arouses understandable opposition. (Freud, 1958, 244) 106
The subject tries to accept the loss of the object by doing the work of mourning.
This process requires a great expense of time and psychic energy (Freud 1958, 245,
quoted in Ricoeur 2004a, 72). Once the loss is accepted, there is a reward: “[W]hen the
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Quoted in Ricoeur 2004a, 71.
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Quoted in Ricoeur 2004a, 72.

135

work of mourning is completed the ego becomes free and uninhibited again” (Freud 1958,
245, quoted in Ricoeur 2004a, 72). The energy that was directed towards the lost object
can be redirected towards other objects. Thus, the self that remembers experiences the
pain of the memories, but once the work is done it is free from the past, being able to
redirect its energies towards other objects:
[I]t is as a work of remembering that the work of mourning proves to be liberating,
although at a certain cost, and that this relation is reciprocal. The work of
mourning is the cost of the work of remembering, but the work of remembering is
the benefit of the work of mourning. (Ricoeur 2004a, 72)
Mourning is certainly a form of memory. We could say that mourning is the
expression of memory when it is dealing with lost objects. It is a painful memory but at
the same time a liberating one. Mourning, as a particular exercise of memory, is also
guided by a desire to be faithful to the past, with the added goal of being reconciled with
the past. How does mourning give us reconciliation? Mourning can reconcile us with the
past in the sense that a memory that mourns is a memory that faces reality, that is, a
memory that accepts the lost of the loved object, as Freud points out:
[I]n mourning [,] time is needed for the command of reality-testing to be carried
out in detail, and that when this work has been accomplished the ego will have
succeeded in freeing its libido from the lost object. (Freud, 1958, 252)107
Thus, what the self in the case of mourning attests to is not substantially different
from what is attested to in memory in general: The self attests to the reality of the past, a
past where the self finds the loss of a loved object. The acceptance of the loss reconciles
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Quoted in Ricoeur 2004a, 74.
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the self in the sense that it is no longer struggling “against” reality, but is facing it. This
“reality facing” can free the self by allowing it to redirect its energy towards other objects.
This analysis of the problem of mourning in relation to memory reinforces the main
thesis that we have analyzed so far: The past must be attested. In the case of mourning,
the attestation of the past takes the form of an acceptance of loss.
Now, we can ask whether the relationship of the self to the past can take a
different form than the attestation of the past as memory and mourning. Indeed, Ricoeur
mentions another form of relating to the past: Forgiveness. The goal of forgiveness is also
the reconciliation with the past (Ricoeur 2004a, 412). In what follows, I will present
Ricoeur’s idea of forgiving in order to explore the role of attestation in this concept.
3.4.2. Forgiveness

The first question we should ask here is whether it is possible to forgive. Ricoeur
expresses an initial difficulty: There is a radical disproportion between the fault and
forgiveness. The fault, in principle, is by definition unforgivable otherwise it would not
be a fault, if we understand forgiving as the act of not considering an act a fault anymore
Fault is unforgivable not only in fact but by right (Ricoeur 2004a, 466).108 However, the
fact that the fault is by right unforgivable does not prevent us from believing in the power
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As we can observe, Ricoeur does not overlook the seriousness of the fault. In this sense, his
position is different from what Papastephanou calls forgiveness without punishment, where the fault is not
taken as seriously and forgiveness only implies “some change of orientation… as a reforming effect of the
act of forgiveness as such.” (Papastephanou 2003, 506). Contrary to this position, Ricoeur stresses the
seriousness of some faults. Herein lays the origin of the paradox of forgiveness: How can serious faults be
forgiven without undermining their seriousness?
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of forgiveness. Following Derrida, Ricoeur asserts that “forgiveness is directed to the
unforgivable or it does not exist” (Ricoeur 2004a, 468). If forgiveness is about forgiving
a trivial fault, then it is not forgiveness. But, is there not a contradiction in the notion of
forgiveness? To forgive in a way is to say, what you did is not as serious, do not worry
any more. But if what the person did is not serious, then there is no need for forgiveness!
Despite this paradox, we find that there is forgiveness: The proclamation “summed up in
the simple phrase: ‘There is forgiveness’ resonates like an opposing challenge” (Ricoeur
2004a, 466).
How is forgiveness then possible? We have to relate forgiving to the problem of
imputability. In the first chapter, we found that imputability is “a kind of judgment saying
that humans are responsible for the proximate consequences of their deeds and for that
reason may be praised or blamed” (Ricoeur 1989, 98). Thus, in imputability the agent
completely recognizes himself in the action, assuming the consequences of it. The link
between the agent and the action is so strong in imputability that the moral characteristics
of the action are, in some respect, “transferred” to the agent. We judge the agent to be
good or bad to the extent that her actions are good or bad. One of the expressions of this
transference of the moral dimension of the action to the self is guilt. According to
Ricoeur, “[t]he link between guilt and selfhood is so tight that it is not seen as possible to
tear out guilt without destroying selfhood” (Ricoeur 2004b, 8). Guilt is an assault upon
self-esteem that paralyzes the self, rendering the continuation of human action
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difficult.109 However, guilt is not the only manner in which evil affects human actions.
Evil has also adverse effects on our actions in their social dimension, as Ricoeur explains:
Something basic was missing in our analysis heretofore of guilt, the fact that it is
not merely a blow to our own credit, a wound at the core of self-esteem, but an
injury inflicted to our bonds with others – to togetherness as such. (Ricoeur 2004b,
8)110
How can actions continue after they have been infected by evil? Forgiving makes
possible the continuation of action. It removes the impairment of actions and thus makes
action possible again. Thus, forgiving works within the sphere of the capable being. The
fault, insofar as it causes guilt, is an impediment to action and forgiving removes that
impediment.
The capacity to forgive is in some respect the opposite of imputation. While
imputation is related to the capacity of putting together the agent and the action, forgiving
performs the reverse operation: Uncoupling the agent from the action. When we impute
an action to the agent, we accord the moral worth of the action also to the agent. When
we forgive, we open a hiatus between the agent and the action. Ricoeur explicitly relates
forgiveness with this kind of un-imputing:
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110

Ricoeur refers here to the guilt that the perpetrator feels as a consequence of her action.

Ricoeur’s position on forgiving is clearly intersubjective. It can be distinguished from what
Papastephanou calls the “monological account” of forgiveness. The monological account by focusing only
on the relationship with God does not give enough importance to the fact that the fault affects our
relationship with others (Papastephanou 2003, 510). In the following text Ricoeur makes even more
explicit the intersubjective nature of forgiveness: “Moreover, unlike escape forgetfulness, forgiveness does
not remain enclosed in the narcissistic relationship of the self to itself: it assumes mediation by another
consciousness (or conscience), the victim’s, which alone is entitled to forgive” (Ricoeur 1996, 23).
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[I]n imputation you have the idea of giving an account, of holding
someone as accountable. Forgiving, in this ideal sense, would mean no
longer counting, reckoning. (Ricoeur 2004b, 15)
This hiatus is what makes it possible for the agent to become again capable of action:
“The guilty person [perpetrator], rendered capable of beginning again: this would be the
figure of unbinding that commands all the others” (Ricoeur 2004a, 490). However, is it
really possible to uncouple the agent from his actions? If we believe in the capacity of the
agent to commit to what he does and to assume responsibility for his actions, are we not
contradicting those premises by affirming the possibility of separating the agent and her
action? These questions show the shocking and in some respects counterintuitive nature
of forgiving. Ricoeur recalls Derrida’s statement that “separating the guilty person from
his act, in other words forgiving the guilty person while condemning his action, would be
to forgive a subject other than the one who committed the act” (Ricoeur 2004a, 490).
Herein resides the greatest difficulty of giving a proper account of forgiveness. We have
to reconcile three statements. (1) The fault is serious, we cannot minimize it. (2) There is
an intrinsic relationship between the wrongdoer and the fault that cannot be denied.
(3)There is forgiveness.111 So, how is it possible to uncouple the fault from the
wrongdoer without denying his agency and the seriousness of his actions?
The separation of the agent and the action does not have the form of a negation of
the participation of the agent in the action, as it were possible to effect a kind of erasing
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Junker-Kenny expresses the same difficulty: “The paradox is between the imputability of the
agent who has committed unpardonable acts, and impunity arising from forgiveness that would not do
justice to his freedom as an agent” (Junker-Kenny 2004, 37).
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of what the person has done. The act of forgiving, on the contrary, supposes that we take
seriously the participation of the agent in the action. Otherwise, there will be nothing to
forgive. In this sense, forgiving is not only contrary to imputation, but also presupposes
imputation. Forgiveness, then, could be defined, in the context of Ricoeur’ s thought, as
the act by which one person (the offended) separates the other from his act, by affirming
and trusting in her capacity to act in a better manner than she did. Then, in what sense
does forgiveness uncouple the agent from the action? Such uncoupling does not happen
in the sense of a negation of the authorship of the action or in the sense of a negation of
the moral responsibility of the agent. This uncoupling happens in a much deeper and
more complex sense. Forgiveness makes possible a separation of the agent from the
moral evil of the action. In forgiving, the culprit is disentangled from the radical evil of
the action.112 If this disentanglement is possible, it is because actions in some respect go
beyond the agent. Our entanglement in evil actions does not suppress some original
goodness in us:
This intimate dissociation signifies that the capacity of commitment belonging to
the moral subject is not exhausted by its various inscriptions in the affairs of the
world. The dissociation expresses an act of faith, a credit addressed to the
resources of self-regeneration. (Ricoeur 2005a, 490)
This belief in human natural goodness, we will see later, is quite controversial as a
philosophical assumption.
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Harvey offers a similar account of forgiving: “Once an act is done, it cannot be literally
undone. Nor can a wrongdoer simply decide to forget the act. But there is something which she can do
which may be appropriate: she can decide to no longer calculate this or that wrong into an account of her
present moral status. And there are various locutions which suggest something along these lines, e.g.,
‘making a fresh start,’ ‘moving on,’ ‘putting it behind you,’ ‘beginning again’” (Harvey 1993, 215).
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Ricoeur sees in Arendt’s idea of forgiveness a similar framework. For Arendt
forgiving, as promising, is a kind of remedy for the weakness of human actions. Two
obstacles are set by time to the continuation of human actions: “[I]rreversibility on the
one hand, unpredictability on the other” (Ricoeur 2004b, 14). The weakness of human
action appears in relation to the lack of reliability of future actions. The weakness of
actions appears in relation to the past in the fact that we cannot change it. What is done is
done. Promises help to strengthen actions in relation to the future giving predictability to
them, binding the agent to the future. Forgiveness helps to alleviate the burden of the past,
untying the agent from the action. Arendt is not denying the responsibility of the agent.
Forgiving, rather, gives to the agent the possibility of continuing to act. This continuation
is well expressed by Arendt appeals to the symbolism of binding/unbinding, as Ricoeur
explains:
Her argument rests on reestablishing a very ancient symbolism, that of
unbinding/binding, then on pairing forgiving and promising under this dialectic,
one of which would unbind and the other bind us. (Ricoeur 2004a, 486)
Ricoeur follows a similar framework. He sees the fault as an impediment, as an
incapacity. However, while Arendt sees the fault as a weakness of the action, Ricoeur
sees the fault as incapacity of the agent. This subtle distinction has important
consequences. By focusing more on the action than on the agent, Arendt, does not have to
deal with some of the paradoxes and problems that Ricoeur’s account on forgiveness has
to consider. In Ricoeur, the main difficulty is how to separate the agent from the action
without undermining agency and the fault. Arendt avoids this difficulty by focusing on a
remedy for the action more than on a remedy for the agent. This is a consequence of the
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different goals of each philosopher. Ricoeur is trying to offer a hermeneutics of the self
whereas Arendt is doing a phenomenology of the public sphere. Although Ricoeur’s
account has to face more paradoxes and difficulties, in my opinion, it is deeper than
Arendt’s account. Consequently I agree with Ricoeur’s assessment of Arendt’s work on
forgiveness: “Hannah Arendt remained at the threshold of the enigma by situating the
gesture of forgiveness at the point of intersection of the act and its consequences and not
of the agent and the act” (Ricoeur 2004a, 489). In particular, I believe that Ricoeur takes
more seriously the reality of evil and the involvement of the selfhood in the act of
forgiveness. While for Arendt the fault makes the action irreversible and forgiveness
makes human action possible again, for Ricoeur, on the contrary, the fault incapacitates
the agent because of the “adherence” of evil to the agent.113 Still we have to recognize
that there are strong similarities between Arendt’s and Ricoeur’s account, particularly the
idea that forgiveness makes action possible again.114 It is hard not to see the influence of
Arendt on Ricoeur’s thought, an influence that, in any case, Ricoeur seems to have no
problem acknowledging.
Ricoeur’s idea of forgiveness has some ontological presuppositions that we need
to make explicit. In the act of forgiveness there is an affirmation of the goodness of the
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Forgiveness unbinds the agent from the evil: “…the enigma of a fault held to paralyze the
power to act of the ‘capable being’ that we are; and it is, in reply, the enigma of the possible lifting of this
existential incapacity, designated by the term ‘forgiveness’” (Ricoeur 2004a, 457).
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Anderson sees the similarity between Ricoeur’s and Arendt’s account of forgiveness in the idea
of natality: “I understand this act [forgiveness] in Arendt’s sense of natality, roughly, as a new beginning.
The acts of both forgiving and promising initiate natality. Arendt and Ricoeur each came to account for
natality” (Anderson 2003, 111).
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agent, a kind of trust in the original goodness of the person. These ideas are beautifully
expressed in the following paragraph:
Under the sign of forgiveness, the guilty person is to be considered capable of
something other than his offenses and his faults. He is held to be restored to his
capacity for acting, and action restored to its capacity for continuing. This
capacity is signaled in the small acts of consideration in which we recognized the
incognito of forgiveness played out on the public stage. And, finally, this restored
capacity is enlisted by promising as it projects action toward the future. The
formula for this liberating word, reduced to the bareness of its utterance, would
be: you are better than your actions. (Ricoeur 2004a, 493)115
Is Ricoeur not too optimistic here? It is hard not see in this the idea of an almost
ontological regeneration through forgiveness or, indeed, the Christian idea of
redemption through forgiveness. Is it possible to understand this power of
regeneration in a merely philosophical context? To tackle this difficulty we can
contrast Ricoeur’s account to Margalit’s account of forgiveness that in a way is
very similar to Ricoeur’s:
Remorse offers us a nonmagical way of undoing the past . . . it is possible to
change our interpretation of the past. By expressing remorse, the offender
presents himself in a new light . . . that can be projected into the past. His ability
to feel remorse attests that he is not basically evil, even if the act that he
performed was abominable . . . his very assumption of responsibility for the deed
is supposed to create a rift between the act and the doer. Thus, an offender can be
forgiven even if the offense cannot be forgotten. (Margalit 2002, 199)116
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The same idea is well explained by Junker-Kenny: “Yet for Ricoeur, there are two incapacities
that have to be reversed. The agent can only be delivered of the first incapacity, to have acted wrongly, by
having sources of goodness re-opened and turned back into the original capability that manifests itself in
the fundamental benevolence which was expressed in the wish to live well with and for others. This is what
the ‘great religions’ do” (Junker-Kenny 2004, 37).
116

Cited by Junker-Kenny 2004, 33-34.
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At this point, Margalit’s and Ricoeur’s account are very similar, except for two
differences. First, Margalit places the affirmation “you are better than your action” on the
side of the person that feels remorse, while Ricoeur places that affirmation on the side of
the one who forgives. Secondly, Margalit introduces an additional element to the
equation of forgiveness: The power of regeneration that has forgiveness come from
“elsewhere” (in the sense of from a transcendent source) (Junker-Kenny 2004, 34).
Although he recognizes that the idea of forgiveness has a religious origin, Ricoeur tries to
keep his analysis of forgiveness within the confines of philosophical terms in Memory,
History, Forgetting117 However, in other texts, Ricoeur makes an explicit connection
between the idea of capacity (as a power of regeneration) and religion:
…I see a strong connection between a philosophical anthropology based on the
idea of capability and the purpose of any religious thinking… all religions are
different attempts in different language games to recover the ground of goodness,
to liberate, so to say, the enslaved capability. (Ricoeur 2002, 284)
Could we say that the hesitation between a rational justification of the idea of the original
goodness of human beings and their capacity of regeneration on the one hand and a
religious justification of these issues on the other hand seriously weaken Ricoeur’s
account of forgiveness? If Ricoeur’s idea of forgiveness would have relied merely on the
ontological assumption of the original goodness of human life, then the lack of
justification for this assumption would be a mortal wound to his account of forgiveness.
However, in my opinion, beyond the ontology that can be at the basis of the idea of
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For more on the relationship between human and divine forgiveness see Todd Pokrifka–Joe’s
Probing the Relationship between Divine and Human Forgiveness in Matthew. Hearing a Neglected Voice
in the Canon (Pokrifka–Joe, 2001).
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forgiveness, we can find some phenomenological evidence that indeed there is in the
victim who forgives a trust in the goodness of the agent. We can attest to this fact if we
take a look at what we can call the “grammar of repentance.”
Human interactions work over on the basis of some normative expectations. The
agents expect from one another some kind of behavior. There are implicit or explicit rules
that shape this expectation. When an action breaks these expectations, there is a need for
justification. This justification can be made by showing that the action is not indeed an
exception to the rules that are at the basis of the relationship. Something similar happens
with the emergence of the fault. The fault produces a disruption in a relationship since the
common rules are broken. Thus, there emerges the need for justification by the
wrongdoer. The wrongdoer justifies his actions by explaining that those actions do not
reflect his deep intentions or feelings. Some of the ways that he can justify himself is by
stating that the action was the result of a moment of weakness or that he was confused or
that he did not take into account all the possible consequences or that he now has a
completely different understanding. In any case, in all these justifications there is an
effort to establish a distance between the action and the self. This distance can be
established by appealing to a lack of knowledge, to a situation of overwhelming
circumstances or to a deep change in the self that happened after the fault was committed.
When the victim forgives, she accepts the uncoupling of the agent from his act and
assumes that the agent is “better than her action.” Is this trust the same than an
ontological optimism in human nature? Probably no, but at the very least it works as a
practical certitude that is enough to justify Ricoeur’s account of forgiveness.
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Who makes the affirmation, “you are better than your actions”? In my opinion,
this affirmation comes mainly from the offended, that is, from the one who forgives.
However, this operation must be completed in the offender. The offender makes possible
the unbinding of the agent by trusting again in her own goodness and in her own capacity
to act otherwise. In this sense the act of repentance is fundamental. However, does not the
need for repentance go against Ricoeur’s idea, following Derrida, that forgiveness is
unconditional? Forgiveness is an unconditional gift, but as any kind of gift, it needs the
acceptance of the receiver in order to be a gift. Thus, the lack of repentance does not
make forgiveness impossible, but it limits its main fruit and consequence: The restoration
of the capacity to act.
How is it possible to affirm that the agent is “better than his actions” and in that
sense to unbind him? Here the idea of attestation is crucial. The trust in the original
goodness of someone cannot be empirically proved, but can only be attested. Human
action, in order to continue, requires that the agent regains her social acceptance and trust.
For that reason, the unbinding of the agent from the evil of the action needs sometimes
the forgiveness that comes from the offended. In some cases only the offended can
unbind the offender, particularly in cases of violent and destructive acts. The offended, by
forgiving, attests to the distance between the agent and his act and believes and trusts in
his capacity of “being better than his actions.” However, as it was said above, forgiveness,
in order to bear all its fruits, needs the act of repentance from the offender. In this act of
repentance there is an attestation that is analogous to the attestation that we find in the act
of forgiveness. The offender in her act of repentance manifests her belief, her trust in her
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capacity for acting otherwise. In this act the agent is implicitly saying, “I regret my
actions, if I had the opportunity I would act otherwise.” If this desire to have acted in a
different manner is absent, then the act of repentance is not sincere.
The fact that in Ricoeur’s account of forgiveness there is a strong relationship
between the self and its action, makes it hard for him to find a public institution of
forgiving. Societies punish actions. Public institutions try to apply justice and to put the
offender at an adequate distance from the victim. To forgive in the public sphere could be
equivalent to not considering that an action is evil, which could be a great injustice, as
Ricoeur explains:
If punishment is required by the violation of the law in order to restore the law, of
satisfying the complaint of the victim and protecting public order, then forgiving
should appear as a kind of injustice. Justice, it seems, forbids the act of forgiving.
The prohibition of forgiveness in the name of justice looks still more indisputable
if you consider that the claim of forgiveness would be to reach beyond the wrong
deed and the wrongful agent, once more to destroy evil at its source, that is the
capacity of the agent to be accused, be held as a culprit. All claim to selfjustification is barred by a strict sense of justice (Ricoeur 2004b, 9)
In the public sphere we can find some institutions that in a way remind us of forgiveness,
like the notion of prescription of indictment118 or the institution of amnesty. However, the
prescription of indictment is rather an exception “to the rigor of justice” (Ricoeur 2004b,
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The idea of “prescription of indictment” in the French legal system is equivalent to the “Statute
of Limitation” in the Anglo Saxon legal system. It means that there are some temporal constraints in the
prosecution of a crime.
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12) than a case of forgiveness.119 The purpose of amnesty, in turn, is to “cure the wounds
of the social body” (Ricoeur 2004b, 12) more than to forgive. Thus, these institutions, as
Ricoeur calls them, contain “traces of forgiveness,” (Ricoeur 2004b, 11) but not a full
expression of it.
What is the relationship between forgiveness, forgetfulness and memory? Is
forgiving a form of forgetfulness? Forgetfulness and forgiving change our relation with
the past. However, while forgetfulness as an abuse of memory (under the form of blocked
memory) makes us a victim of the haunting power of the past, forgiving lightens the
burden of the past.120 According to Ricoeur forgiveness is equivalent to what can be
called a “good oblivion,” an idea that is magnificently explained in this paragraph:
[W]hat kind of forgetting would deserve to be held as a trace of forgiving? I
would suggest to speak of a good oblivion in the same way as we speak of a good
memory… It would mean breaking free from the trading logic of adding and
subtracting, from the poor vocabulary of deleting the debt, of drawing a line on
the blackboard of our sins as though pardon could compete with the work of time,
or, worse, to contribute to this frightening destructive work. Good oblivion should
be on the side of this other figure of forgetting, the preservation of the traces, but
delivered from their mischievousness, their haunting power. Lifting the burden of
the debt is recovering the lightness of existence, the divine freedom from worry.
(Ricoeur 2004b, 14-15)
As we can observe in this paragraph, Ricoeur avoids any superficial interpretation
of forgiving as a simple “erasing of the past,” pointing out that the good oblivion (which
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Reagan emphasizes that for Ricoeur amnesty is not a real forgiveness: “Ricoeur claims that
amnesty is a “caricature” of forgiveness because it is conditional and it defies justice for utilitarian ends”
(Reagan 2008, 244).
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See Kearney 2008, 81.
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is equivalent to forgiveness) does suppose the “preservation of the traces.” Thus, the past
is recognized in forgiveness, but the “grace” of forgiveness is that the past loses its
“mischievousness,” its “haunting power.” Then, forgiveness is equivalent to forgetfulness
in the sense that in both cases the past loses some of its burden. However, while in the
bad oblivion the past is neglected (and thus it never stops to haunt us), in the good
oblivion the past is there but without its haunting power.
Forgiveness, at the same time, is a form of memory and mourning, as Ricoeur
shows here:
I would suggest that the work of forgiving consists in connecting together
memory work and mourning work. Mourning, at the core of memory, would
mean that we must deal with the idea of loss, loss of the claim to construct a story
of our life without lacks nor gaps. There is something inextricable in human
things. Loss at the level of our claim to repair all wounds. There is something
irreparable in human affairs. This is why the work of rememoration cannot go
without that of mourning. Should we then speak of forgiving as a further kind of
work? I would suggest that forgiveness, when and where it is available, wants to
add to these former kinds of work an amount of cheerfulness, of gaiety, in the
sense of Nietzsche’s gay science. This playful note is that of grace in the midst of
human actions – and passions. (Ricoeur 2004b, 15-16)
In this important passage, Ricoeur connects the idea of forgiving with the idea of memory
and mourning. There is a close link between some kind of memories and mourning.
Memory can be a form of mourning insofar as dealing with our past sometimes supposes
that we accept the necessary losses that life brings, first and foremost the loss of time,
that is, the fact that the past is no longer there: It has passed. In addition, we may have to
deal with the fact that not all our expectations are fulfilled in the past. There are losses
and frustrations that we have to admit when we remember some events. The idea of
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forgiving establishes a relationship with difficult memories past that is slightly different
from the relationship that we find in mourning. Ricoeur states that through forgiving our
relationship with the past becomes a little bit easier and happier. Ricoeur appeals to an
unmistakable religious language, when he affirms that forgiving brings a note of grace.
From a philosophical point of view, we could take the word grace in the sense that
forgiving is a gift. Here is how Ricoeur develops this idea:
This should not be taken to imply that forgiveness is solely connected with the
religious dimension of life. Admittedly, in the Judaeo-Christian culture of the
West, forgiveness is synonymous with grace, and grace is the prerogative of the
One who, since He can read our hearts, can forgive to the extent that He can also
punish. But the warm glow of forgiveness can extend outside the religious sphere,
in the form of an economy of giving, where the logic of superabundance
outweighs that of just equivalence: this economy of giving has considerable
juridical and political implications. (Ricoeur 1996a, 24)
If forgiveness is a gift that we receive, then it is not something that completely depends
on us. We can connect this assertion with the claim that forgiving is offered without
asking anything in return: Forgiving is unconditional (Ricoeur 2004a, 481).
What does forgiving achieve? Ricoeur explains the goal of forgiving in the
following terms:
A new relationship with the past would then proceed from this triangular
connection between memory, mourning and forgiveness, namely that the past
would be set at the right distance from the present: the past as no longer there but
as having been (Ricoeur 2004b, 16)
This paragraph can be easily connected to one of the goals of the work of mourning: To
achieve a peaceful relationship with the past. In a blocked memory, that is, in a memory
that has not made the work of mourning, the past haunts the subject in the form of
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compulsion to repetition and melancholia. Forgiving, as a kind of memory that
remembers and mourns, can accomplish a just relationship to the past, a past that is “set
at the right distance from the present: The past as no longer there but as having been”
(Ricoeur 2004b, 16). When the past is not set at a right distance, the past persists “there”
preventing the self from projecting itself into the future. Sometimes the lack of forgiving
(“I will never forget what you did”) or the lack of mourning (“I do not accept the loss of
my youth”) can give the past too much weight, keeping the past “too close.” At the same
time the lack of mourning or forgiveness, insofar as it is expressed in the “repression” of
some events (“that never happened to me”; “for me, that person does not exist”), gives to
the past too little weight, keeping the past “too far,” but at the same time too close
inasmuch as the repression of the past can be expressed in compulsion to repetition and in
melancholia. In both cases, the past haunts the self and prevents it from projecting itself
into the future. The “right place” for the past is just that: The past, that is, something that
has been and is no longer. When the self recognizes the right ontological status of the
past, the past is kept at the right distance without making difficult the projection into the
future. Forgiveness joins mourning in the task of freeing the present from the weight of
the past:
Forgiveness is a sort of healing of memory, the completion of its mourning period.
Delivered from the weight of debt, memory is liberated for great projects.
Forgiveness gives memory a future. (Ricoeur 1996a, 24)
In addition to finding a complicated balance that “does justice” to the past,
forgiving adds the possibility of a happier and graceful relationship to the past, which can
bring us reconciliation: “If it were possible, we could then be allowed to speak of
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reconciliation with ourselves. But that cannot occur without a certain amount of folly”
(Ricoeur 2004b, 16). What does Ricoeur mean by “reconciliation with ourselves”?
Reconciliation is a word that implies the end of a situation of confrontation. It is
relatively easy to think of reconciliation as the fruit of forgiving in the context of the
social relations. In fact, a society that can forgive can arrive at a significant level of
reconciliation. However, Ricoeur here speaks of “reconciliation with ourselves.” If he
uses this language, it is because the lack of forgiving could be equivalent to a situation of
distress or violence within the self, as expressed in the feeling of anger. We do not
forgive; we usually retain anger in us against the persons or situations that have hurt us.
Forgiveness can bring reconciliation in the sense that allows us to “let go” of resentment
and to accept the past.121 As Ricoeur correctly points out, “it is impossible in the long run
for a society to remain endlessly angry against itself” (Ricoeur 2004b, 12). Ricoeur
realizes that the use of the word “reconciliation” is only analogical and not completely
proper (it is probably for this reason that we cannot speak of reconciliation “without a
certain amount of folly”).122 However, we need to appeal to this analogy in order to
express the possibility of finding peace in ourselves.
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The idea of forgiveness as an overcoming of an emotional feeling is popular. For example, for
Hughes forgiveness “typically involves the overcoming of moral anger toward another…” (Hughes 1997,
33).
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The word folly can refer to the fact that when we speak of forgiveness and reconciliation we
are expecting in human affairs something that goes well beyond the logic of reciprocity that usually rules
human affairs. Forgiveness introduces a different logic that is not based on equivalence but in what Ricoeur
calls “the economy of the gift,” which will be discussed in the fifth chapter.
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How is it possible to just “let go” of the offenses that we have suffered? It seems
that it is not enough to mourn, to accept the past. Mourning helps us accept certain losses.
However, when losses are the consequence of deliberate acts of an offender, mourning
cannot be enough. In such cases, in order to stop the anger that we feel, we have to
uncouple the evil that we have experienced from the agent. We have to attest to the idea
that despite everything, the offender is still better than his acts.
3.5.

Conclusion

We started the discussion in this chapter by presenting the ambiguous status of
memory: Memory is a present image of something that belongs to the past. We continued
the discussion by pointing to the fragility of memory, always at risk of being confused
with fiction, of being erased and of being manipulated. The main consequences of the
status of memory (a present image of the past) and of the fragility of memory are that we
can access the past in its reality only through an act of trust, of credence. Thus, the first
thesis of this chapter is that we need to attest to the past.
However the past must not only be attested to in its reality, but the meaning of the
past is not fixed either; it is a matter of interpretation. A given interpretation of the past is
also a matter of attestation, of credence, of belief that such an interpretation does justice
to the past. This attestation can have, as one of its main motivations, the idea that we have
a debt to the past, a debt to our ancestors who must be honored. Thus, the attestation of
the meaning of the past takes on an ethical dimension through the idea that we have to do
justice to what was the case. Part of this duty is to come up with an adequate balance
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between memory and forgetfulness. To know when to remember and when to forget
requires a practical understanding that is part of the attestation of the past. Ricoeur
explains well what is at stake by resorting to a spatial metaphor. We have to keep the past
at an adequate distance. To keep the past too far is an excess of forgetting. To keep the
past too close would be an excess of remembrance.
Why is it so important to find an adequate relationship to the past? Is not the past,
in the ultimate instance, something of the past? The answer to this challenge introduces
the main thesis of this chapter: The past matters because our relationship to the past
mediates our relationship to ourselves. In the language that we have been using, we can
say that through the attestation of the past and through the attestation of its meaning, the
self attests to its own self. In other words, the confidence of being a self is mediated
through the attestation of the past. It is not only that the self becomes a self through
awareness of its own past,123 but what Ricoeur seems to have in mind is that our
relationship to our past determines who we are. The self attests to its own self by giving a
specific meaning to its own past. Paradoxically, what is at stake in our negotiation with
the past is our future.
Mourning and forgiveness prove the thesis that through a negotiation with the past
the self attests to its own self. First, mourning and forgiveness are specific ways of
dealing with the past. In mourning the self turns to its own losses and in forgiveness the
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Dramatic cases, as Alzheimer disease, attest to the fact that the dissolution of memories usually
brings the dissolution of the self.
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self turns to the offenses received. What is at stake in mourning and forgiveness is the
meaning of the past. Mourning is about accepting the reality of the losses; forgiveness is
about unbinding the culprit from his fault. By “negotiating” with the past, the self attests
to its own self. However, even though what is at stake in mourning and forgiveness is the
meaning of the past, both determine and affect the future of the self.124 In the case of
mourning, it allows us to liberate the energies that are invested in the lost object. In the
case of forgiveness, it regenerates in the self its capacity to act, allowing the self to attest
to its own self as capable. Although mourning and forgiveness are paradigmatic cases of
how the self attests to its own self attesting to the meaning of the past, these two cases are
not the only examples. In general, each time that we visit our past we are implicitly
attesting to our self.
In the idea of the attestation of the self through the attestation of the past, we find,
once more, that attestation is a mediated attestation, in this case, mediated by memory.
The problem of mediation that we find in attestation is related to the idea of otherness
that we find at the core of the self. In the next chapter, I will give a full account of this
problem through the discussion of the passivity of the self.
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It is for this reason that the work of the commissions of Truth and Reconciliation in countries
that have experienced political violence is so important. In negotiating an acceptable shared truth of the
past the whole future of the country is at stake. The accepted truth about the past that emerges from this
commission sets, in many cases, the ethical standards that will be expected in a society. It is what is present
in the motto “never again.”
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Chapter Four

Attestation and Injunction

4.1.

Introduction

In the first three chapters, I have presented attestation in relation to the capacities
of the self and in relation to personal identity. Attestation, in this context, has appeared as
the credence, the assurance of being oneself acting. However, the attestation of the self
does not always happen through the active dimensions of the self or through the
assurance of its own identity. The self also gains its confidence of existing in the mode of
selfhood by experiencing different levels of passivity that will be explained in what
follows. These passivities are often experienced as injunctions, that is, as a moral call for
the self.
The problem of injunction appears in the context of the dialectic between the self
and otherness. The main thesis that Ricoeur presents by way of this dialectic is that the
self is constituted by otherness. Otherness is not something external to the self but is
something at its very core.125 Ricoeur distinguishes three kinds of otherness: The
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As stated in the introduction, for Ricoeur the self does not occupy the place of foundation such
as one finds in Descartes’ philosophy of the cogito. However, Ricoeur at the same time disagrees with
those philosophies that proclaim the dissolution of the self. It is not a self that is self-founded nor is it a
“dissolved self.” The presence of otherness at the core of the self can be seen as an intermediate position
between these two extreme ideas of the self. A self that is constituted by otherness is a self that is not
transparent to itself, since otherness introduces some opacity into it. Otherness dislocates the self from its

157

otherness of one’s own body, the otherness of other people and the otherness of one’s
own conscience. The category of otherness is a logical category. In order to analyze it, we
need to find phenomenological evidence for this category. Such evidence is found in the
category of passivity. To each kind of otherness, there corresponds an experience of
passivity, as Ricoeur explains:
In this regard, I suggest as a working hypothesis what could be called the triad of
passivity and, hence, of otherness. First, there is the passivity represented by the
experience of one’s own body – or better, as we shall say later, of the flesh – as a
mediator between the self and a world which is itself taken in accordance with its
variable degrees of practicability and so of foreignness. Next, we find the
passivity implied by the relation of the self to the foreign, in the precise sense of
the other (than) itself, and so the otherness inherent in the relation of
intersubjectivity. Finally, we have the most deeply hidden passivity, that of the
relation of the self to itself, which is conscience in the sense of Gewissen rather
than of Bewusstsein. (Ricoeur 1992, 318)
In what follows I will analyze the three passivities that Ricoeur distinguishes. The
purpose of this analysis is to understand the role of attestation in the dialectic between the
self and otherness. In this regard, Ricoeur makes a very general statement: “The term
‘otherness’ is then reserved for speculative discourse, while passivity becomes the
attestation of otherness” (Ricoeur 1992, 318).126 By stating that passivity is the attestation
of otherness, Ricoeur shows us another important dimension of attestation that

place of self-foundation. At the same time, a self constituted by otherness is not a dissolved self, because
otherness gives content, substance and stability to the self, as we will see in this chapter.
126

Ricoeur does not give us a definition of passivity. Waldenfels offers a sort of definition in the
context of the dialectic between the self and the other: “It is true that Ricoeur does not limit passivity and
passion to the simple incurring (pâtir) of something, but brings them to the abyss of a suffering (souffrir),
in which the suffering of myself, grasped as the ‘intimate passivity’ of my own body, binds the suffering
with the suffering of the other” (Waldenfels 1996, 120). Thus, we can say that passivity is what “happens”
to the self in the sense of what “affects” the self.
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complements the analysis that has been made so far. Passivity can be defined as the
attestation of the self through otherness: By experiencing otherness in passivity, the self
attests to its own self. In order to make the attestation of the self through otherness more
explicit, we need to find a phenomenon in each experience of passivity where the
attestation of the self appears clearly. In the experience of the passivity of the body, this
phenomenon is one “intimate passivity.” In the experience of the passivity of others
(other people) self-esteem shows the attestation of the self through otherness. Finally, the
phenomenon of conviction makes evident the attestation of the self through the otherness
of conscience.
After analyzing the three experiences of passivity I will propose an interpretation
of the role of attestation in the dialectic of self and otherness. My thesis is that attestation
makes possible such a dialectic. Thanks to attestation otherness is integrated as part of the
self; otherwise, it would remain external to the self
4.2.

The passivity of the body

In this section, I present the dialectic of the self and otherness at the level of the
passivity of the body. I present this dialectic in three phases. First, I show the otherness of
the body by explaining the three degrees of passivity of the body that Maine de Biran
distinguishes. Secondly, I present the receptivity of the body by discussing Ricoeur’s
engagement with Husserl and Heidegger. Finally, I present attestation as what allows the
dialectic between the body as otherness and the body as intimate passivity. My thesis is
that through the experience of the body the self attests to its self, that is, gains the trust of
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being a self. At the same time, attestation makes possible the dialectic between the body
as otherness and the body as intimacy.
4.2.1. The body as otherness

The body is the first passivity and a kind of “primordial passivity” that makes
possible every other passivity. We have a body, we are incarnated beings, and from that
condition we experience the otherness of other people and the otherness of conscience.
The otherness of the body can be explained following Ricoeur’s analysis of Maine de
Biran’s three degrees of passivity. On the first level we find that “the body denotes
resistance that gives way to effort” (Ricoeur 1992, 321).127 Effort and resistance form a
unity.128 On this level I receive the “indelible significance of being my body” (Ricoeur
1992, 321). Here, there is a basic apprehension of the body in the daily experience of
feeling the resistance of it. A second degree of passivity “is represented by the coming
and going of capricious humors” (Ricoeur 1992, 321). Passivity becomes here something
foreign and hostile. While the first passivity refers to a kind of physical resistance of the
body, we can speak here of a psychological experience of resistance. Indeed, many times
in our life a bad humor acts as a resistance to our activities, particularly in experiences
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This experience of “resistance” is doubtless associated with the phenomenon of suffering, as
Meech points out: “The category of flesh (a translation of Husserl’s Leib – sometimes translated as “living
body”) expresses ontologically the self’s experience of its own body as its most intimate other. This
experience is attested most profoundly in a phenomenology of suffering” (Meech 2006, 105).
128

Another way of expressing that effort and resistance go hand to hand is to say, quoting Gedney,
that “I am fundamentally to be understood by my capacity to act but that equally this capacity to act
testifies to the self’s power to act in relation to the passivity that is the body-affected” (Gedney 2004, 334).

160

such as depression. Although we can do something about our humors, for the most part
they are “there” despite ourselves. The third degree of passivity of the body for Maine de
Biran is marked “by the resistance of external things; it is through active touch, in which
our effort is extended, that things attest to their existence as indubitably as our own”
(Ricoeur 1992, 321-322). The experience of external things is an experience of the
passivity of the body insofar as the body mediates our experience with the world.
What is common to these three degrees of passivity is the experience of resistance,
either the resistance of one’s own body that gives way to effort, the resistance of the
capricious humors or the resistance of external things. In these three aspects, our own
body is revealed to us as an otherness that sometimes becomes a burden, particularly
when that resistance is accompanied by the experience of physical or psychological pain.
4.2.2. The body as intimacy

Along with the experience of resistance that reveals the otherness of the body,
there is a radical receptivity of the self to the body. This radical receptivity can be
evidenced in the experience of the body as “intimate passivity.” Again Ricoeur’s
reception of Maine de Biran’s work can help us articulate this point. In Maine de Biran
we find the idea that the knowledge of the body belongs to the region of a
“nonrepresentative certainty” (Ricoeur 1992, 321). We become acquainted with our body
thanks to an act of apprehension, which is different from all objectivizing representation
and includes “within the same certainty the acting self and its contrary, which is also its
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complement, corporeal passivity” (Ricoeur 1992, 321). Thus, we have a certainty of our
body that is present in both our actions and passions.
The idea of intimate passivity and “nonrepresentative certainty” shows the
receptivity of the self to the body. This receptivity is so strong that is hard to distinguish
between the self and the body. The body appears to the self as an intimate experience.
Ricoeur develops the idea of the body as intimate passivity by appealing to Husserl’s
notion of the flesh. “Flesh” is the translation of Leib. Husserl distinguishes between the
body as lived body, the body insofar as it is experienced by the self – Leib – as opposed
to the body as a public entity that appears as one body among others – Körper. Through
the idea of the flesh we can have access to the experience of having a body, which is
crucial to the understanding of the idea of intimate passivity.
The flesh, Husserl tells us, is what “is most originally mine and of all things that
which is closest” (Ricoeur 1992, 324) and has an aptitude for feeling that is mainly
revealed in the sense of touch, becoming “the organ of desire, the support of free
movement” (Ricoeur 1992, 324). The radical passivity of the flesh is evidenced in the
fact that the flesh is not an object of choice or desire, but is prior to any initiative. It is the
basis and foundation of any wanting and in that sense precedes the “distinction between
the voluntary and the involuntary” (Ricoeur 1992, 324).
The experience of the body as an intimate passivity not only shows the radical
receptivity of the self to the body, but it also shows the radical openness of the body to
others and to the world. The body as an openness mediates the experience of the self with
the world. Here Ricoeur touches the core of his hermeneutics of the self, in which he

162

states that the self is constituted by otherness. In his thesis of the radical openness of the
body he discusses the position of Husserl, who in the Cartesian Meditations proposes a
philosophical exercise: To reduce the ego to what he calls the sphere of ownness. Husserl
wants to give a phenomenological description of the constitution of the ego and its world.
In order to account for what comes from the ego, he strips the ego of anything that comes
from “outside” in order to see what is left. The result is a “sphere of ownness” in which
we find a flesh that becomes a body constituting in the process other bodies, other selves
and a world. In this phenomenology the radical passivity of the body appears in a fashion
similar to Maine de Biran’s idea of body as nonrepresentative apprehension. Where
Ricoeur disagrees is in the possibility of constituting the flesh prior to the constitution of
other selves. The very hypothesis of a sphere of ownness prior to the idea of otherness is
doomed to failure because others are required even for the constitution of the intimacy of
the flesh:
...the presupposition of the other is... contained in the formation of the very sense
of the sphere of ownness. In the hypothesis that I am alone, this experience could
never be totalized without the help of the other who helps me to gather myself
together, strengthen myself, and maintain myself in my identity. (Ricoeur 1992,
332)
Johnstone’s article “Oneself as Oneself and Not as Another” issues a strong
criticism to Ricoeur’s position. What is interesting to note is that Johnstone, following
Husserl, presents a position that is completely opposed to Ricoeur’s views. This
opposition can be noted in the very title of his article, where he criticizes the main thesis
of Ricoeur’s ontology of the flesh. According to Johnstone, oneself is oneself and not
another, as Ricoeur claims. With respect to the problem of the flesh, Johnstone criticizes
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the fact that Ricoeur “deems the presence of another to be necessary for the constitution
of the concept of one’s own tactile-kinesthetic body” (Johnstone 1996, 7). Johnstone’s
attempt at a refutation is based primarily on the evidence of our daily experience where
we have a coherent perception of the body without the need of the mediation of others:
One need only consult one’s own experience to find one’s own tactile-kinesthetic
body continually present and, with a mere shift of attention, on display center
stage available for scrutiny. As may be verified by closing one’s eyes to short
circuit visual expectations somewhat, and by turning the focus of one’s attention
inward, various regions of the flesh are located contiguously, hands near wrists,
mouth near tongue, eyes near brow, chest near abdomen, while others are
separated by intervening regions. (Johnstone 1996, 7)
Johnstone also criticizes Ricoeur’s claim that, without otherness, the flesh has a “natural
disposition toward fragmentation” (Johnstone 1996, 7). For Johnstone the “various
inclinations and motivating feelings infusing the tactile-kinesthetic body are holistic
rather than pluralistic in nature” (Johnstone 1996, 7). In other words, the physiological
structure of the body gives harmony to the experience of our own body, which is attested
in an “infant’s body muscles” that “work in concert, and are rarely (if ever) incoherent in
the sense of two appendages moving in unrelated fashion” (Johnstone 1996, 7). Thus, the
cases of fragmentation of the body that some people can experience are more a
“pathological symptom within a global psychotic disorder” (Johnstone 1996, 8) than a
proof of the needs of otherness to constitute the flesh.
Johnstone does not criticize Ricoeur’s interpretation of Husserl. Rather, he
disagrees with Ricoeur’s idea that we need others to constitute our own flesh. In my
opinion, this point is hard to settle. We are dealing here with a matter of philosophical
assumption that cannot be demonstrated. The main problem is that we do not know
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whether it would be possible to constitute our flesh at an early age without the presence
of other children or adults. Since we “always already” find the self in the midst of other
selves, it is very hard to trace back the constitution of a notion as basic as the notion of
the flesh. Beyond this dispute, it is relevant to ask ourselves how important Ricoeur’s
assumption that we need others to constitute our own flesh is. For Ricoeur, it matters
because it would otherwise be hard to prove his main thesis: That the self is constituted
by otherness. Ricoeur’s argument seems to be as follows: -The self is constituted by
otherness. -In order to have a self mediated by otherness, we need a self that is radically
open to others. -The body is a fundamental mediation in our experience with others. Then, to have a self radically opened to others, we need a body that is opened as well. Only a body that is constituted in its own flesh (as lived body) by others can be
completely opened to others.
Given the central role that others play in his hermeneutics of the self, Ricoeur
departs from Husserl and enters into a dialogue with Heidegger in order to show the
radical openness of the body to others and to the world. For Ricoeur, Heidegger frees
“the problematic of one’s own body from the trial of a reduction to ownness” (Ricoeur
1992, 326). Ricoeur finds in Dasein’s structure of “being in the world” an indication of
the openness of the body. The fact of “being in the world” means that the world precedes
the self. It is not that, first, we find a self and, then, a world, but in the very structure of
the self we find the fact that we are opened to a world. Heidegger’s notions of facticity
and throwness show that we are “always already” in a world and in a situation that we
have not chosen. From the experience of facticity we can see that the body has two
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dimensions: It is a space of intimacy and it is an openness to the foreign and to others.
We are “thrown” in the midst of the world with a body that is a source of intimacy for us.
At the same time, because we have found ourselves in the middle of a world, we are an
openness, that is, we are constituted beforehand by the world in which we find ourselves.
Using Heidegger’s notions of facticity and throwness, Ricoeur reformulates the
dialectic of the self and the body. As a body we find ourselves in the world with the
burden of existence. This burden is felt in the experience of passivity, as Maine de Biran
shows. The resistance of one’s own body that gives way to effort, the passivity of
capricious humors and the resistance of external objects show that existence involves
shouldering a daily weight. We, thus, have to face the otherness of our own existence in
an effort of appropriation and overcoming.129 Ricoeur summarizes these ideas in the
following way:
One could even say that the link, in the same existentiale of state-of-mind, of the
burdensome character of existence and of the task of having-to-be, expresses what
is most crucial in the paradox of an otherness constitutive of the self and in this
way reveals for the first time the full force of the expression “oneself as another.”
(Ricoeur 1992, 327)
Thus, we find that Ricoeur formulates the dialectic between oneself and another
(same and otherness) at a level as basic as our experience of our own body. However, it
seems that Ricoeur grants too much to others in the constitution of the body. We can still
say that the self is another, as Ricoeur tries to state, without saying that the sense of our
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Ricoeur uses Heidegger’s notion of throwness and facticity to show the dialectic of the body
and otherness noting that Heidegger does not give enough consideration to the problem of the body.
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body as flesh is already constituted by others. The self could be open to others even if
the constitution of the sense of the body did not require the mediation of others.
Since Ricoeur grants too much to others in the constitution of the own body, the
role of attestation seems crucial in order to recapture some sense of ownness in the body,
as I will explain in what follows.
4.2.3. The attestation of the self by the experience of the passivity of the body

According to Ricoeur, our self in its basic constitution as a body is in part
constituted by the otherness of the body, which in turn, is constituted by the otherness of
other people. This strangeness of the body would hardly do justice to our experience, if it
would not be compensated with the fact that I feel this body as my body.130 By
approaching the certainty that this body is my body we are entering into the realm of
attestation. Indeed, the assurance that the body is mine and an intimate part of me is an
act of attestation. I attest to the fact that this is my body. This attestation seems to be
located in the different experiences of “intimate passivity” described above in dialogue
with Maine de Biran and Husserl. At the same time, through the attestation of the body as
mine, I attest to my own self in the sense that I gain the confidence of existing in the
mode of selfhood through the confidence of having a body. We could say that the
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Here we can refer to the fine phenomenological analysis done by Gabriel Marcel. For Marcel
our experience of incarnate beings is well expressed in the statement “I am and I am not my body.” Indeed,
I am a body in the sense that there is a complete identification between myself and my body and I am not
my body in the sense that I can speak of the body as an entity different of the self: I can “give up” my body,
I should take good care of “the body”, etc. For more on this topic, see Marcel 1976.

167

certainty (attestation) of having a body is transferred to the certainty (attestation) of being
a self. In other words, the statement “it is me here” can be supported by appealing to the
reality of the body in the form “it is me here, here is my body,” as we see in the Gospel’s
scene of the apparition of Jesus to the disciples, where Jesus invites Thomas to put his
fingers in his wounds as a proof of his resurrection.131 In that passage we can see how the
existence of the self (in the case of Jesus, the resurrected self) is associated with the
existence of the body. By appealing to his own body as the “proof” of the resurrection of
his self, Jesus is implying that the body “attests” to the existence of the self.132
The attestation of the self through the attestation of the body as any act of
attestation is not free of suspicion. In some cases, traumatic experiences of the body can
produce a challenge to the experience of the self. For example, drastic changes in
physical appearance can produce a great uncertainty in the self about its own existence.
This possibility, instead of weakening the thesis that the body is a source of attestation for
the self, reinforces this idea, since, as Ricoeur insists, attestation is always threatened by
suspicion and doubt.
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This scene is found in John’s Gospel (Chapter 20: 26-27): “A week later his disciples were in
the house again, and Thomas was with them. Though the doors were locked, Jesus came and stood among
them and said, ‘Peace be with you!’ Then he said to Thomas, ‘Put your finger here; see my hands. Reach
out your hand and put it into my side. Stop doubting and believe’.”
132

Gedney, along the same lines, states that the body is a “place” where attestation occurs: “The
lived body represents the place in which my attestation receives both an initial confirmation in the reality of
my actions, but it also opens up the possibility of encountering the other as the other person who also acts
in their lived bodies; who are, as it were, ‘there in the flesh’” (Gedney 2004, 334).
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4.3.

The passivity of others

In this section I analyze the passivity with regard to other people. As in the
previous section, I show the dialectic between the self and the other – this time at the
level of other people – and the role of attestation in this dialectic. In order to articulate
this dialectic, first I show the otherness of other people. This otherness will be evidenced
by explaining Ricoeur’s appropriation of Husserl’s concept of the appresentation of
others. Secondly, I show the receptivity of the self to other people. This crucial aspect is
explained by discussing Ricoeur’s critical reception of Lévinas. Finally, I show how
attestation makes possible the dialectic between the self and the other in the experience of
self-esteem.
4.3.1. The otherness of other people

To explain the passivity with regard to others, Ricoeur borrows from Husserl,
essentially assenting to his conception of the other. The other, in Husserl, has what we
can call a double status. On the one hand, it is possible to have an authentic experience of
the other. On the other hand, there is no intuition of the other. In this sense, the other is
always “beyond me.” Ricoeur summarizes these ideas:
Husserl gave the name “appresentation” to this givenness in order to express, on
the one hand, that unlike representations in signs or images, the givenness of the
other is an authentic givenness and, on the other hand, that unlike the originary,
immediate givenness of the flesh to itself, the givenness of the other never allows
me to live the experience of others and, in this sense, can never be converted into
originary presentation. (Ricoeur 1992, 333)
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“Appresentation” represents the two facts I mentioned above. Appresentation is an
authentic givenness of something. In this sense, the other is really given. However,
appresentation is not intuition. Rather, what is appresented is co-given: Something is
given with something else. In this case, another ego is given along with a body. The
other’s self is really given, but not as an originary presentation. The other in some sense
remains beyond the self. Thus, Husserl presents the experience of the other as a dialectic
of immanence-transcendence that is consistent with Ricoeur’s dialectic of the self and
another. However, for Ricoeur it is also important to show that the self possesses a
receptivity to otherness. This receptivity is articulated by entering into a critical dialogue
with Lévinas.
4.3.2. The receptivity of the self to otherness

The experience of the passivity of the others requires a self that is capable of
receiving the injunction of others.133 Ricoeur shows the basic receptivity of the self by
criticizing Lévinas’ position on the relationship between the self and the other. Lévinas
gives precedence to the other over the self, holding an idea of the same that is marked by
the notion of separation. The self is separated from others and tends to form a circle with
itself. According to Ricoeur, Lévinas sees in the self a “will to closure, more precisely a
state of separation, that makes otherness the equivalent of radical exteriority” (Ricoeur
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As Wallace puts it, only “a self – insofar as it esteems itself as a self capable of reason, agency,
and good will – can exercise solicitude for others.” (Wallace 2002, 86) Meech explains this capacity of
receiving the other by appealing to the Heideggerian idea that we are always already in a world-withothers: “…I am permitted to posit a predialogical self (or other) as long as I acknowledge that I always do
so from within an already existing world-with-others” (Meech 2007, 107).
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1992, 335-336). Thus, it is not possible to establish a fruitful relationship between the self
and the other:
If interiority were indeed determined solely by the desire for retreat and closure,
how could it ever hear a word addressed to it, which would seem so foreign to it
that this word would be as nothing for an isolated existence? (Ricoeur 1992,
339)134
Lévinas answers this challenge by arguing that the other enters into the sphere of
the self under the form of an ethical injunction. The irruption of the other is explained by
the image of the face:
For an ego such as this, incapable of the Other, the epiphany of the face (still a
phenomenological theme) signifies an absolute exteriority, that is, a nonrelative
exteriority... (Ricoeur 1992, 337)
For Lévinas it is possible to establish an ethical relation between the self and the other in
the context of the separation of the self and the exteriority of the other because
responsibility has its origin in the other who constitutes me as responsible, not in the self
that accepts it:
It is in me that the movement coming from the other completes its trajectory: the
other constitutes me as responsible, that is, as capable of responding. In this way,
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Waldenfels summarizes Ricoeur’s criticism of Lévinas well: “The principal reproach against
Lévinas is thus that he abruptly opposes the ‘otherness of the other’ to the ‘identity of the self’ such that he
blocks the pathway from the ego (Ich) to the self, enclosing the ego in an ontological totality and separating
it from the other, who thus becomes exiled in an absolute exteriority” (Waldenfels 1996, 120). Along the
same lines, Foster summarizes Ricoeur’s objection to Lévinas as follows: “He [Ricoeur] sees Lévinas’
injunction coming from the Other to the closed up ego as overemphasized to the point of creating an
impossible situation for reception. He sees Lévinas’ emphasis on the separation between the ‘same’ and the
‘other’ in term of the stubborn, closedness of the ego, as a characteristic which makes it impossible for the
ego to respond to the call from the other…” (Foster 2004, 25).
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the word of the other comes to be placed at the origin of my acts. (Ricoeur 1992,
336)
However, contrary to Lévinas, Ricoeur considers that in order to have a self that is
responsible for its acts, we need first to grant it a capacity of reception. Thus, while in
Lévinas the relation between the self and the other is marked by the idea of separation
and exteriority, in Ricoeur the relationship between the self and the other is marked by
the notion of receptivity.
The idea of separation not only makes impossible the ethical relation but it adds
an additional problem. Without receptivity it is not possible to distinguish between the
other that instructs me about justice and the other that just wants to do violence to me:
…must we not join to this capacity of reception a capacity of discernment and
recognition, taking into account the fact that the otherness of the Other cannot be
summed up in what seems to be just one of the figures of the Other, that of the
master who teaches, once we have to consider as well the figure of the offender in
Otherwise than Being? And what are we to say of the Other when he is the
executioner? And who will be able to distinguish the master from the executioner,
the master who calls for a disciple from the master who requires a slave? (Ricoeur
1992, 339)
Cohen holds that the separation Lévinas establishes between the self and the other
is necessary to avoid a philosophy of totality where the ethical relationship is not possible.
Lévinas’ idea of separation does not entail the absence of relation, as Ricoeur assumes.
Far from that, the uniqueness of the ethical relation “is precisely that its terms, self and
other, are both out of relation and in relation” (Cohen, 2002, 131). Recognizing that in
Lévinas the other appears at some distance from the self, Cohen thinks that Ricoeur is
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mistaken in his claim that in Lévinas the self has no capacity to receive the other.135 In
this respect, Ricoeur is “tilting at a straw man” (Cohen 2002, 138) and he “nowhere
touches upon Lévinas’s very fine analyses of the self’s capacity of reception found in Part
Four of Totality and Infinity” (Cohen 2002, 138). Particularly, Cohen refers to Lévinas’s
idea of the self as a created being. According to Lévinas the self is the product of
“familial relations,” conditioned “by birth, filiality (paternity, maternity), and fraternity”
(Cohen 2002, 138).
In my opinion, there are two different issues in this discussion. The first issue is
about the fairness of Ricoeur’s interpretation of Lévinas, but this exceeds the purpose of
this dissertation. The second issue concerns the nature of the ethical injunction of the
other. It seems that for Ricoeur the ethical injunction needs to be received by the self in
order to be an ethical injunction, while for Lévinas the ethical injunction is received
“despite” the self. Both philosophers grant transcendence to the ethical injunction, but
while for Ricoeur that transcendence must become an immanence in order to be effective,
in Lévinas the force of the ethical injunction resides in its exteriority. In this sense, I
agree with Ricoeur that without a capacity of reception in the self we do not have an
injunction from the other. The radical transcendence of the other’s injunction that is
present in Lévinas (at least in Ricoeur’s reading) seems to make an ethical injunction
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Along the same lines, according to Kemp, Ricoeur misses important aspects of Lévinas’
philosophy that account for the capacity of the self to receive the other: “In Totality and Infinity there are
three levels of description of existence: that of enjoyment and habitation (called ‘Interiority and
Economy’); that of the face (called ‘Exteriority and the Face’); and that of life and fecundity (called
‘Beyond the Face’). None of these levels excludes the others” (Kemp 1996, 56). He adds that “Lévinas’s
description of separation does not have the negative and even masochistic accent which Ricoeur ascribes to
it…” (Kemp 1996, 57).
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impossible. How can we listen to the voice of the other if we do not receive it? However,
I insist, this criticism is only fair if Ricoeur’s interpretation of Lévinas is correct. Beyond
the discussion between Ricoeur and Lévinas, it is important to understand more precisely
what Ricoeur means by the dialectic between the self and others and the role of
attestation in it. The analysis of the notion of self-esteem will help tackle both issues.
4.3.3. The attestation of the self through self-esteem

The dialectic between the self and the other happens mainly at the ethical level.
Ricoeur tries to articulate the dialectic between the self and other in such a way that the
otherness of the self is preserved (as it happens in Husserl’s idea of the appresentation of
the other) and, at the same time, the self has a capacity for the reception of the injunction
of the other, avoiding the excesses of Lévinas’s ethical injunction
The core of the dialectic between the self and other people is found in the notion
of self-esteem. This notion needs to be stripped from its common psychological
connotations in order to be fully understood in the context of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of
the self. Self-esteem is not just the appreciation that the self has for itself, but it is what
constitutes the self. By estimating myself I become a self, as Ricoeur points out:
In this way, self-esteem and self-respect together will represent the most advanced
stages of the growth of selfhood, which is at the same time its unfolding. (Ricoeur
1992, 171)
If self-esteem is so intrinsically related to the construction of selfhood, it is worthwhile to
discuss this concept in order to come to a better understanding of the dialectic between
the self and the other.
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Ricoeur’s analysis of self-esteem is rich and deep and can be described as a
phenomenological account of the ethical unfolding of the self in the midst of its relations
with others. It could be surprising that a notion that in principle is based on a reflexive act
(self-esteem) can account for ethical relations. However, the originality of Ricoeur’s
notion of self-esteem is precisely its essentially ethical sense in which self-esteem is
constructed through the mediations of others:
For the agent, interpreting the text of an action is interpreting himself or herself…
[O]ur concept of the self is greatly enriched by this relation between interpretation
of the text of action and self-interpretation. On the ethical plane, selfinterpretation becomes self-esteem. In return, self-esteem follows the fate of
interpretation. (Ricoeur 1992, 179)
Self-esteem is based on the evaluations that the self makes of its own actions. At the
same time, the evaluations of the actions are socially mediated. Thus, in the last instance,
self-esteem is constructed, in part, through the evaluations that others perform of our
actions.136
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Before the self evaluates its own actions, the self finds that actions are “already” socially
morally evaluated, as we can realize if we appeal to the notion of “standards of excellence”: “These
standards of excellence are rules of comparison applied to different accomplishments, in relation to ideals
of perfection shared by a given community of practitioners and internalized by the masters and virtuosi of
the practice considered” (Ricoeur 1992, 176). The idea of “standards of excellence,” which is borrowed
from MacIntyre, shows that in each action there are certain standards that determine whether an action is
well performed or not. Another important notion related to the valuation of actions, also from MacIntyre, is
the idea of “internal goods” of an action. According to this notion, each action possesses its own good that
determines if an action is well or poorly performed. The notion of internal good is applied reflexively to the
agent: “This concept of internal good, dear to MacIntyre, thus provides an initial support for the reflexive
moment of self-esteem, to the extent that it is in appraising our actions that we appraise ourselves as being
their author” (Ricoeur 1992, 177).
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For Ricoeur the main ethical intention is “to live well with and for others in just
institutions” (Ricoeur 1992, 351). Self-esteem is the reflexive moment of this ethical aim
and unfolds mainly by the idea of solicitude:
[M]y thesis is that solicitude is not something added on to self-esteem from
outside but that it unfolds the dialogic dimension of self-esteem, which up to now
has been passed over in silence. (Ricoeur 1992, 180)
Solicitude expresses the dialogical dimension of self-esteem. Self-esteem and solicitude
cannot be understood separately: “…self-esteem and solicitude cannot be experienced or
reflected upon one without the other” (Ricoeur 1992, 180). The idea of solicitude shows
that the “good life” must be accomplished with others and needs the mediation of others.
Because we are not self sufficient, we need others to accomplish our own good. There is
a lack in each of us that makes us need others:
To self-esteem, understood as a reflexive moment of the wish for the “good life,”
solicitude adds essentially the dimension of lack, the fact that we need friends; as
a reaction to the effect of solicitude on self-esteem, the self perceives itself as
another among others. (Ricoeur 1992, 192)
The lack is not only on the side of the one who receives solicitude, but even the one that
shows solicitude needs others. So, from the idea of lack there unfolds an important
element of solicitude: Reciprocity. These two elements, lack and reciprocity appear in the
different “figures” by which, according to Ricoeur, solicitude is expressed: Friendship,
benevolent spontaneity, and sympathy. This will be the object of the following
paragraphs.
In his analysis of friendship, Ricoeur basically reminds us of the basic points of
Aristotle’s analysis of friendship in the Nichomachean Ethics in order to stress the idea
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that the good life is constructed with others in reciprocal relations. Indeed, friendship
shows that we are not self sufficient, that we lack many things and that we need others to
realize our own good, as Ricoeur points out here:
It is in connection with the notions of capacity and realization – that is, finally of
power and act – that a place is made for lack and, through the mediation of lack,
for others. (Ricoeur 1992, 182)
Friendship is an essential component of the realization of the good life. Even the happy
man needs friends. We need friends not only because life is not self-sufficient but also
because, in order to enjoy its own good, the self needs the mediation of others:
This need has to do not only with what is active and incomplete in living together
but also with the sort of shortage or lack belonging to the very relation of the self
to its own existence. (Ricoeur 1992, 186)
The second figure where we observe the unfolding of self-esteem is in benevolent
spontaneity. Ricoeur offers the notion of “benevolent spontaneity” as a response to
Lévinas idea of the master of justice who is the person who instructs others in justice and
shows the injunction of others over the self. In the injunction of the master of justice the
reciprocity proper to friendship disappears. Lévinas intentionally wants to establish the
precedence of the initiative of the other in order to break with any idea of totality where
the other could be subsumed in an attempt of domination from the self, as Ricoeur
explains here:
E. Lévinas’s entire philosophy rests on the initiative of the other in the
intersubjective relation. In reality, this initiative establishes no relation at all, to
the extent that the other represents absolute exteriority with respect to an ego
defined by the condition of separation. (Ricoeur 1992, 188-189)
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Ricoeur, as was stated above, disagrees with this idea of injunction in that it does
not suppose a capacity of reception in the self. The injunction of others needs to be heard
and received in order to be a real injunction. Without a capacity for receiving the
injunction, the injunction would remain external and, as a consequence, could not appeal
to the self:
Taken literally, a dissymmetry left uncompensated would break off the exchange
of giving and receiving and would exclude any instruction by the face within the
field of solicitude. (Ricoeur 1992, 189)
In order to compensate for this dissymmetry Ricoeur proposes the idea of benevolent
spontaneity. The idea of benevolent spontaneity refers to the reception of the injunction
of the other thanks to the capacity of the self to recognize the superiority of the authority
the master of justice has:
On the basis of this benevolent spontaneity, receiving is on an equal footing with
the summons to responsibility, in the guise of the self’s recognition of the
superiority of the authority enjoining it to act in accordance with justice. (Ricoeur
1992, 190)
This idea is similar to Gadamer’s idea of authority.137 In both cases, we see that authority
is not seen as something imposed from “outside” but as the source of a truth that is freely
recognized by the self. The initiative of the other that instructs justice is compensated by
the capacity of the self to accept others’ initiative.138
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See Gadamer 1986.

Wallace expresses the same idea stating that “Ricoeur stubbornly insists on preserving self-love
and other-regard in a correlative tension that he argues is snapped by Lévinas’s one-sided emphasis on selfemptying obedience in the face of the summons of the other” (Wallace 2002, 86).
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The capacity of the self to accept the injunction of the other is grounded,
according to Ricoeur, in the goodness of the self:
Now what resources might these be if not the resources of goodness which could
spring forth only from a being who does not detest itself to the point of being
unable to hear the injunction coming from the other? (Ricoeur 1992, 189)
Cohen, from a Lévinasian perspective, strongly criticizes this idea of benevolent
spontaneity, because it supposes that there is in the self a morally inclined solicitude.
Responding to Ricoeur, Cohen asks rhetorically “from whence is selfhood inclined to
benevolence?” (Cohen 2002, 132) and then adds, “[n]o evidence supports his optimism,
or, rather, equal evidence opposes it” (Cohen 2002, 132).139 Cohen’s objection is
interesting. To expect that the self will recognize its responsibility from its source of
goodness could be non-realistic. In this sense Lévinas seems to be more grounded in
stating that the source of responsibility is not the self but the other who summons to
responsibility. However, in Ricoeur’s defense, it must be noted that responsibility needs
to be accepted by the self. For that reason, Ricoeur insists that there is no injunction
without attestation. The act of acceptance of responsibility is well expressed in Ricoeur’s
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Kemp, on the contrary, claims that Lévinas does recognize the goodness of the self and a
positive capacity to receive the other: “Enjoyment indeed is experienced in a habitation where the other,
although not yet being ‘face’, nevertheless is not absent, but, on the contrary, present in intimacy and
sweetness, in familiarity and femininity… it is impossible to understand this analysis otherwise than as
praise of the goodness of life in the sense in which this goodness is given by the creation of human
existence… habitation is not total passivity in relation to the foreigner – it is in principle a home of
hospitality” (Kemp 1996, 56). The main difference from Ricoeur is that while Ricoeur builds his ethics
upon this capacity of benevolent spontaneity, it seems that Lévinasian ethics cannot be built upon this level,
as Kemp claims: “But the hand is fallible, it may be a manipulator, and one may close one’s house instead
of opening it to the poor and the stranger. In these cases, the Same at all levels of praxis, including
philosophical or metaphysical praxis, closes in on itself, so that interiority and the economy of the home
cannot constitute an ethics. Indeed, it is only the face entering from the exteriority which assigns us to
responsibility” (Kemp 1996, 56-57).
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idea of solicitude in general and benevolent spontaneity in particular. Thus, by
recognizing the role of the self in the act of taking responsibility, Ricoeur offers a good
complement to Lévinas’ idea of injunction, as Bourgeois points out:
In accepting the role of solicitude in human existence, Ricoeur has developed a
place within interiority that really allows a response to the face of the other. And
in doing so, he has accounted for a central, indeed, the central point of Lévinas,
that a breakthrough – a break out – out of the “totality” of traditional philosophy
is necessary for there to be a face to face encounter. (Bourgeois 2002, 122)140
The last figure of solicitude that Ricoeur presents is the relationship with the
dying person. The dying person works as the paradigm of the suffering person. Ricoeur’s
idea of suffering goes beyond the notion of physical or mental pain and is related to the
diminishing or the destruction of the capacity of acting:
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For Bourgeois, Ricoeur’s project is compatible with a “break out” of a philosophy of totality.
By giving a role to the self in the act of acceptance of responsibility, expressed in the idea of benevolent
spontaneity, Ricoeur would not place the other under the dominion of the self. However, for Cohen,
Ricoeur’s project does fall into a philosophy of totality: “Ricoeur can never come across this totality
precisely because all his investigations operate within it, unwittingly conforming to its contours. Lévinas’s
thought, in contrast, articulates this totality by exceeding and rupturing it – from a moral angle, a height”
(Cohen 2002, 147). Wallace offers an interesting interpretation of the difference between the role of others
in relation to the self in Lévinas and Ricoeur. According to Wallace this difference could be based in a
different hermeneutic tradition. Lévinas belongs to the Jewish tradition where biblical revelation “centers
on prescriptive teaching – regarding matters of behavior, morality, ritual, and law – to the degree that even
in seemingly unlegal genres, such as the Psalms and sapiential literature, Lévinas argues that are
prescriptive upheavals where God’s commanding voice to the reader breaks through the literary surface of
these texts” (Wallace, 86). By contrast, Ricoeur belongs to a Christian tradition where God is named
through the different biblical genres. In the Christian tradition there is no primacy of the legal texts over the
others. Thus, God’s revelation is not experienced primarily as a legal injunction (as it happens in the Jewish
tradition), but in many different manners, and this gives to the self a more active role in the articulation of
God’s will and revelation. Thus, Lévinas’ formation in the Jewish biblical tradition would incline him to
stress the idea of the injunction of the voice of the other manifested in the genre of prescriptions, while
Ricoeur belonging to the Christian tradition would stress the reception of the word through the diverse
biblical genres without giving priority to any of them. These two hermeneutical traditions can be translated
into two philosophical attitudes. One – well expressed in Lévinas – gives importance to a voice that is
manifested as an injunction, and the other – present in Ricoeur – stresses the importance of the
appropriation and interpretation of that voice from the one that receives the injunction.
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Suffering is not defined solely by physical pain, nor even by mental pain, but by
the reduction, even the destruction, of the capacity for acting, of being-able-to-act,
experienced as a violation of self-integrity. (Ricoeur 1992, 190)
The relationship between the suffering person, particularly the dying person, and
the one that assists her seems to be asymmetrical. The one comforting and taking care
seems to be only one that is giving:
Here initiative, precisely in terms of being-able-to-act, seems to belong
exclusively to the self who gives his sympathy, his compassion, these terms being
taken in the strong sense of the wish to share someone else’s pain. (Ricoeur 1992,
190)
On the contrary, the one that is being comforted seems “to be reduced to the sole
condition of receiving” (Ricoeur 1992, 190). Thus, reciprocity apparently is broken.
However, if we take a closer look, we see that in true sympathy “the self, whose power of
acting is at the start greater than of its other, finds itself affected by all that the suffering
other offers to it in return” (Ricoeur 1992, 191). Thus, reciprocity is reestablished. One
person offers comfort, consolation and sympathy and the other gives something that does
not come from her power of acting, but from her own weakness. Thus, the dying person
offers to the one comforting a reminder of one’s condition of mortality and vulnerability
(Ricoeur 1992, 191). Ricoeur summarizes the exchange in this beautiful text:
This is perhaps the supreme test of solicitude, when unequal power finds
compensation in an authentic reciprocity in exchange, which, in the hour of agony,
finds refuge in the shared whisper of voices or the feeble embrace of clasped
hands. (Ricoeur 1992, 191)
As it has been stated, self-esteem is at the core of the dialectic between self and
other people. The three figures of solicitude (friendship, benevolent spontaneity and
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sympathy) show that the good life cannot be accomplished alone. Others are an essential
mediation to the ethical life. Ricoeur tries to keep a delicate balance between the self and
others.141 Following Husserl, he tries to preserve the otherness of other people and
against Lévinas, he grants to the self a capacity to receive the injunction of others.
Still, it is hard to understand how the good life is mediated by others. It is easy to
accept that we need others to accomplish our goals since we are not self-sufficient.
However, we find a stronger claim in the three figures of self-esteem: The self assumes as
its own good the good of others. In friendship, the good of the friend becomes the good
of the self; in benevolent spontaneity the injunction of others becomes the self’s own
moral response and in sympathy the self assumes the fragility and mortality of the other
as a reminder of its own mortality and fragility. How is it possible for the self to assume
the good of the other as its own good? Attestation seems to be the explanation for this
phenomenon. Through attestation, in the form of self-esteem, the self is able to gain the
confidence of being a self through the assumption of the good of others142 and by doing
that, the self integrates the good of others as its own good. Thus, we can say that self-
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This effort of keeping a balance between the self and the other is observed in the three figures
of solicitude, although with different emphasis: “Let us attempt, in conclusion, to take an overview of the
entire range of attitudes deployed between the two extremes of the summons to responsibility, where the
initiative comes from the other, and of sympathy for the suffering other, where the initiative comes from
the loving self, friendship appearing as a midpoint where the self and the other share equally the same wish
to live together. While equality is presupposed in friendship, in the case of the injunction coming from the
other, equality is reestablished only through the recognition by the self of the superiority of the other’s
authority; in the case of sympathy that comes from the self and extends to the other, equality is
reestablished only through the shared admission of fragility and, finally, of mortality” (Ricoeur 1992, 192).
142

Wallace also connects the idea of self-esteem to attestation: “Self-attestation – the capacity for
self-esteem – has its origin in my self-reflexive openness to being enjoined to give myself to meet the
other’s needs even as my hearing and understanding the voice of the other have their origin in my regard
for myself as a moral subject” (Wallace 2002, 86).
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esteem is the phenomenological place where the attestation of the self through the other
happens.
This view is doubtless appealing. However, we wonder what happens where the
self denies other selves or does not assume the good of others as its own good. If we are
true to what we have been holding we should state that in those cases the self is not
attesting to its own self. However, we see that sociopaths (an extreme case of the denial
of the good of others) do attest to their own self, in the sense that they have the
confidence in being capable of acting, of remembering and even promising. Ricoeur does
not consider this challenge. However, by making a strong association between selfhood,
self-esteem and the ethical aim, he is proposing an ethics rooted in an ontology that could
be formulated in the following terms: To be a self means to pursue the ethical aim. Then,
if somebody, like a sociopath, does not pursue the ethical aim, that person indeed is
diminishing his selfhood. If this interpretation is faithful to Ricoeur, we have to say then
that his account is coherent, but controversial, to say the least. The next section, focused
on the analysis of conscience, can shed some light on this problem.
4.4.

The passivity of conscience

The third type of passivity that Ricoeur explains is the passivity with regard to
conscience. As I did with the other two passivities (body and other people), I discuss this
passivity by showing how the dialectic between the self and the other is present even here.
The first step in the unfolding of this dialectic is explicated in the otherness of conscience
which is evidenced in the fact that conscience is a call. The second step of this dialectic is
the self’s receptivity to the call of conscience that will be shown in the structure of
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“being-enjoined.” Then, I will show how attestation makes possible this dialectic by
analyzing the idea of conviction. In conviction, what is other (the call of conscience) is
assumed as the expression of the dearest values of the self. Finally, I will discuss some
critical considerations that commentators have made about Ricoeur’s idea of conscience
that are relevant to the relationship between conscience and attestation.
4.4.1. Conscience as a call

Ricoeur finds in Heidegger’s analysis of conscience143 a good framework from
within which he articulates his own position. Ricoeur agrees with Heidegger’s idea of
conscience as an ontological phenomenon and not a mere religious or moral one144 and
praises him for recognizing the otherness of conscience:
In the chapter of Being and Time entitled “Gewissen,” … Heidegger described
perfectly this moment of otherness that distinguishes conscience. (Ricoeur 1992,
342)
The otherness of conscience in Heidegger’s phenomenological description is described
mainly through the metaphor of the “voice of conscience” and introduces an important
element for Ricoeur’s account, the idea of a non self-mastery of the self:
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For more on Heidegger’s idea of conscience see Mariana Ortega’s article When Conscience
Calls, Will Dasein Answer? Heideggerian Authenticity and the Possibility of Ethical Life (Ortega 2005).
144

Ricoeur praises Heidegger for giving conscience a character that is not merely religious or
moral: “In this sense, we can note the neutral character of the phenomenon of conscience as regards its
religious interpretation. It is the self that calls the self and bears witness to its ownmost power of being… If
a theological interpretation of conscience is to be possible, it will precisely presuppose this intimacy of self
and conscience” (Ricoeur 1995d, 271). Along the same lines, Gedney states: “Ricoeur… attempts to
distinguish the general character of conscience from its particular manifestations as good or bad. The
standard of conscience calls me to act, to be resolved, that is, to be or become myself, and this is also a call
to be faithful” (Gedney 2004, 336).
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Unlike the dialogue of the soul with itself, of which Plato speaks, this affection by
another voice presents a remarkable dissymmetry, one that can be called vertical,
between the agency that calls and the self called upon. It is the vertical nature of
the call, equal to its interiority, that creates the enigma of the phenomenon of
conscience. (Ricoeur 1992, 342)
Heidegger shows that in the self there is a kind of asymmetry in the sense that the self is
affected with an element that is in the self and in some sense beyond the self. However,
in Heidegger the otherness of conscience remains within the immediacy of conscience.
As a consequence, for Ricoeur, in Heidegger’s account there is no transcendence in the
voice of conscience.145
Conscience in Heidegger is a call to authenticity. Dasein finds itself in
inauthenticity, lost in the they. Conscience is precisely what calls Dasein to get away
from inauthenticity and to find its ownmost possibilities. Dasein can run away from the
they by facing its own nothingness through the mood of angst. This interpretation of
conscience, according to Ricoeur, falls short mainly for two reasons. First, conscience
does not appear as an injunction from others146 and secondly, conscience is deprived of
any ethical content.147 Ricoeur counters this idea of conscience by affirming that it is
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Along the same lines, Hall points out that there is no exteriority in Dasein’s call, and this makes
Heidegger’s notion of consciousness peculiar: “This peculiar nature of conscience becomes particularly
apparent in Heidegger’s explanation of the “whence” of the appeal; if Dasein is appealed to, who calls?
Paradoxically, it is Dasein that calls itself out of its lostness. And yet, the call is not something that the self
voluntarily chooses; rather, the call comes to Dasein, though Dasein is nonetheless the source of the call…”
(Hall 2007, 119).
146

Ricoeur states that there is some strangeness in Heidegger’s account of conscience, but there is
a “strangeness without a stranger” (Ricoeur 1995a, 111, Ricoeur's emphasis).
147

According to Ricoeur, in Heidegger’s account “Conscience says nothing, there is no uproar, no
message, just a silent call” (Ricoeur 1995a, 110). Meech summarizes Ricoeur’s criticism of Heidegger
amoral idea of conscience: “Ricoeur concludes that all Heidegger can provide in terms of a return from
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basically an injunction to live well with and for others in just institutions. However, it is
important to note that although Ricoeur criticizes Heidegger for depriving conscience of
any moral content, in Ricoeur conscience is not a moral phenomenon either: “Conscience
is fundamentally a principle of individuation rather an instance of accusation and
judgment” (Ricoeur 1995b, 273).148
Conscience is an injunction of otherness. However, the status of otherness is itself
ambiguous. First, otherness can be identified with the presence of other people in the
form of social values. Secondly, the otherness of conscience can be identified with the
idea of the ancestors. In the self we find the sedimentation of generations whose traces
are found in myths and cults. Finally, the otherness of conscience can be identified with
God as well. These three possibilities, for Ricoeur, more than exhaust the idea of
conscience and show its basic ambiguity:
Perhaps the philosopher as philosopher has to admit that one does not know and
cannot say whether this Other, the source of the injunction, is another person
whom I can look in the face or who can stare at me, or my ancestors for whom
there is no representation, to so great an extent does my debt to them constitute
my very self, or God – living God, absent God – or an empty place. With this
aporia of the Other, philosophical discourse comes to an end. (Ricoeur 1992, 355)

ontological to ethical conscience is a kind of moral situationism – conscience as a silent summons attests
only to the brute fact of Dasein’s thrownness. Conscience cannot orient action; instead, it calls the self out
of the domination of the They to assume responsibility for its own thrownness” (Meech 2007, 109).
148

In this respect Ricoeur states that “it would not be excessive to attempt to isolate the pre-ethical
features of conscience [for intérieur] as the forum of the colloquy of the self with itself. (This is why I
prefer to use the term for intérieur to conscience morale in French to translate the German Gewissen and
the English conscience)” (Ricoeur 1996b, 454). See also Kemp 1996, 46.
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In the end the philosopher cannot know for sure about the specific nature of conscience.
This difficulty and ambiguity seems to be consubstantial with the nature of conscience. If
conscience is an otherness, then the analysis of this phenomenon must respect such
otherness. For that reason, Ricoeur claims that the “ultimate equivocalness with respect to
the status of the Other in the phenomenon of conscience is perhaps what needs to be
preserved in the final analysis” (Ricoeur 1992, 353).
4.4.2. Being enjoined: The capacity to listen to the voice of conscience

Conscience is not just a call, but there is in the self a basic capacity to receive that
call. This fact is evidenced in the phenomenon of being enjoined. Being enjoined
supposes the injunction of others in conscience and the capacity to receive that injunction
through the notion of “listening to the voice of conscience”:
Being-enjoined would then constitute the moment of otherness proper to the
phenomenon of conscience, in accordance with the metaphor of the voice.
Listening to the voice of conscience would signify being-enjoined by the Other.
(Ricoeur 1992, 351)149
The structure of being enjoined combines the idea of injunction with the idea of
receptivity. In the capacity of the self to receive the injunction of conscience the
phenomenon of attestation appears for the first time in the passivity of conscience. The
injunction of others needs a self that can be receptive to that injunction and such
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Gedney summarizes this notion of being-enjoined very nicely: “The self is constituted in a
fundamental way in conscience but not simply as the power to decide over the abyss. The self is called to a
decision as a response to the other who has called and challenged me, and it is thus first and foremost a
‘being-enjoined’” (Gedney 2004, 337).
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receptivity to otherness is attestation, in the sense that the self achieves its own
conviction of existing in the mode of the self insofar as it experiences the injunction of
conscience.150 At the same time, attestation at the level of conscience needs injunction,
because the attestation of the self is mediated by the otherness of conscience. Without
injunction it would be an empty attestation.
Ricoeur recognizes in Lévinas’s approach a solid idea of injunction. Otherness in
Lévinas, as I have discussed above, appears as an injunction to the self. However,
Ricoeur criticizes Lévinas for not including in the idea of the openness of the self the
capacity to “hear the voice of conscience.” It is Heidegger who best articulates the
receptivity of the self, the idea that at the core of the self we find the otherness of
conscience. However, in Heidegger conscience is not an injunction, but an empty call to
authenticity.151 Thus, Ricoeur’s position occupies a middle ground between the two
approaches:
To Heidegger, I objected that attestation is primordially injunction, or attestation
risks losing all ethical or moral significance. To Lévinas, I shall object that the
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Wallace summarizes this injunction as follows: “In the depths of one’s interiority, the subject is
enjoined to live well with oneself and for others. The colloquy of the self with itself – the phenomenon of
being enjoined – occurs in the place where the self appropriates for itself the demand of the other upon it.
Conscience, then, is the forum for the summoning of the self to its obligations” (Wallace 2002, 84).
151

Here is how Kemp summarizes Ricoeur’s criticism of Heidegger: “[A]s a criticism of his
analytic of the human world, for giving no room for the other at the border of or outside the world which is
mine. There is no place for the other – whether it is my body as the other I am in an ambiguous way (to be
body is indeed to take care of oneself as another), or the other here and now, absent in the past or in the
future to which I must ascribe his or her own world…” (Kemp 1996, 49). Further Kemp adds his own
criticism of Heidegger for not giving a room for the other in the analytic of Dasein stating that according to
“Heidegger, ultimately the other can give me nothing of real importance. Likewise, in my ownness, I am
fundamentally unable to give something to others except – if this can be more than a flatus vocis in the
Heideggerian universe – to ‘let them be’” (Kemp 1996, 53).
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injunction is primordially attestation, or the injunction risks not being heard and
the self not being affected in the mode of being-enjoined. (Ricoeur 1992, 355)
This intermediate position between Lévinas and Heidegger152 can be expressed in
the ontological structure of being-enjoined by others, which is equivalent to conscience in
Ricoeur. Being-enjoined supposes and summarizes the moment of receiving an injunction
from others (in opposition to Heidegger) and the moment of recognizing the injunction in
the form of attestation (in opposition to Lévinas):
To these alternatives – either Heidegger’s strange(r)ness or Lévinas’s externality
– I shall stubbornly oppose the original and originary character of what appears to
me to constitute the third modality of otherness, namely being enjoined as the
structure of selfhood. (Ricoeur 1992, 354)
Is it possible to understand the injunction of others as a call and conscience (as
attestation) as the response to the call? Such an interpretation would have several
problems. For Ricoeur it is not possible to have an injunction without attestation. These
two terms come together (Ricoeur 1992, 352).153 If attestation were just an answer, it
would be possible to have injunction without attestation. Contrary to that possibility,

152

Hall explains this intermediate idea of conscience between Lévinas and Heidegger:
“Conscience is neither completely anxiety/authenticity nor complete alterity. The injunction can be reduced
neither to the voice of Dasein to itself nor to the other commanding the self to moral concern” (Hall 2007,
122). In another article, Hall offers another complementary interpretation of Ricoeur intermediate position
between Lévinas and Heidegger: “In the concluding section of Oneself as Another, Ricoeur attempts to
negotiate a path between Heidegger’s “demoralized” account of conscience, which risks evacuating selfattestation of any ethical and moral concern, and Lévinas’s “deontologized” account, which risks reducing
the phenomenon of conscience to the otherness of other persons” (Hall 2002, 161).
153

Ricoeur responds to Heidegger’s demoralization of conscience with an idea of conscience
intimately associated with the idea of injunction: “To this demoralization of conscience, I would oppose a
conception that closely associates the phenomenon of injunction to that of attestation” (Ricoeur 1992, 351).
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Ricoeur situates the phenomenon of being-enjoined, injunction-attestation and passivity
as the capacity of finding oneself called upon, as he explains in this paragraph:
[T]he passivity of being-enjoined consists in the situation of listening in which the
ethical subject is placed in relation to the voice addressed to it in the second
person. To find oneself called upon in the second person at the very core of the
optative of living well, then of the prohibition to kill, then of the search for the
choice appropriate to the situation, is to recognize oneself as being enjoined to
live well with and for others in just institutions and to esteem oneself as the
bearer of this wish. (Ricoeur 1992, 352, Ricoeur’s emphasis)
Although, as was said above, conscience is not a mere moral phenomenon, the
injunction of others in conscience is an ethical injunction, as we can observe in the
paragraph just quoted. Then, to understand better the attestation of the self through the
otherness of conscience we have to focus on a phenomenon where the fact of beingenjoined by otherness as an ethical injunction is evidenced. This phenomenon in
Ricoeur’s thought seems to be conviction, where the attestation of the self in conscience
appears most clearly.
4.4.3. Conviction: The attestation of the self through conscience

The dialectic between the self and otherness at the level of conscience is
completed in conviction. Conviction allows what is other (the “call of conscience”) to be
integrated as part of the self. In conviction, the voice of conscience becomes my own
without losing its otherness.
The idea of conviction emerges in the context of the problem of conscience. As I
have stated above, the ethical injunction consists in a call “to live well with and for others
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in just institutions” (Ricoeur 1992, 351). The emergence of evil and violence in societies
makes it necessary to create norms. Ricoeur calls the realm of norms morality (Ricoeur
1992, 170). Conscience usually is associated with norms. However, in order to discover
the reality of conscience we have to go beyond the realm of norms in order to reveal the
ethical injunction. The ethical injunction is experienced in conscience in the phenomenon
of conviction, as Ricoeur explains here:
We must not stop moving up the slope leading from this injunction-prohibition
back to the injunction to live well. This is not all: we must not stop the trajectory
of ethics at the point of imperative-injunction but continue to follow its course all
the way to moral choices in situation. The injunction then meets up with the
phenomenon of conviction… (Ricoeur 1992, 351-352)
The phenomenon of conviction is related to the moral choices that we have to make in
each situation. We can distinguish in the phenomenon of conviction different levels. In
one extreme, we find weak convictions when we have to take decisions that are not very
important. In the other extreme, we find strong convictions when important things are at
stake. When we make decisions where our most firm values are tested, the phenomenon
of conviction appears more clearly.
In conviction we experience the otherness of conscience as an injunction.
However, injunction does not appear just as an otherness. The voice that may initially
appear as foreign can become my own voice. Ricoeur illustrates this point appealing to
the commandment “thou shalt not kill”:
....must not the voice of the Other who says to me: “Thou shalt not kill,” become
my own, to the point of becoming my conviction, a conviction to equal the
accusative of “It’s me here!” with the nominative of “Here I stand”? (Ricoeur
1992, 339)
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This ambiguity of the voice of conscience clearly shows that in conviction we find an
intersection of injunction and attestation. Conviction is injunction in the sense that
conviction is experienced as a call to do something, as a decision that is not up to the self.
However, conviction expresses at the same time the most inner and authentic belief of the
self. Conviction is equivalent to saying “it’s me here” which is the same expression that
Ricoeur uses to illustrate the definition of attestation.154
Finally, we can say that in conviction attestation becomes an ethical attestation.155
It is not the first time that the link between ethics and attestation appears. In the capacity
of imputation we found that the confidence of existing in the mode of the self becomes in
imputation the confidence of judging and acting well:
This experiential evidence is the new figure in which attestation appears, when
the certainty of being the author of one’s own discourse and of one’s own acts
becomes the conviction of judging well and acting well in a momentary and
provisional approximation of living well (Ricoeur 1992, 180).

154

Here Ricoeur joins the expression “it is me here” with attestation: “...attestation is
fundamentally attestation of self. This trust will, in turn, be a trust in the power to say, in the power to do, in
the power to recognize oneself as a character in a narrative, in the power, finally, to respond to accusation
in the form of the accusative: “It’s me here” (Ricoeur 1992, 22).
155

It is not the first time that the link between ethics and attestation appears. In the capacity of
imputation we found that the confidence of existing in the mode of the self becomes in imputation the
confidence of judging and acting well: “This experiential evidence is the new figure in which attestation
appears, when the certainty of being the author of one’s own discourse and of one’s own acts becomes the
conviction of judging well and acting well in a momentary and provisional approximation of living well”
(Ricoeur 1992, 180).
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4.4.4. Conscience: Critical Considerations

The dialectic between the self and the other at the level of conscience has the
form of an injunction to a self that is receptive to that injunction and assumes that
injunction in the form of conviction. However, if we take a closer look at Ricoeur’s idea
of conscience, we find some problems that hinder the dialectic. The first problem can be
located at the level of the injunction. Is conscience a clear voice that allows us to discern
the ethical injunction? To tackle this issue, I will discuss Wallace’s objection to Ricoeur’s
idea of conscience. The second problem is related to the idea of conviction. Is Ricoeur’s
idea of conviction consistent with his idea of conscience? Some remarks of Pamela
Anderson will be helpful to articulate this problem. Now let us discuss Wallace
objections.
Wallace points out to at least two possible problems in Ricoeur’s account of
conscience: First, the fact that he does not recognize the plurality of voices that we
usually find in conscience and secondly the lack of a criterion to adjudicate between the
different voices:
But what I find missing in Ricoeur’s magisterial analysis of conscience is an
equally powerful account of the phenomenon of the war of the self with itself in
the interior adjudication of opposing life choices and moral options. In the
colloquy of the self with itself, the character of this interior conversation is
oftentimes more like an aporetic and conflicted contest between diverging voices
than it is a careful and deliberative weighting of adjudicable options. Caught in
the vicegrip of seemingly irresolvable extremes for action, the self, as it struggles
with the voice of conscience within, must often run the risk of dissolving into an
irredeemable jumble of broken pieces in its agonistic struggle to decide which
path to pursue in responsibility to itself and others. Conscience, in this model, is
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not a hearkening to a voice or the voice within, but a confrontation with a
plurality of many different voices – some of which are self-generated, others of
which have their origin outside of the self. Conscience, from this perspective, is
not a hearkening to one voice – be it the voice of the other or the voice of God or
the voice of the nowhere – but a cacophonous echo chamber of many voices –
many disparate and irreconcilably contested voices – all of which lay claim to the
attention of the moral agent. (Wallace 2002, 88–89)
Is there any possible solution to these problems? Wallace made a first attempt in the same
article where he formulates these sharps criticisms. Wallace quotes a text where Ricoeur
recognizes the importance of others in the decisions that we have to make in our
conscience:
…the decision taken at the end of a debate with oneself, at the heart of what we
may call our innermost forum, our heart of hearts, will be all the more worthy of
being called wise if it issues from a council, on the model of our French national
consultative council on ethics, or on the model of the small circle bringing
together relatives, doctors, psychologists, and religious leaders at the bed of
someone who is dying. Wisdom in judging and the pronouncement of wise
judgment must always involve more than one person. Then conscience truly
merits the name conviction. (Ricoeur 2000c, 155)156
However, Wallace points out that the appealing to others does not solve the cases where
our conscience dictates us to go against the status quo, where there is no council to
consult or where we have to make a decision in the solitude of our own convictions.
Thus, Ricoeur can leave us without many guidelines about how to make decisions
and how to adjudicate between different voices in our conscience. Moreover, Ricoeur
does not seem to recognize the multiplicity of voices that are present in our conscience.
However, if we turn to Ricoeur’s account of tragedy, we can find some indications that

156

Quoted in Wallace 2002, 89–90.

194

could solve the issue of the conflicts of conscience and of the multiplicity of voices that
we sometimes find in us.
For Nussbaum, Ricoeur sees the conflictual nature of conscience by recognizing
the teaching that tragedy can provide (Nussbaum 2002, 272).157 However, Ricoeur does
not expect from tragic wisdom any “solution” to the conflicts, but rather an
acknowledgment of the inevitable place of conflict in moral life (Ricoeur 1992, 247).158
Tragedy for Ricoeur, following Hegel, shows us the narrowness of the moral perspectives
of the agents (as it is evidenced in the limited perspective of Antigone and Creon in the
tragedy Antigone). These teachings instead of making us renounce the ethical life, make
us move to phronesis:
Tragedy, on the level our investigation has reached, is not to be sought only at the
dawn of ethical life but, on the contrary, at the advanced stage of morality, in the
conflicts that arise along the path leading from the rule to moral judgment in
situation. (Ricoeur 1992, 249)159

157

Ricoeur, indeed, devotes many pages in Oneself as Another to the contributions of tragedy to
moral life. See Ricoeur 1992, 241 and ff.
158

Piercey interprets the recognition of the inevitable place of conflict as the recognition of
limitations of reason in moral life: “Rather than being an instrument that reason uses to achieve other ends,
tragedy brings reason face to face with its own limitations” (Piercey 2005, 12).
159

Tragedy shows the conflicting nature of human actions and, even more, the basic conflicts of
human action. This is not a small contribution. Indeed, many times ethical problems arise not because the
agents are incapable of solving a moral conflict, but because they do not see the conflict. Pellauer calls this
phenomenon “moral blindness”: “By this notion, I mean the fact that we do not even “see” that there is a
moral question, conflict, or dilemma, so the question of practical wisdom does not even arise. Hence, it is
not a matter of the wrong description of some moral fact. Moral blindness is rather the failure to even
recognize that there is a moral fact or state of affairs to be investigated and evaluated” (Pellauer 2002, 193).
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Phronesis160 comes to our aid in order to make the hard choices among different goods.
Nussbaum praises Ricoeur for recognizing the tragic dimension of action and
complements his account with a fine interpretation of the relevance and the importance of
recognizing the tragic character of action. Tragedy can help the moral actor look for
solutions that in the future avoid the necessity of succumbing to the doomed options:
Tragic dilemmas may have a natural element, but they usually also have an
element of human greed or neglect or lack of imagination. We should not treat the
greed as given; we should exercise imagination in a free Hegelian spirit, asking
what steps might be taken to produce a world that is free of some life-crushing
contradictions. (Nussbaum 2002, 274)161
Wallace’s challenge can also be addressed from Ricoeur’s recognition of the
plurality of the good. This recognition, as Nussbaum rightly points out, is present in
Ricoeur’s reception of Michael Walzer’s idea of the different spheres of the good162 and
can, at the same time, be the reason why Ricoeur does not provide a more specific way to

160
Phronesis or practical wisdom “consists in inventing conduct that will satisfy the exception
required by solicitude, by betraying the rule to the smallest extent possible” (Ricoeur 1992, 269). For a
complete analysis of Ricoeur’s notion of phronesis see John Wall’s article Phronesis, Poetics, and Moral
Creativity (Wall 2003).
161

This capacity of tragedy to show us that conflict is an inevitable aspect of moral life and to
reorient our action (particularly in the future) to avoid, precisely, tragic conflicts (insofar it is possible to do
it) is well explained by the example of the choices that women face in India. Nussbaum explains that many
women have to choose between sending their children to school and sending them to work. It is a very hard
choice because the cost of sending them to school could be a matter of survival for many families that need
the income that the children can provide. At the same time the cost that illiteracy has for the children in
particular and for the country in general is huge. Then, it is a tragic choice, where whatever choice is made,
hard consequences will follow. However, authorities instructed by tragic wisdom can create the conditions
for families so that they do not have to choose between education and survival.
162

Ricoeur follows Walzer in the idea that in ethical life there is a plurality of goods that many
times are incommensurable (see Ricoeur 1992, 252).
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adjudicate between the conflicts of moral life.163 Thus, Ricoeur’s omission of the
plurality of voices that we find in conscience can be compensated with the idea of tragic
wisdom and with the recognition of the plurality of goods, answering, at least in part,
some of the challenges that Wallace presents.
However, in my opinion there is a much more serious problem in Ricoeur’s idea
of conscience. I would like to point out to an inconsistency between his idea of
conscience and his idea of conviction. While Ricoeur has an idea of conscience
somewhat ambiguous (it is not very clear what kind of voice conscience is) and weak (we
may find many competing voices instead of a single strong voice), he presents a very
strong idea of conviction where the self assumes as its own the injunction of others and it
is able to stand for his own values, even to the extreme of dying for them. Here is my
objection: If the voice of conscience is ambiguous and multiple, how is it possible for the
self to come up with a definite and single answer to the voice of conscience?
This difficulty seems to be implicit in Pamela Sue Anderson’s article
“Agnosticism and Attestation: An Aporia concerning the Other in Ricoeur’s ‘Oneself as
Another’.” Anderson sees a contradiction between Ricoeur’s confessed philosophical
agnosticism in Oneself as Another and Ricoeur’s idea of attestation. Indeed at the
beginning of Oneself as Another Ricoeur expresses the need for keeping the
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Still, Ricoeur recognizes that in a specific sphere, such as in the Christian faith, there are ways
of discerning the injunction of conscience: “The Christian is someone who discerns ‘conformity to the
image of Christ’ in the call of conscience. This discernment is an interpretation. And this interpretation is
the outcome of a struggle for veracity and intellectual honesty. A ‘synthesis’ is not given and never attained
between the verdict of conscience and the christomorphism of faith. Any synthesis remains a risk, a ‘lovely
risk’ (Plato)” (Ricoeur 1995b, 274-275).
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philosophical discourse free of theological or religious assumptions.164 However,
Anderson points to a certain inconsistency between this acknowledged agnosticism and
Ricoeur’s idea of attestation. Attestation as a trust, a confidence in existing in the mode
of selfhood seems to contradict Ricoeur confessed agnosticism and, at the end of the day,
attestation seems to win:
Whatever the manner in which we now choose to distinguish Ricoeur’s use of
agnosticism, we have, from our assessment in the preceding pages, found that
attestation will always win the day for Ricoeur. And so, I would contend that we
have shown Ricoeur’s belief, which ultimately remains protected from any
decisive doubt, to affect profoundly the very status of his so-called autonomous
philosophical discourse. Far from an autonomous discourse, philosophy gives any
final priority concerning the Other to the domain of belief. (Anderson 1994, 76)
In short, as Crump nicely summarizes, “the primacy of attestation signifies [for
Anderson] that Ricoeur’s philosophical discourse is covertly determined by religious
belief/conviction and theological discourse” (Crump 2002, 163).165 It is interesting to
note that this possible inconsistency can be evidenced in Ricoeur’s notion of conscience
and conviction. While Ricoeur’s notion of conscience expressed his philosophical
agnosticism rather well to the extent that the philosopher cannot know the nature of the

164

The philosophical agnosticism is presented as follows: “…I have presented to my readers
arguments alone, which do not assume any commitment from the reader to reject, accept, or suspend
anything with regard to biblical faith. It will be observed that this asceticism of the argument, which marks,
I believe, all my philosophical works, leads to a type of philosophy from which the actual question of God
is absent and in which the question of God, as a philosophical question, itself remains in a suspension that
could be called agnostic…” (Ricoeur 1992, 24).
165

2002).

Crump explains in some detail the relation between Ricoeur’s philosophy and theology (Crump
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otherness of conscience,166 Ricoeur’s notion of conviction, on the other hand, seems to be
an expression of his notion of attestation where we could find some contamination by
theological and religious assumptions. Thus, although it is true that Ricoeur is not
building a notion of attestation full of religious assumptions, he is assuming in the self an
attitude towards itself and towards otherness that is rich in content and commitment, but
that does not seem compatible with his agnostic notion of conscience.
Anderson’s criticism is illustrative of the tension that we find between Ricoeur’s
notion of otherness and Ricoeur’s idea of attestation. However, Anderson is confusing
two spheres. Ricoeur’s “agnosticism” refers to the status of the philosophical discourse.
The philosopher, as such, should keep her philosophy uncontaminated by religious
assumptions. However, the idea of attestation is first of all a phenomenological
description of the agent. Attestation, as a kind of conviction, of trust of being oneself
acting and suffering, is the conviction of the self, not the conviction of the philosopher. In
the idea of attestation, in principle, there is no claim about the ontological nature of the
self, but a phenomenological description of how the self experiences its selfhood. Thus,
while philosophical agnosticism is a kind of theoretical asceticism, attestation is a
practical certitude.

166

Anderson explicitly sees in Ricoeur’s notion of conscience one of the expressions of his
philosophical agnosticism.
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4.5.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have explained the philosophical idea that gives its name to
Ricoeur’s main work on the hermeneutics of the self: Oneself as Another. Here Ricoeur
makes a very strong claim: At the core of the self there is an otherness that constitutes the
self. There are several philosophical assumptions that need to be proved in order to make
the idea of a self constituted by an otherness plausible. I have developed them throughout
the chapter. It is time to summarize them.
There is a threefold otherness at the core of the self: The otherness of the body,
the otherness of other people and the otherness of conscience. To each otherness there
corresponds an experience of passivity (the passivity of the body, the passivity of other
people and the passivity of conscience).
The self, in order to be constituted by otherness needs to have a fundamental
openness to otherness. This openness has been shown by Ricoeur at the level of the lived
body (the flesh) by entering into a critical dialogue with Husserl, making the claim that
even the constitution of the flesh (the lived body) is not possible without the other. With
this claim, Ricoeur, from the outset, wants to show that the self is radically opened to
other people. This idea is emphasized by appealing to Heidegger’s idea of facticity and
throwness that show that the self is “always already” opened and constituted by the world.
The same idea of being opened to otherness is affirmed by Ricoeur at the level of the
passivity of other people, by emphasizing the reciprocal dimension of solicitude in
friendship, benevolent spontaneity and sympathy. In these reciprocal relations we observe
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the openness of the self to the good of the other (friendship), to the injunction of other
(benevolent spontaneity) and to the instructive fragility and weakness of the other
(sympathy). Finally, we discussed that conscience is openness to the injunction of
otherness insofar as having a conscience means being-enjoined by otherness. Thus,
openness is the first structure of the self that permits the dialectic between the self and
otherness.
The second structure that we find in the dialectic between the self and the other is
the structure of otherness. Indeed, without an authentic otherness there is no dialectic
between the self and the other. Otherness needs to be preserved in its authentically being
“beyond the self.” The otherness of the self, as it was explained, appears at the level of
the body in the experience of resistance of the body, in the experience of the capricious
humors and in the experience of the physical limits of the things evidenced in the sense of
touch. All these experiences show that the body is a real otherness and a kind of limit for
the self. At the level of other people, Husserl explains well the otherness of others when
he states that there is no original presentation of other selves; these are “appresented,”
presented along with the bodies of others. Finally, the otherness of conscience is shown
in its ambiguous philosophical status. Conscience can be the sedimentation of the voice
of other people, of the ancestors or even of God. This ambiguity seems to preserve for
Ricoeur the otherness of conscience; otherwise, with a too delimited idea of conscience
we could be tempted to represent conscience just as a projection of the self.
So far we have the openness of the self and the otherness of the other. We need a
third element that makes possible the dialectic between the self and the other. In my
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thesis it is attestation that makes this dialectic possible. The dialectic between the self and
otherness supposes that otherness is assumed as part of the self. The idea of Oneself as
Another is that the self recognizes itself in what is other. In other words, the self gains its
own selfhood through otherness. How is it possible that what is other becomes part of the
self? Otherness can become part of the self insofar as the self becomes a self through
otherness and this happens through attestation, in its three main instances: The
experiences of “intimate passivity,” self-esteem and conviction. In the experience of
“intimate passivity,” the self attests to its own self through the experience of having a
body that is felt as my body. This experience possesses the two basic elements of the
attestation of the self through otherness. The body is felt as something external (as
something that “resists” my own efforts) at the same time that the body is felt as being
part of the core of the self. Thus, through this experience the self acquires the confidence,
the trust of existing in the mode of selfhood. This confidence is a very basic one that
serves as the support for the other forms of attestation that we find in the other levels of
passivity.
Self-esteem is an experience of attestation where the dialectic between the self
and the others (the foreign) is fulfilled. Self-esteem is an instance of the attestation of the
self that occurs with the mediation of others. This is so because self-esteem is constructed
by the mediation of others. First, the esteem of the self depends on the evaluation of
actions, which is done socially. Second, the esteem of the self is achieved through the
different figures of solicitude, such as friendship, benevolent spontaneity and sympathy.
The exchange of goods proper to friendship helps build self-esteem insofar as the good is
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achieved with others. The one that is summoned to justice constructs her own self-esteem
insofar as she recognizes the injunction of others in an act of benevolent spontaneity. The
one that shows sympathy constructs his own self-esteem by the gift that he receives from
the dying person that reminds one of one’s own fragility and mortality. All these
instances are driven by the idea of reciprocity and show that the unfolding of self-esteem,
which is a form of attestation, needs the mediation of others. Others never lose their
otherness, but they are recognized as constructing self-esteem and thus as a privileged
instance of the attestation of the self. In this way, through the recognition of others as
building their own self-esteems, once again, we find that the dialectic of the self and
otherness achieves its full meaning.
Finally, the phenomenon of conviction, as an attestation of the self at the level of
conscience, fulfills the dialectic of the self and otherness. In conviction, the injunction of
otherness (either under the form of the “face of the other” or as norms) is assumed and
recognized as part of one’s own self. What is an injunction is assumed as one’s ownmost
conviction and through that conviction, the self attests to its own self.
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Chapter Five

Recognition and Attestation

5.1.

Introduction

So far we have analyzed attestation in relation to human capacities, personal
identity, memory and the otherness of the self. Through this analysis I have tried to shed
some light on the phenomenon of attestation and how it works in the different layers of
the hermeneutics of the self. However, even now a crucial question remains to be
answered. What are the conditions that make attestation possible? In this chapter I
attempt to answer this question. The main thesis of this chapter is that the self in order to
attest to its own self needs to be recognized by others. Without recognition there is no
attestation.
In order to show that attestation is mediated by recognition, I, first, present the
main features of Ricoeur’s philosophy of recognition. Then, I analyze the relation
between recognition, capacity and attestation. Through the idea of capacity, recognition
and attestation come together. The self by recognizing its capacities, attests to its
capacities and to its own self. This step, while making explicit the importance of selfrecognition as a way of attestation of the self, will also show the limits of self-recognition.
In order to recognize my own capacities I need them to be recognized socially. The
problem of the social recognition of capacities will move us to the third step: The
problem of mutual recognition. We will see that the social recognition of capacities, far
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from being taken for granted, always appears along with misrecognition and in the
context of a struggle. The analysis of misrecognition and struggle for recognition will
help us understand the complexities of social recognition paving the way for the
understanding of the conditions that must be satisfied in order to recognize fully the
capacities and the self. Having charted out Ricoeur’s course of recognition I hope to
make clear how attestation is only possible through mutual recognition and what the
conditions for such recognition are.
5.2.

The Course of Recognition

In 2005, Ricoeur gave three lectures on the topic of recognition at the Institut für
die Wissenshaft des Menschens in Vienna. These three lectures were edited and presented
in his last main work, The Course of Recognition. In this work, Ricoeur contends that,
despite the philosophical importance of the idea of recognition, there is no major work
that develops this topic systematically. This is what he provides.
The method Ricoeur adopts is to follow the lexical meaning of the word
‘recognition’ as it is offered in dictionaries. Ricoeur notes that the “word recognition has
a lexical stability that justifies its place as an entry in the dictionary” (Ricoeur 2005a, 2).
In this sense we can speak of a “rule-governed polysemy of the word recognition in its
ordinary usage” (Ricoeur 2005a, 2). However, Ricoeur also finds “a kind of discordance
[that] appears during the comparison of one lexicon with another” (Ricoeur 2005a, 2).
Part of the purpose of The Course of Recognition is to find the rule that governs the
polysemy of the word recognition:
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I shall follow Littré’s advice about the rule that “needs to be discovered.” It lies
concealed behind the succession of twenty-three (yes, twenty-three!) meanings
enumerated. (Ricoeur 2005a, 5)
Ricoeur consults two main dictionaries: Dictionnaire de la langue française and
the Grand Robert de la langue française. After a careful analysis of the main meanings of
the word ‘recognition’ that the dictionaries offer, Ricoeur sees a trajectory of meaning
that goes from recognition as an active operation (where the subject masters and rules the
meaning) to a passive operation where the subject is recognized:
My hypothesis is that the potential philosophical uses of the verb to recognize can
be organized along a trajectory running through its use in the active voice to its
use in the passive voice. This reversal on the grammatical plane will show the
traces of a reversal of the same scope on the philosophical plane. To recognize as
an act expresses a pretension, a claim, to exercise an intellectual mastery over this
field of meaning, of signifying assertions. At the opposite end of this trajectory,
the demand for recognition expresses an expectation that can be satisfied only by
mutual recognition, where this mutual recognition either remains an unfulfilled
dream or requires procedures and institutions that elevate recognition to the
political plane. (Ricoeur 2005a, 19)
As Ricoeur says here, these two senses of recognition mark out a trajectory of
meaning, a course that goes from its active to its passive sense. The trajectory of meaning
that we observe when we analyze the word recognition is analogous to a philosophical
trajectory. Recognition, at first glance, appears as something that depends on the self that
recognizes. However, this is only an appearance. Recognition, indeed, is something that
is granted, as it will be shown particularly in the topic of mutual recognition. This seems
to be the underlying premises in Ricoeur’s philosophy of recognition. The concept of
recognition is not static, but it has its own history and inner development. The self starts
by mastering the meaning of what is recognized, and ends up with the conviction that
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recognition comes from elsewhere. This is not an empirical description of what happens
in each of us, but it is more a logical and normative model that shows that the self
becomes a self only insofar as it is recognized. In this way, we can say that the course of
recognition is indeed the course of the self where we find a dialectical unfolding of the
self analogous and complementary to the one that is found in Oneself as Another.
The conceptual unfolding of the idea of recognition that Ricoeur undertakes s in
his semantic analysis finds a philosophical confirmation in the history of philosophy:
Recognition appears first as an active operation in Descartes and ends up as a passive
operation in Lévinas. My description of this evolution is schematic and succinct and only
aims at clarifying Ricoeur’s idea of recognition. For that reason, I will focus on the
beginning and on the end of Ricoeur’s description of the philosophical evolution of
recognition. I will not linger in the intermediate steps, which would distract us from the
main goal of this chapter of finding the connection between recognition and attestation.
The first sense of the word recognition that Ricoeur develops is the idea of
recognition as identification, which is found in Descartes, where there is an almost total
identification between knowing and recognizing. To recognize is to know something as
such. In that respect, Descartes represents a model of mastering meaning.167 Ricoeur sees
in the late Husserl a major transformation of the idea of recognition. He supports his
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Recognition as identification is related to the recognition of the identity of things, as Connolly
points out: “Recognizing an object entails actively ‘grasping’ its identity…” (Connolly 2007, 134). In
Descartes identification is related with judging and distinguishing, as Moratalla explains: “For Descartes to
judge is to distinguish between what is true and false; to distinguish something is to identify something”
(My translation) (Moratalla 2006, 211).
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thesis by citing Lévinas’ article, “The Ruin of Representation,” in which Lévinas claims
that, in the late Husserl, we find a major transformation in the idea of representation.
According to Lévinas, what marks this transformation is the idea that the meaning of
things exceeds the meaning of what is explicitly given (Lévinas 1998, 115).168 There is a
“surplus of meaning” in the sense that the representation of the thing does not exhaust its
intended meaning. This marks a departure from transcendental idealism and a turn to the
“things themselves” that directly affects the idea of recognition.
The problem of recognition, then, is not situated in the representation of the
subject but in the things themselves, in the sense that recognition is mediated by the
giveness of the object. If we narrow our focus to the different things that can be
recognized, we realize that what they have in common is that they change (Ricoeur 2005a,
61-68). Because they change, the recognition of things is always threatened by the
possibility of misrecognition. Recognition, from a phenomenological point of view, as it
appears in Husserl or Merleau-Ponty, is guided by coherence in perception. Something is
recognized as such insofar as there is some harmony in its perception. However, the
harmony in perception is fragile. It is always possible that at some point the “noema,” as
Husserl puts it, will explode, raising the problem of misrecognition.
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Cited by Ricoeur 2005a, 60.
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Phenomenology thus exposes the very fragility of recognition.169 In Descartes,
recognition appears very close to certitude, because of the identification between
knowledge and recognition. By contrast, in the context of phenomenology, recognition is
an experience that is always threatened by misrecognition, particularly because of the
problem of change. As a consequence, it is never free from the specter of suspicion. This
element of suspicion and uncertainty becomes more crucial when we are trying to
identify human beings.170 Ricoeur shows this element of suspicion by focusing on a scene
from Proust’s Time Regained, where the narrator is thrown into “the spectacle of a dinner
where all the guests who had earlier peopled his solitude and evening outings reappear,
struck by decrepitude under the blows dealt by old age” (Ricoeur 2005a, 66). The
narrator describes his difficulty in recognizing the characters affected by the passage of
time. Here, the problem of recognition and misrecognition appears in all its force.
These epistemological analyses of recognition are important because they set the
ground for the personal and social analysis of recognition. Recognition is primarily an
epistemological act in the sense that to recognize is to know. However, it is a form of
knowledge that, as has been explained, is given to the self. In appearance, to recognize is
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In relation to recognition as identification, Altieri states that “this recognition is precarious,
fallible and often after the fact. The risk of unrecognition – due principally to the fact that things (including
ourselves) can change – goes along with this perceptual recognition” (My translation) (Altieri 2006, 382).
170

If the identity of the thing changes, the recognition of the thing is more difficult, as Moratalla
explains: “The common feature of these ways of being is “change,” the effect of the elapsing of time,
change that is not analyzed from the point of view of the subject, but from that of the object, and which has
been greatly explored in literature” (My translation) (Moratalla 2006, 212).
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an act of mastering meaning, but in fact, to recognize is to accept something that is given
to the self. The same dynamic will be observed at the personal and social level.
5.3.

The recognition of the capacities

The analysis of the history of the idea of recognition serves as a preparation for
entering into the core of Ricoeur’s philosophy of recognition, which has as its horizon
personal recognition. The problem of personal recognition is analyzed in the second part
of the Course of Recognition. In that analysis we find that the problem of self-recognition
is linked to the concept of capacities. In this section I will explore two main theses about
the idea of capacity that will serve to deepen the relation between attestation and
recognition: –The recognition of the capacities of the self mediates the attestation of the
self. – Capacities can only be understood fully from a social perspective and, as a
consequence, need to be socially recognized.
5.3.1. Self-recognition, capacities and attestation

Ricoeur relates the idea of self-recognition to the idea of capacity and attestation.
The recognition of the self happens through the recognition of the capacities of the self
and, at the same time, the self, by recognizing its capacities,171 attests to its own self. For
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Connolly links self-recognition to our capacity to act and accept responsibility: “Recognizing
oneself involves an affirmative declaration of our capacity to act in the world and to accept responsibility
for the repercussions of our actions” (Connolly 2007, 134).
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this reason, Ricoeur states that there is a semantic kinship between attestation and
recognition:
My thesis on this level is that there is a close semantic kinship between attestation
and self-recognition, in line with the “recognizing responsibility” attributed to the
agents of action by the Greeks, from Homer and Sophocles to Aristotle. In
recognizing that they have done something, these agents implicitly attest that they
were capable of doing it. The great difference between the ancient thinkers and us
is that we have brought to the reflexive stage the juncture between attestation and
recognition in the sense of “taking as true.” (Ricoeur 2005a, 91-92)
By recognizing what they have done, the agents attest to their being capable of acting and
affirm their belief in their own capacities, in their being agents.172
Ricoeur notes that the main difference between the notion of recognition in
ancient texts and the notion of recognition in the contemporary reflection on agency lies
in the fact that we have added to the notion of responsibility the idea of being the “true
agent” of our actions. Indeed, it seems that the Greeks did not develop thematically the
reflexivity of actions, that is, the belief the agent possesses that she is the true author of
her actions. For that reason, while it makes sense, in the Greek world, to speak of the
recognition of capacities, the idea of attestation as the belief of being oneself acting and
suffering is rather a modern concept, insofar as this idea of attestation requires a more
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Moratalla explains the link between attestation and self-recognition as follows: “They are
capacities that we hold to be true, that we recognize in us and that we confess, experience and feel. It is not
anymore the recognition-identification of things but the recognition-confession of oneself. Of this selfrecognition there is no proof, no certitude, only attestation. We move here in a kind of truth and in a kind of
certitude proper to the practical field. For Ricoeur there is a close link between attestation and selfrecognition, along the lines of the recognition of responsibility. By recognizing that we have performed an
act, the agent state that they are capable” (My translation) (Moratalla 2006, 214).
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elaborate idea of the self, an idea of the self that apparently was not present in the Greek
world.173
5.3.2. Capacities are social

So far, I have presented the idea of the self-recognition of the capacities. However,
the self-recognition of capacities is not enough because capacities are indeed social, that
is, capacities are only meaningful in the context of a community and they need the
recognition of others in order to be fully developed.174 Thus, the idea of social capacity
serves as a mediation between self-recognition and mutual recognition. At the same time,
the idea of social capacity is important to the idea of attestation. If it is true – as I have
stated here – that the attestation of the self is mediated by the attestation of the capacities,
then, because capacities are social, the attestation of the self is mediated by the
recognition of others.
Ricoeur states that the emphasis that he has placed on the reflexivity of the
capacities, “must not overshadow the alterity implied in the exercise of each modality of
the ‘I can’” (Ricoeur 2005a, 252). Thus, for example, in the case of the capacity to speak,
“to say something – presupposes an expectation of being heard” (Ricoeur 2005a, 253).
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Moratalla relates this change with the Cartesian turn: “The arising of the ‘Cartesian cogito’
constitutes the most important event of thought of modernity, which forces us to think in a different way.
The reflection on persons, identity, and over the self is elevated to a thematic level without precedence”
(My translation) (Moratalla 2006, 213).
174

Connolly emphasizes the fact that the capacities that we recognize are social: “He [Ricoeur]
suggests that what we recognize in ourselves are precisely those characteristics which we share with each
other…” (Connolly 2007, 137).
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The capacity to act “takes place in a setting of interaction, where the other can take on
over time the role of obstacle, helper, or fellow actor” (Ricoeur 2005a, 253). In the case
of the capacity to narrate, we find that “[t]here is no narrative that does not mix together
different life stories,” and that the “plot is the configuration that weaves together events
and characters” (Ricoeur 2005a, 253). In the capacity to be imputable, the alterity is
particularly clear:
[T]he idea of imputability centers on this power to act, over against some other
person, who can be by turns an interrogator (who did this?), an inquisitor (admit it
– you are the author responsible for this act), an accuser (get ready to bear the
consequences of your act, to repair the harm you have done, and to suffer the
penalty). It is before the judge, who assigns guilt more often than he offers praise,
that the subject admits to being the actual author of his act. (Ricoeur 2005a, 254)
In order to explain the idea of socially recognized capacities it is helpful to appeal
to Ricoeur’s reading of the Nobel Prize winning economist, Amartya Sen, who centers
his economical analysis – particularly in his On Ethics and Economics and Commodities
and Capabilities – on the importance of the notion of capacity.175 What is interesting in
Sen’s view is that he adds to the idea of social capacity a normative model that shows
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Connolly sees in Ricoeur’s analysis of Sen’s thought the transition from self-recognition to
mutual recognition. I defend the same interpretation: “Sen demonstrates how the effects of shortages can be
mitigated not only by redistribution, but by providing people with the right to obtain gainful employment.
In this instance having the right to act can forestall famine. Ricoeur uses this example to segue from
recognizing oneself to mutual recognition. This analysis acknowledges that the abstractly conceived
capabilities Ricoeur attributes to individuals may well be restricted and their realization impeded by the
way that societies are organized, the way the rights are conceived, and the way that goods are distributed”
(Connolly 2007, 138). For more on Sen’s thought on human capabilities, see David Crocker’s article
Functioning and Capability: The Foundations of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s Development Ethic (Crocker
1995). For the topic of capacities in general in relation with social justice, see the following studies by
Martha Nussbaum: Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism
(Nussbaum 1992) and Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution (Nussbaum
1998).
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that capacities need to be recognized and promoted by society. This model, we will see,
places us in the threshold of the idea of mutual recognition, which is the topic of the next
section.
Sen criticizes traditional economics for having focused exclusively on the notion
of well-being and for understanding humans as beings only motivated by the
maximization of their own interest and proposes a theory that takes into consideration
other motivations in human beings:
It is difficult to believe that real people could be left out completely by the reach
of the self-examination induced by the Socratic question: ‘How should one live?’
(Sen 1985, 2)176
As a consequence of this expansion of the view of human beings, Sen emphasizes the
importance of agency. Here, the importance of the freedom of the individual and her
capacity to choose comes to the forefront. Sen argues that the capacity to choose and to
develop one’s own capabilities is crucial for human beings, and that, therefore,
economics should focus on creating conditions that enhance people’s freedom.177
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Cited by Ricoeur 2005a, 142.

It is important to note that the freedom Sen promotes is not just the absence of interference or
impediment from others. Using Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between negative and positive freedom, he
asserts that the mere “absences of hindrances that some individual – or principally the state – can impose
on an individual” (negative freedom) (Ricoeur 2005a, 143) are not enough: “[The] protection against the
abusive interference of others, which libertarians place at their pinnacle, is vain if specific measures are not
taken that guarantee this minimal capacity to act” (Ricoeur 2005a, 146). The guarantee of the capacity to
act is equivalent to Berlin’s notion of positive liberty. Positive liberty means the capacity to exercise one’s
own freedom.
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Capacities do not become social capacities until they are recognized by a society.
This recognition of the capacities in Sen’s thought appears through the notion of the right
to capacities and through the idea of collective responsibility (Ricoeur 2005a, 143). It is
the responsibility of society to ensure that individuals can exercise their capacities.
With the analysis of the idea of social capacity, we are ready to entertain in the
idea of mutual recognition. Since capacities are basically social, personal recognition
must be granted by others. I recognize myself through my capacities and the capacities
need to be recognized by others because they are eminently social.
5.4.

Mutual recognition

With the topic of mutual recognition, we enter in the core of this chapter. The
analysis of the notion of capacities has shown us that there is a strong link between
recognition and attestation. By recognizing their capacities, agents attest to their capacity
to act and thereby to their own self. However, at the same time, as we saw in the previous
section, capacities need others to be recognized, because capacities are indeed social. As
a consequence, the capacities of the self can only be attested if they are recognized by
others, recognition that is, indeed, part of a process of mutual recognition as I will explain
in this section.
I start by presenting Ricoeur’s answer to Hobbes challenge about the origin of the
state. For Hobbes, the state is based in our most basic passions of competition, mistrust
and glory. The drive for recognition comes from these passions. Ricoeur, against Hobbes,
states that recognition must be based on a desire of recognition grounded on moral
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principles. This idea of moral recognition finds its first expression in his discussion of
Honneth. In Honneth we find a phenomenological analysis of the effort of people in
society to be recognized at different levels. This analysis will at the same time show the
limits of recognition, and this will pave the way for an analysis of the conditions of
mutual recognition: Reciprocity and unconditionality. These two conditions will help us
understand how the self can attest to its own self through the mediation of others’
recognition.
5.4.1. Moral recognition

Once we have demonstrated that capacities are indeed social, it is necessary to see
the moral context of the idea of recognition. It would be easy to see recognition as just a
competition. However, through the idea of mutual recognition Ricoeur is not just
emphasizing the social dimension of each capacity, but, also, the fact that we need the
recognition of others in order to fully develop our capacities and, in that way, he wants to
restate a basic moral idea of living together. Nonetheless, it is not obvious that human
beings live together in order to recognize one another. Recognition is always threatened
by misrecognition, as illustrated by the history of human civilizations which are marked
by war, neglect or hatred. Thus, for Ricoeur a theory of recognition must, from the start,
face the challenge presented by the bitter truth of misrecognition. In this respect, Hobbes’
theory of the state of nature is paradigmatic. It is a state of “war of all against all,” in
which there are three dominant passions: Competition, distrust and glory (Ricoeur 2005a,
164). Individuals agree to form a state and relinquish their power to the sovereign,
because of the fear of a violent death. Thus, the state has its origin not in a moral motive,
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but in the calculation of individuals. They prefer to relinquish all their rights, because of
the fear of a violent death.
Ricoeur sees a basic problem with the non-moral origin of the state as understood
by Hobbes. He asks himself whether “it suffices, through the intervention of calculation,
to carry the whole edifice of contracts and promises that appears to reconstitute the
conditions of a common-wealth” (Ricoeur 2005a, 170). The will to live in common needs
more motivation than just a calculation of convenience. For Hobbes, the only motivation
to relinquish power to the sovereign is for the security that is provided by the state.
According to Ricoeur, Hegel answers Hobbes’ challenge by providing a moral
idea of the life in common that is expressed in the desire for recognition. For Hegel, the
motivation that impels individuals to live in common is not just the fear of a violent death,
but the desire to be recognized, in the sense of being respected (Ricoeur 2005a, 171-172).
However, recognition is not something that is easily achieved. Hegel develops it in what
he calls the “struggle for recognition.”
5.4.2. Difficult recognition: Honneth’s analysis

In this section, I concentrate on Ricoeur’s remarks on the renewal of Hegel’s
notion of the “struggle for recognition,” particularly by Honneth.178 Honneth renews
Hegel’s notion of “struggle for recognition” by presenting three levels where the struggle
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Moratalla reminds us that the idea of struggle is at the heart of social relations: “…the demand
for recognition does not happen without struggle; indeed the idea of struggle for recognition is at the heart
of modern social relations” (My translation) (Moratalla 2006, 221).
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of recognition takes place: Love, the juridical plane and the level of social esteem.179 He
offers an account of misrecognition at each level. In what follows, I attempt to grasp the
conditions for the social recognition180 of the capacities in the context of the “struggle for
recognition” through the analysis of each of the figures of recognition-misrecognition.
The model of recognition through love encompasses “erotic relations, friendship,
and family ties” (Ricoeur 2005a, 188). It is a level of prejuridical recognition, in which
the subjects confirm each other in relation to their concrete needs (Ricoeur 2005a, 189).
Honneth relates this level to the notion of the “capacity to be alone” as developed in
psychoanalysis and understood as a goal that must be achieved in order to reach personal
maturity. Ricoeur writes:
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Connolly describes Honneth’s analysis as a philosophy of the self analogous to Ricoeur with
more emphasis on the idea of recognition/misrecognition: “Honneth (1995) argues that our sense of selves
is largely a consequence of the way we are recognized by others. He too develops a phenomenology of
selfhood. Rather than identify a suite of individual capacities, however, he develops a schema in which to
place the consequences of social recognition for individual identity. In ideal circumstances the forms of
recognition to which we are subject will facilitate the development of self-confidence, self-respect or
responsibility, and self-esteem. These characteristics of Honneth’s capable agents are derived from the
three forms of social recognition he discusses, namely love-based, rights-based and solidarity- or meritbased recognition. With the first, the recognition of intimates fosters the confidence to interpret and
articulate our needs and desires. Second, the recipient of rights comes to understand that individual capacity
has social consequences; moreover, that the capacity to act is circumscribed by social responsibilities.
Third, public recognition of our achievements, which is largely mediated through employment and wages,
contributes to our understanding of the esteem in which we are held and thereby how we evaluate our lifeprojects” (Connolly 2007, 139).
180

Recognition, in Honneth, is always social and for the most part mediated by institutions, as
Connolly explains: “Honneth… harnesses the term recognition to an investigation into the way people
acknowledge each other. In his work recognition is invariably preceded by the word social and is largely
mediated by institutions, like the state, which structure and regulate patterns of public recognition”
(Connolly 2007, 134). Honneth’s analysis is very useful for Ricoeur’s account since, as Ricoeur, Honneth
sees in misrecognition an obstacle for the development of our capacities: “Honneth also examines the
suffering caused to individuals by misrecognition. In other words he directs the attention to how failures of
recognition compromise our capacity to act” (Connolly 2007, 139).
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Just as the young child must face the test of the absence of the mother, thanks to
which she regains her own capacity for independence, if for his part the child is to
attain the autonomy suitable at his age, in the same way relationships in adulthood
face the test of separation, whose emotionally costly benefit is the capacity to be
alone. And this grows in proportion to the partner’s confidence in the permanence
of the invisible bond that develops in the alternation between presence and
absence. (Ricoeur 2005a, 189)
The “capacity to be alone” is “[b]etween the two poles of emotional fusion and selfaffirmation in solitude” (Ricoeur 2005a, 189). It implies being in a relationship in which
the subjects are respected in their identity and recognize one another. We could even say
that the other two alternatives, emotional fusion and self-affirmation, imply a
misrecognition. Emotional fusion denies recognition because, for recognition to take
place, it is necessary that the individual keeps his or her individuality. If there is a fusion,
then there are no longer different individuals to be recognized. At the same time, if there
is just self-affirmation in solitude, there is no recognition of others, but only selfreference.
What kind of recognition do individuals receive on this level? Ricoeur speaks
here of recognition as approbation of the other’s existence (Ricoeur 2005a, 191). The
opposite of recognition, misrecognition, is expressed in the “[h]umiliation, experienced
as the withdrawal or refusal of such approbation” (Ricoeur 2005a, 191). Misrecognition,
at this level, hurts the base of one’s existence, as Ricoeur states: “Deprived of
approbation, the person is as if nonexistent” (Ricoeur 2005a, 191).
The second kind of recognition occurs at the juridical level. Honneth connects the
juridical level with the level of love. The capacity to be alone that appeared in the sphere
of love is interpreted on the juridical level as the predicate “free,” in the sense of “the
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rationality presumed to be equal in every person considered in his or her juridical
dimension” (Ricoeur 2005a, 197). By the same token, the idea of trust – in the sense of
the confidence in the permanence of the relationship despite the distance that we
observed in the sphere of love – is expressed in the idea of ‘respect’ in the juridical
sphere. As a result, the juridical level is “stamped with a claim to universality that goes
beyond the proximity of ties of affection” (Ricoeur 2005a, 197).
What are recognized at the juridical level are the other person as well as the norm.
Recognition in relation to the norm means “to take as valid, to assert validity” (Ricoeur
2005a, 197). As regards the person, “recognition means identifying each person as free
and equal to every other person” (Ricoeur 2005a, 197). Both recognitions are intertwined.
When I recognize the validity of the norm, I recognize the person that the norm protects
and when I recognize the person, I recognize the validity of the norm that commands
respect for that person.
Ricoeur claims that “juridical recognition adds to self-recognition in terms of
capacities… new capacities stemming from the conjunction between the universal
validity of the norm and the singularity of persons” (Ricoeur 2005a, 197). These new
capacities can be understood in two ways:
…on the one hand, on the plane of an enumeration of personal rights defined by
their content; on the other, on the plane of the attribution of these rights to new
categories of individuals or groups. (Ricoeur 2005a, 198-199)
The struggle for recognition on the juridical level consists in a struggle for new rights and
in the struggle of groups to be considered as holders of those rights. We could speak here
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of a horizontal and a vertical enhancement of rights. In the vertical sense, the struggle for
recognition goes deeper in the recognition of new rights. In this context, Ricoeur
mentions the incorporation of the idea of social rights (such as the right to education,
healthcare, etc.), which are added to civil and political rights (Ricoeur 2005a, 199).
Depending on the level at which a person or group feels excluded, different
feelings are experienced (Ricoeur 2005a, 201):
In this regard, the humiliation that relates to a denial of civil rights is different
from the frustration that relates to not being able to participate in the shaping of
the public will, which is again different from the feeling of exclusion that results
from the refusal of any access to the most basic goods. (Ricoeur 2005a, 200)
Thus, we find that there are three main feelings that are experienced as the result of the
non-recognition of rights in the civil, political and social sphere of rights – humiliation,
frustration and exclusion. These feelings are reflected in the struggle that some groups
undertake in order to extend the sphere of application of rights and arise particularly
when groups compare their own situation to “the types and standards of living attained
elsewhere” (Ricoeur 2005a, 201). Those negative feelings (like humiliation, frustration
and exclusion) are “important impulses in the struggle for recognition” (Ricoeur 2005a,
200).
The third model of recognition that Honneth develops is the idea of social esteem.
Rather than renewing Hegel’s idea of constitution of the state, this notion, instead
emphasizes Hegel’s concept of Sittlichkeit (ethical life). It is a concept “irreducible to
juridical ties” (Ricoeur 2005a, 201). Honneth’s idea of social recognition “sum[s] up all
the modes of mutual recognition that exceed the mere recognition of the equality of rights
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among free subjects” (Ricoeur 2005a, 202). Social recognition presupposes the
“existence of a horizon of values common to the subjects concerned” (Ricoeur 2005a,
202). This horizon of values depends on the cultural conception that a society has of itself
and constitutes the measure by which individuals are esteemed. Every society has a
different set of values by which to esteem individuals. For that reason we find the “very
notion of esteem varying depending on the kind of mediation that makes a person
‘estimable’” (Ricoeur 2005a, 202).
Are these forms of recognition sufficient? Ricoeur warns us that the struggle for
recognition can be an infinite task:
Does not the claim for affective, juridical, and social recognition, through its
militant, conflictual style, end up as an indefinite demand, a kind of “bad
infinity”? This question has to do not only with the negative feelings that go with
a lack of recognition, but also with the acquired abilities, thereby handed over to
an insatiable quest. The temptation here is a new form of the “unhappy
consciousness,” as either an incurable sense of victimization or the indefatigable
postulation of unattainable ideals. (Ricoeur 2005a, 218)
The conflicts involved in the struggle for recognition are never completely settled, since
there are competing parts that want to be recognized. This is particularly evident on the
juridical and social levels. Often, the recognition of one group competes with the
recognition of another group. This is the case not only because the individuals and groups
do not find the deserved recognition, but also because, many times, the desire to be
recognized is, in a way, infinite.
There is a tragic destiny in the struggle of recognition. Recognition will never be
attained because it cannot be grounded in a struggle. It is a contradiction to “force”
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recognition. We can struggle for rights or for different rendering of the social contract,
but the true recognition cannot come out of a struggle. We can appeal here to the cases of
native groups. In many countries they have felt humiliated and segregated. They want to
be recognized, they want to be respected. However, that respect and appreciation cannot
be forced. For that reason, despite the good will of its members, in many societies some
minorities continue to remain unrecognized.
5.4.3. Unconditional and reciprocal recognition

Ricoeur is not seeking a way to end the struggle. Conflicts are hard to settle.181
Still, we may wonder whether the social bond must be constructed on the idea of struggle
or “whether there is not also at its [the social bond’s] origin a kind of goodwill linked to
the similarity between one human being and another in the great human family” (Ricoeur
2005b).
In other words, the question is whether societies can be constructed on the basis
of a positive desire for recognition. Ricoeur thinks that it is important to propose a kind
of “horizon” of full recognition. He does this by postulating what he calls “states of
peace” which serve as a moral motivation:
Experiences of peaceful recognition cannot take the place of a resolution for the
perplexities raised by the very concept of a struggle, still less of a resolution of the
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Connolly sees in Ricoeur’s approach a “healthy skepticism” about the possibilities of being
fully recognized: “Ricoeur’s approach to his topic is characterized by a healthy skepticism, rather than just
speculation, about the success of recognition” (Connolly 2007, 134).
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conflicts in question. The certitude that accompanies states of peace offers instead
a confirmation that the moral motivation for struggles for recognition is not
illusory. This I why we have to turn to days of truce, clear days, what we might
call clearing, where the meaning of action emerges from the fog of doubt bearing
the mark of “fitting action.” (Ricoeur 2005a, 218)
The idea of “states of peace” acts as a kind of regulative ideal, in the Kantian sense of the
word. It is not an ideal that can be completely realized, but it gives a motivation and a
moral direction to the search for recognition.
The notion of states of peace appears in the work of several authors. Ricoeur
refers to two of them: Marcel Hénaff and Luc Boltanski (Ricoeur 2005a, 219, n. 52). In
general, Ricoeur understands the states of peace as “peaceful experiences of mutual
recognition, based on symbolic mediations” (Ricoeur 2005a, 219).182 Ricoeur mentions
three main states of peace that correspond to the three classical forms of love: Philia, eros
and agape. Among the three, Ricoeur thinks that agape is the one that can provide an
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Williams interprets the states of peace as an alternative to an endless conflict in the struggle for
recognition: “Ricoeur affirms mutual recognition is at least possible. The end of the process is not simply
mutual recognition but states of peace. These constitute an alternative to struggle and unhappy
consciousness. However, he limits the expectations of what these might mean. Experiences of peaceful,
non-struggle recognition, cannot take the place of resolution for the perplexities raised by the very concept
of struggle, still less of a resolution of the conflicts in question. States of peace are temporary truces within
the situation of universal conflict, but their significance is a confirmation that the moral motivation for
struggles for recognition is not illusory. States of peace are mediated symbolically, and are distinct from
juridical recognition and the reciprocity constitutive of the commercial order of exchange” (Williams 2008,
470). Moratalla interprets the states of peace in a more radical way, as the ground, for solidarity and
hospitality: “The concept of “states of peace” is the Ricoeurian answer to Hobbes’s challenge and to
Hegel’s response, and it offers us at the same time the elements to found solidarity and hospitality, allowing
that these words stop of being only common places… to become constitutive of our humanity” (My
translation) (Moratalla 2006, 224).
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alternative to the “struggle for recognition,” insofar as agape is the only form of love
based solely on disinterest.183
Agape satisfies one of the essential conditions of recognition: Unconditionality.
True recognition must be unconditional because what is recognized is ultimately the
person’s worth and dignity. If recognition is not disinterested, then it is not a true
recognition. This is so, for example, in the case of adulation. An artist who is recognized
only because he benefits the one who recognizes him cannot feel completely recognized.
However, the unconditionality of love is not enough for having full recognition.
Authentic recognition must be reciprocal. If I am recognized by somebody that I do not
recognize, then that recognition is useless, because in general one appreciates the
recognition that comes from somebody for whom one feels some respect and
consideration. In this sense, recognition has to come from a “competent and willing
recognizer.” Although Ricoeur does not state reciprocity explicitly as one of the
condition for recognition, this idea is implicit in his idea that the full recognition of the
self happens in mutual recognition.
5.5.

The articulation of love and justice

We saw that the basic conditions of mutual recognition are unconditionality and
reciprocity. In this section I try to offer a deeper justification for this thesis by showing
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See Boltanski’s L’amour et la justice comme compétences: Trois essais de sociologie de
l’action (Boltanski 1990).
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the dialectic between love and justice. It is my contention that through this dialectic we
can understand the conditions of mutual recognition and, what is crucial for this
dissertation, namely, the conditions for the attestation of the self.
Ricoeur elaborates the dialectic between love and justice in the Course of
Recognition through the idea of exchanges of gift. However, before discussing this idea it
is important to explain what, in my opinion, serves as its theoretical foundation: The
economy of the gift.
5.5.1. Economy of the gift

The expression “economy of the gift” is enigmatic. Ricoeur does not develop a
systematic doctrine of this economy, but he discusses and develops the concepts involved
in it in many of his writings.184 Hall points out that it is in principle a contradiction to put
together the words “economy” and “gift” since the word economy supposes a logic of
exchange and self-interest while the idea of gift supposes that something is “given to
another out of generosity, without an interest in return, without concern for reciprocation”
(Hall 2006, 190). For Hall the idea of the “economy of the gift” makes sense in the
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In this text, Ricoeur links the economy of the gift with the logic of superabundance and the
logic of equivalence: “It is this commandment [to love one’s enemies], not the golden rule, that seems to
constitute the expression closest, on the ethical plane, to what I have called the economy of the gift. This
expression approximating the economy of the gift can be placed under the title of a logic of
superabundance, which is opposed as an opposite pole to the logic of equivalence that governs everyday
morality” (Ricoeur 1995c, 300) In the same text, Ricoeur relates the economy of the gift to the idea of the
supraethical: “Detached from the golden rule, the commandment to love one’s enemies is not ethical but
supraethical, as is the whole economy of the gift to which it belongs. If it is not to swerve over to the
nonmoral, or even to the immoral, the commandment to love must reinterpret the golden rule and, in so
doing, be itself reinterpreted by this rule” (Ricoeur 1995c, 301).
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context of the “confrontation between the moral ideal of reciprocity and the supramoral
ideal of love” (Hall 2006. 190). While the idea of economy refers to moral relations of
reciprocity, expressed mainly in the idea of justice that we see in the golden rule, the idea
of gift185 is grounded in a theology of salvation, as Hall explains:
The God who is poetically named in the narratives of creation and redemption is
the God with whom humans cannot hold reciprocal relations; the gift of existence,
original and redeemed, cannot be returned to the giver. (Hall 2006, 196)186
The idea of an existence that is given by God as a gift is the foundation for love in its
extreme versions.187 Because God loves us in a way that we cannot reciprocate, we are
expected to do the same to others.

185

I mean that the idea of the gift in the context of an economy of the gift is grounded in a
theology of salvation and not necessarily in other contexts.
186

The same theology of salvation is expressed in the person of Jesus: “…we are – in the manner
of Jesus – to gift others with an exuberant solicitude, without expecting something of equivalent or greater
worth in return. That is, we are to give, and give generously, not in order to get, but simply because, in the
fullness of time, we ourselves have been gifted in myriads ways” (Einsohn 2005, 27-28).
187

There are a lot of textual support in Ricoeur’s work for this interpretation, like the following:
“In order to introduce this major theme, the economy of the gift, I would like to emphasize, following
James Gustafson, the polycentrism of Judeo-Christian symbolism in relation to any moralizing reduction.
In so doing, we set in the foremost place the sense of our radical dependence on a power that precedes us,
envelops us, and support us. This sense is supraethical par excellence. And the symbol that articulates this
experience and confers a sense on it – that is, both a meaning and a direction – is that of an original but
always ongoing creation. No doubt, this symbol sets human beings in the place of honor, but within a
cosmos created before them and that continues to shelter them. Each of us is not left face-to-face with
another human being, as the principle of morality taken in isolation seems to imply. Rather nature is
between us, around us – not just as something to exploit but as an object of solicitude, respect, and
admiration. The sense of our radical dependence on a higher power thus may be reflected in a love for the
creature, for every creature, in every creature – and the love of neighbor can become an expression of this
supramoral love for all creatures” (Ricoeur 1995c, 297-298). In another text, Ricoeur states that the “love
of neighbor, in its extreme form of love for one’s enemies, thus finds its first link to the economy of the gift
in this hyperethical feeling of the dependence of the human creature…” (Ricoeur 1995d, 325).
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In the economy of the gift love and justice correct each other from some of its
possible deformations. At the core of the idea of justice, there is a fundamental
ambiguity, as Ricoeur points out:
We saw the rule of justice oscillate between the disinterested interest of parties
concerned to increase their own advantage as far as the accepted rule will allow,
and a true feeling of cooperation going as far as the confession of being mutual
debtors to one another. (Ricoeur 1995d, 328)188
Justice implies fairness in the sense that the parties must accept rules that are applied to
all, leaving aside their own interests in order to comply with fair rules. In the strict
Kantian sense, the parties must go beyond their own pathological interests, in order to
accept only the rules that can be universalized. The foundation of that disinterestedness is
the recognition of the value of others as ends in themselves. However, at the same time,
the parties involved can act justly for reasons of self-interest. One can be just not because
one respects others, but because it is to one’s own benefit if everyone lives by the rule of
reciprocity. This ambiguity appears more clearly in the golden rule. The rule ‘do not do
to others what you do not want others to do to you’ can be interpreted on the one hand as
a way of considering the intrinsic worth of the other and on the other hand, as a
justification for using others to my own benefit.189 I can restrain myself from doing to
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Hall claims that Ricoeur places the golden rule and the love command in a dynamic encounter:
“He argued that posing the golden rule and love command along the lines of dynamic encounter, rather
than static opposition, offers a profound solution…” (Hall 2007, 152).
189

Hall mentions a possible misinterpretation of the golden rule. One is called a “reactive
reciprocity” and the other an “instrumental reciprocity”: “…the golden rule might be interpreted in terms of
what I have called a reactive reciprocity: do to others what they do to you. It is this orientation that links the
golden rule to the “eye for an eye” of the law of retribution. Second, and perhaps more insidious, the
golden rule can be interpreted in terms of a kind of instrumental reciprocity: I give so that you will give”
(Hall 2007, 151). To point out the risks involved in the idea of justice expressed in the golden rule in no
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others what I do not want others to do to me because I respect them as human beings with
the same worth as me. But I can also restrain myself from doing to others what I do not
want others to do to me as a way to ensure that others will not do anything that can harm
me.190 Thus, the golden rule is “in a concrete fashion, at the heart of an incessant conflict
between self-interest and self-sacrifice” (Ricoeur 1995c, 301). We could say that the
golden rule is always in between a Kantian interpretation (where the goal is to respect the
other) and a utilitarian interpretation (where the goal is to maximize one’s own benefit).
In this context, the commandment to love our enemies corrects the tendency of exploiting
the golden rule in a utilitarian fashion, as Wall states:
Theological love is able to disorient our ordinary tendency toward utilitarianism
because, according to Ricoeur, it is not good to be pursued (as is love in the
ordinary meaning of the term), but a command to be obeyed. (Wall 2001, 246247).191

way undermines the value and importance of this rule, as Hall explains: “The Golden Rule is expressive of
the ideal of reciprocity characteristics of justice in two senses. First, the Golden Rule highlights the
fundamental asymmetry of action, the fact that action involves both an agent and a patient. This recognition
is guaranteed by the tension between “doing unto others” and “as oneself.” Opposed to a conception of the
situation of action solely in terms of the confrontation between two agents, this presentation of action
recognizes both an actor and another who is a potential victim. The merit of the Golden Rule is its
acknowledgment, at the level of grammar, of both the one who acts and the one who is acted upon. Second,
the Golden Rule sets both agent and patient on the same footing relative to the deliberation over action. An
equivalence is established in the application of the Golden Rule to discrete situations; both myself and
others are potential aggressors or potential victims” (Hall 2002, 152).
190

This possible perversion of the golden rule and the idea of justice is called by Wall a new
“deontological radical evil” and can take more pernicious forms degenerating into vengeance as “an
‘original violence’ that attempts to ‘equalize’ a prior violation of goods with a calculated violence to the
goods of the offender” (Wall 2001, 245).
191

Along the same lines, Wall adds: “Our fallen incapacity for respecting genuine otherness is
therefore resisted and turned around, Ricoeur argues, only through a still more primordial capacity for
superabundant love. Through the radical limit-experience of God’s love for us, we are able to catch the
glimmer of a divine economy that reverses the ordinary devolution of human relations into utilitarian
exchange” (Wall 2001, 247).
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However, it is not only that love corrects justice, but also the case that justice
corrects love from its own possible deformations. Hall describes the risks and perils of a
misunderstood idea of love:
Equally perverse and immoral, the demand to forgo reciprocity encountered in the
superabundant logic of the love command too easily inclines toward a
misinterpreted self-degradation in the face of the object of love. The vulnerable in
society are made to bear the brunt of a ‘love’ that leaves physical and emotional
scars, and too often on claims of biblical precedent: a woman ‘cherishes’ her
husband by remaining submissive in the face of beatings; children ‘honour’ their
parents by remaining quiet in the face of physical and emotional neglect; the slave
obeys his master as a show of love for God. (Hall 2006, 200)
The commandment of love, without the idea of justice can be interpreted in ways that can
be very destructive for the subject that is summoned to love. Thus, the idea of justice
introduces a fundamental element that should be present in relations of love: The idea of
reciprocity.192
To summarize, the economy of the gift seems to contain two fundamental ideas:
First, that love should be unconditional193 and second, that it should be reciprocal.
Through these two elements, the economy of the gift serves as a good foundation for
recognition, since, as it has been stated above, recognition should be unconditional and
reciprocal as well. However, the economy of the gift has the limitation of being grounded
in a theology of salvation. We are supposed to love one another unconditionally because
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Reciprocity is not a condition for love, because otherwise love would not be unconditional.
However, it seems that reciprocity is needed to correct love from its possible corruptions.
193

Gedney makes a direct connection between the idea of gift and love in Ricoeur: “We give a gift
in the name of generosity, and thus love, and we receive in return in that name as well” (Gedney 2008, 69).
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of God’s unconditional gift of existence. How is it then possible to formulate a
philosophy of recognition based in the idea of unconditional and reciprocal recognition
without appealing to a theology of God’s gift of existence?
5.5.2. Exchange of gifts

We need to find phenomenological evidence to show that it is possible to have an
experience of unconditional and reciprocal recognition (analogous to the idea of agape).
Ricoeur finds this phenomenological evidence in the idea of the exchange of gifts that
serves as a model of recognition, a phenomenological equivalent of the state of peace of
agape. Ricoeur focuses on the idea of an exchange of gifts as a symbolic event194 in
which recognition happens.195 Through the exchange of gifts, the individuals recognize
one another. As stated above, recognition supposes unconditionality and reciprocity. The
idea of a ‘gift’ contains the idea of unconditionality, since, in principle, a gift is
something that it is given without expecting anything in return (otherwise it would not be
a gift).196 At the same time, in an exchange of gifts, there is an element of reciprocity.

194

The exchanges of gift is a symbolic event in the sense that the meaning of the act transcends
the value of the gift, as Tatranský points out: “Even for a material gift, however, the value of the gift ideally
transcends the worth of the thing I give, since it is rather an expression or a token of gratuity and generosity
of my love towards the other” (Tatranský 2008, 304).
195

Williams, along the same lines, sees the gift-exchange as a symbolic mutual recognition and as
an expression of the state of peace called agape: “Ricoeur’s thesis is that the gift exchange is a symbolic
mutual recognition. This makes it necessary to sort out the ‘good’ reciprocity from the bad (conditional)
reciprocity. Ricoeur proposes that the second gift is a response to the call of Agape coming from the first
gift” (Williams 2008, 471).
196

The idea of an unconditional gift is tied to the idea of unconditional love which is controversial
when it is analyzed without giving it a theological foundation. For more on this controversy see Anderson’s
Unselfing in Love: A Contradiction in Terms (Anderson 2006).
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However, the exchange of gifts can easily be transformed into a mere do ut des, that is, I
give to you in order that you give to me. Ricoeur tries to solve this problem by appealing
to an interpretation of the exchange of gifts that preserves the idea of giving without
expecting anything in return. He does this by referring to another meaning of the notion
of recognition: Recognition as gratitude (one of the meanings that the French word
reconnaissance has is, precisely, ‘to be grateful to’). The person who receives a gift gives
in return, because she is grateful. Thus, through the idea of recognition as gratitude,
Ricoeur advances the possibility of thinking of two simultaneous acts of giving, neither
of which is performed because of an expectation of anything in return. The one who
receives gives in return because she is grateful, but not because she feels a juridical or
moral obligation to do it.197
For Ricoeur, the idea of exchange of gifts is a model of recognition insofar as, in
the exchange the subjects recognize one another. By giving something to you, I am
celebrating and recognizing your existence, your value.198 The “risk of the first gift, the
risk of its offer, preserves something of the disinterested character of Agape” (Williams

197

The giving of a gift initiates a relation that calls for a response, as Williams explains: “The
generosity of the gift does not call for restitution, which would amount to annulling or canceling the first
gift as a gift, but rather calls for a response to the offer. The first gift is re-read here as an initiation of
relation, an offer that can be refused or accepted” (Williams 2008, 471).
198

Ricoeur in his discussion goes against some interpretations that only see the practice of gift
giving as a form of commercial exchange where the gifts are given as a fulfillment of an obligation. One of
the interpretations that is discussed is the one by Mauss who sees in the idea of gift a force that people feel
the obligation to transmit and not stop. As Williams explains, in such an interpretation the very idea of gift
disappears, since a gift, by definition, implies the absence of constraint: “Mauss cites the Hau, as the force
in the gift that obligates a gift in return. But when a gift thus obliges a gift in return (exchange), what
disappears is the very idea of the gift in the first place” (Williams 2008, 470-471).
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2008, 471). By giving something in return, I am showing gratitude,199 consideration for
your act, for your person, and, thus, I am recognizing you as a person.
5.5.3. The concept of mutuality

What kind of recognition happens in the midst of the exchange gifts? Ricoeur
prefers to speak of a mutual recognition than a reciprocal recognition.200 Mutuality
supposes reciprocity201 but in mutuality there is additional awareness of the differences
among the members. Mutuality is a space in between those who are present in the
exchange of gifts:
…the recourse made to a concept of mutual recognition amounts… to a plea in
favor of the mutuality of relations between those who exchange gifts, in contrast
with the concept of reciprocity that the theory places above social agents and their
transactions. (Ricoeur 2005a, 232)

199

Tatranský describes rather well the feeling of gratitude that the first gift engenders: “As such,
my gift awakes in the other originally not an obligation to give another gift in return, but a feeling of
gratitude, which eventually moves the other – but from within, so to speak – to reciprocate, even if I have
no right to expect the return of the gift…” (Tatranský 2008, 304).
200

I follow here Moratalla’s interpretation of Ricoeur who states that Ricoeur prefers to speak of
mutuality to avoid the risks of reciprocity: “In these experiences a reciprocal recognition is produced that
erases interpersonal limits, and for that reason Ricoeur prefers to speak of mutuality in order to distinguish
it from the experiences that are under the logic of reciprocity” (My translation) (Moratalla 2006, 224-225).
201

David Pellauer distinguishes between these two notions in the following way: “…these recent
theories of recognition do not really get beyond the idea of reciprocal recognition, which can all too easily be
limited to narrow contexts, such as commercial exchanges. In these narrow cases, the selves involved are
simply those required for participating in the exchange; nothing more about them needs to be known or
acknowledged. Beyond this reduction to what he sees as a diminished self, Ricoeur wants to argue that
mutual recognition goes beyond every explanation in terms of a struggle for recognition present in Hegel and
his successors. Mutual recognition depends more on ‘states of peace’ than on those of struggle and conflict”
(Pellauer 2007, 131).
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Reciprocity is a relationship viewed from “above,” where the subjects are
interchangeable, because the position of each subject is not important. Mutuality stresses
the non-interchangeability of the subjects whereby each one occupies a position that
cannot be exchanged for that of the other. In mutuality there is reciprocity, but that
reciprocity is based on the intrinsic worth of the subjects that cannot be exchanged. The
non interchangeability of the subjects seems to be crucial because it safeguards
differences and the possible asymmetry among them. Because it tends to forget the
differences between the subjects, reciprocity may at the same time erases the alterity of
the self, which is a form of misrecognition, as Ricoeur suggests here:
…I want to turn the objections that each phenomenologist runs into along his own
way into a warning addressed to every concept of the primacy of reciprocity over
the alterity of the protagonists in an exchange with each other. (Ricoeur 2005a,
262) 202
Mutuality builds a “space” where dissymmetry can be preserved, and this has many
advantages, as Ricoeur explains:
Admitting the threat that lies in forgetting this dissymmetry first calls attention to
the irreplaceable character of each of the partners in the exchange. The one is not
the other. We exchange gifts, but not places. The second benefit of this admission
is that it protects mutuality against the pitfalls of a fusional union, whether in love,
friendship, or fraternity on a communal or a cosmopolitan scale. A just distance is

202

Williams makes explicit the risks of reciprocity: “Ricoeur, like Hegel, defends reciprocity
qualified as mutuality. However there is still a problem: if the praise of mutual recognition leads us to
forget the ‘originary asymmetry in the relation between self and others,’ this would be the ultimate
misrecognition at the heart of actual experiences of mutual recognition” (Williams 2008, 472).
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maintained at the heart of mutuality, a just distance that integrates respect into
intimacy. (Ricoeur 2005a, 263) 203
Thus, full recognition can only be built upon mutuality, where the subject is granted its
full value. Mutuality presupposes justice, but yet is founded on agape, that is, on the
possibility of a love that is disinterested.204
By emphasizing the idea of mutuality, it seems that Ricoeur is warning us against
a liberal idea of recognition where we overstress reciprocity for the sake of recognition
and we overlook the differences among subjects. This liberal notion of recognition can be
observed in some public policies that assume that giving equal opportunity to all the
members will automatically bring recognition. However, since not all relations in a
society are among equals, any politics of recognition must start recognizing the
differences and the dissymmetries that are present in relations. A politics of recognition
just based on equality can exert violence against groups that cannot be treated equally
because they are found in an initial relation of dissymmetry.

203

Williams expands upon the ideas presented by Ricoeur in the paragraph cited above, pointing
out the paradox that in order to preserve recognition I have to keep dissymmetry: “It may appear that to readmit dissymmetry into mutuality is once again to raise the suspicion that dissymmetry can undermine that
very mutuality and reconciliation inherent in the process of recognition. After all, that was the very
inference that Ricoeur drew against both Husserl and Lévinas. At stake is the meaning of the ‘between.’
Even in the between I am not you; we exchange gifts but not places.” (Williams 2008, 472).
204

Jervolino connects the idea of mutuality with Ricoeur’s idea of translation: “Translation as a
labor of memory and the mourning it requires, being always faced with the challenge of the untranslatable,
help us maintain the appropriate distance from the other, the appropriate distance that reconciles respect
with intimacy” (Jervolino 2008, 233-234). Kaplan, introducing the article just quoted, summarizes rather
well the parallel between recognition and translation: “…the capacity to translate reveals a new form of
vulnerability that reminds us of our limitations in understanding and communicating with others.
Translation is the paradigm of our relation to the other – an asymmetrical yet mutual relation between self
and other, including other cultures, religions, and historical ages. Jervolino relates Ricoeur’s model of
translation to his notion of recognition developed in his final book, The Course of Recognition: both
attempt to respect the other while preserving the alterity of the other” (Kaplan 2008, 11).
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5.6.

Conclusion

With the idea of mutuality we reach the end of our analysis of the course of
recognition. How does this course of recognition help us get a better understanding of the
problem of attestation?
My main thesis is that the notion of recognition reinforces the idea that the
attestation of the self is always mediated. In this case, attestation is mediated through
recognition. We observed how this was the case when we related self-recognition and
attestation. The recognition of our own capacities allows the attestation of those
capacities and the attestation of the self. In order to attest to our self, we need to attest to
our capacities. In order to attest to our capacities, we need to recognize our capacities.
Thus, recognition becomes the path to attestation.
That attestation is mediated through recognition becomes even more clear when
we look up the topic of mutual recognition. Ricoeur states that the capacities need to be
recognized by others in order that we may attest to them. This is so, because capacities
are basically social capacities. Thus, it is not enough for attestation to be mediated by a
simple self-recognition of capacities, but it needs to be mediated by the recognition of the
other.
That recognition is in need of social mediation by others in order to attest to one’s
own capacities can be easily seen by noting that capacities are mainly social capacities.
However, the claim that we need the recognition of others in order to attest to our own
self is controversial to say the least. To be fair, Ricoeur never makes this claim in the
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Course of Recognition. However, he explicitly states that the social recognition of society
is required in order to attest to our capacities and he also states, mainly in Oneself as
Another, that the attestation of the self and the attestation of the capacities are closely
connected. Thus, it seems consistent to believe that Ricoeur would accept the claim that
the social recognition of the capacities is required for the attestation of the self.
However, the attestation of the self is the belief, the trust of existing in the mode
of selfhood. Is the social recognition of others a necessary condition for this belief, this
trust in one’s own existence in the mode of selfhood? In order to answer these questions,
we should make some distinctions. We need to distinguish between different levels of
attestation. Firstly, we have a very basic form of attestation, an attestation required in
order to have a minimal sense of selfhood. I am thinking here of the minimal awareness
that is required in order to recognize oneself as a self. This attestation depends on the
recognition of the people that are closest to the self. Without this basic recognition, there
probably is no self at all. This basic recognition can be located at the first, i.e., the
affective level of the struggle for recognition, as distinguished by Honneth. Secondly, we
can identify a deeper attestation of the self, an attestation required in order to recognize
one’s own responsibilities, or in order to believe in our capacity to be agents of social
change. For this attestation, it seems that the recognition by the social body is required.
This attestation happens at the juridical and the social level of the struggle for recognition.
In addition, the role of others in the very attestation of the self appears clearly if
we link recognition to the problem of social identity. Ricoeur, indeed, explicitly links the
problem of attestation with the problem of identity:
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As for our third major theme, placed under the heading of mutual recognition, we
can already say that with it the question of identity will reach a kind of
culminating point: it is indeed our most authentic identity, the one that makes us
who we are, that demands to be recognized. (Ricoeur 1992, 21)
If our identity is that of and for which we demand recognition, and if, as Ricoeur also
claims, identity is what makes us who we are, then it makes perfect sense to claim that
the social recognition, granted by the social body, is required to attest to one’s self, as we
see in the struggle that some minorities have to engage in order to keep their own identity.
This struggle becomes particularly tragic when it happens in the context of a process of
modernization. Traditional groups understand their own world in particular ways, but
these groups suddenly find themselves threatened by processes of modernization that do
not recognize their identities, or the validity of their understanding. In such a situation,
the groups’ struggle for recognition becomes a struggle for the very survival of their
selves. In that context, the claim that attestation is a ‘right to demand’ gains its full sense.
By connecting attestation with the struggle for recognition, we can speak of a
‘struggle for attestation.’ If the social recognition of the capacities is necessary for the
attestation of the capacities and the attestation of the self, then the struggle for
recognition is also a struggle for attestation. The subjects, in demanding recognition, are
also, thereby, demanding that they be allowed to attest to their selves. This is consistent
with the following statement by Ricoeur:
Attestation has become a demand, a right to require, under the rubric of the idea
of social justice. (Ricoeur 2005a, 148)
We can examine critically the claim that attestation is mediated by recognition by
appealing to Meech’s reflections on attestation. Meech comes very close to the
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conclusion that I have presented here – that attestation is mediated through the
recognition of others – by relating the idea of attestation to the idea of community.
Meech’s argument is complex and is developed in several steps. First, he reminds us that
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self is developed through many different kinds of
discourses – “Fregean semantics, speech act theory, pragmatics, studies of identity,
narrative theory, and ethics” (Meech 2007, 115). At the end of all these detours we
discover – with Ricoeur – that the self has only analogical unity and, therefore, – Meech
adds – that the effort of moving to an ontology of the self must happen in the midst of a
conversation where all these discourses come together:
So if an ontology of the self is possible, then there is a discursive space in which
participants in these diverse discourses converse about aspects of the same reality,
namely, a self that is a unity, even if only analogically. That the self is an
analogical unity respects that the self is never glimpsed as a whole but in detours.
This analogical unity does not ground these discourses (it always comes too late)
but is disclosed retrospectively as something presupposed and (indirectly) talked
about. (Meech 2006, 115)
Then, the attestation of the self happens in the midst of a community of inquirers:
What gives credence to an ontology of the self? On the one hand, it is the
testimony that emerges at the end of an itinerary of detours. Yet a community is
the condition of testimony – it opens the discursive space where self and other
meet; notwithstanding, in such meetings the self and the other carry their
communities into the future. The testimony that arises in a hermeneutics of the
self is thus the testimony of a community of inquirers. (Meech 2006, 116)
The inquirers, by recognizing one another in the legitimacy of their claims, can attest to
the self that is present in the different discourses. In this sense, attestation happens in an
experience of recognition that is not as different from the experiences of recognition that
are described in the Course of Recognition.
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The effort of developing an ontology of the self in the context of a community is
remarkable and original. Meech recognizes that Ricoeur does not go that far. Meech
points out that the dialectic between the Same and the Other (that is at the core of
Ricoeur’s ontology of the self) needs the community to be completed (Meech 2006, 116).
He advances this thesis by showing the role of the community in the three expressions of
the dialectic of the Same and the Other: The dialectic between the self and the flesh, the
dialectic between the self and the other people and the dialectic between the self and
conscience. Meech tries to show how without the support of the community these
dialectics cannot be fulfilled. For example, with respect to the dialectics between the self
and the body, Meech states:
…the community that provides me the resources to relate to my body as other, in
a world with others, can also negatively impact my prior relation to my body: first
by wounding my ability to live out that relatedness and second by wounding my
ability to express my suffering when it denies me access to the community’s
narrative resources. (Meech 2006, 117)
In Meech’s reflection we see a slight shift of attention from the idea of a community of
inquirers to the idea of the actual community in which the self lives. I think that Meech is
right in emphasizing the role of the community in both instances: In the inquiry about the
self and in the life of the self in a community. The only shortcoming that I see in Meech
in this respect is that he does not make explicit the shift from the community of inquirers
to the community in which actual selves live. However, it is a minor problem in
comparison to his insightful idea that attestation needs the mediation of a community. It
is remarkable that Meech arrives at conclusions that are similar to the ones that Ricoeur
arrives at in the Course of Recognition by expanding some ideas that Ricoeur develops in
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Oneself as Another. In this sense we could state that the Course of Recognition is a
continuation of Oneself as Another.
Through the concept of recognition, the idea of attestation undergoes important
transformations. In the course of this dissertation, I have presented attestation as an act
that comes from the self and is expressed mainly in the idea of capacities. The self attests
to its self, through the assurance of being itself acting. It is true that Ricoeur also adds to
this definition the idea of being itself suffering. However, at least in the first three
chapters, we saw that attestation is more related to the idea of acting than to the idea of
suffering. It is only in the fourth chapter that the dimension of passivity enters the scene
by making room for the possibility that the self attest to its self by being affected by its
body, other people and its conscience. However, attestation is still located in an initiative
of the self. It is true that the self is constituted by several passivities. However, these
passivities need to be assumed by the self.
By relating the idea of attestation to the idea of recognition, for the first time,
attestation becomes something that is granted more that something that depends on the
self. The self, to attest to its own self, needs to be recognized by others. This recognition,
as I have stated, is granted through the recognition of the capacities. When my capacities
are recognized, I can recognize myself in my capacities and, as a consequence, I can
attest to my own self.
In this way, through recognition we can understand several cases where the self
fails to attest to itself: People whose culture has been so attacked that they have lost any
sense of self-identity; people who have been so deeply humiliated that they have lost their
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capacity for acting or people whose memory has been erased as a consequence of
personal or collective trauma. Once again, through the discussion of recognition, we are
reminded of the fragility of attestation. The self is not something that is gained once and
for all, but is always a work in progress.
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Conclusion

The purpose of this dissertation has been to show how attestation helps us move
from a hermeneutics to an ontology of the self. Commentators have and Ricoeur himself
has admitted that attestation has a central role in the ontology of the self. Also, in Oneself
as Another, Ricoeur declares that attestation is the key for the whole book. However, it
has not been clearly shown in the secondary literature what the hermeneutical role of
attestation is and how that hermeneutical role of attestation helps us to move to an
ontology of the self. Thus, my main contribution has been to show the hermeneutical role
of attestation and how this hermeneutical role helps us to arrive at an ontology of the self.
We can thus make sense of the title of this dissertation: Attestation as a bridge between
hermeneutics and ontology. In what follows, I will stress some of the main theses that are
present in this dissertation and I will suggest some possible further developments to the
ideas presented here. First, I will emphasize the role of attestation as a hermeneutical key
for Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self. Second, I will show how the hermeneutical role of
attestation can help us to move to an ontology of the self. Finally, I will advance some
views about the role that attestation can have in Ricoeur’s general hermeneutical project.
1.

Attestation as a hermeneutical key

Throughout this dissertation I have tried to make clear the meaning as well as the
critical role played by attestation in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self. I introduced my
project by stating that attestation has a key role in the three dialectics of the self
illustrated in Oneself as Another. The first dialectic is the dialectic between analysis and
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reflection. The role of attestation in this dialectic is that of appropriation, insofar as
through attestation the self appropriates its capacities. The second dialectic is the dialectic
between idem-identity and ipse-identity. In this second dialectic, we attest to ourselves
not only by understanding our self through narratives, but by affirming that a specific
narrative configuration expresses our identity. The third dialectic is between sameness
and otherness. It is only through attestation that we are able to assume what is other than
ourselves as something that constitutes our very selves and without which we would not
be who we are.
Ricoeur states that the most important of the three dialectics is the dialectic
between sameness and otherness. This dialectic encompasses the other two. I have said
that attestation can be described as having the role of appropriation, affirmation and
assumption (in the sense of assuming what is other than ourselves). The idea of
appropriation encompasses the idea of affirmation and assumption. We can say that
attestation has the role of allowing the appropriation of our own selves through otherness.
In other words, the confidence of being oneself acting and suffering (attestation) is gained
through the confidence that what is other than ourselves constitutes our own selves. Thus,
the self gains the confidence of being a self through the confidence that the actions it
performs and the words it says are its own actions and words; the confidence that the
narratives it tells express its own identity; the confidence that the body is its own body;
the confidence that the esteem of others constitute its own esteem and that the values that
it embraces are its own values.
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2.

Attestation as an ontological key for the hermeneutics of the self

How does this hermeneutical role of attestation – allowing for the appropriation of
the self through otherness – helps us move towards an ontology of the self? First, we
have to say that attestation has both a hermeneutical and an ontological function.
Hermeneutically speaking, attestation allows the self to appropriate its own otherness.
Indeed the self is able to understand and interpret its own activities and passivities only
by appropriating its own otherness. Ontologically speaking, the self becomes a self only
by appropriating otherness. At the hermeneutical level, attestation answers to the question
how can I know that I am a self? I know that I am self by appropriating otherness. At the
ontological level, attestation answers the question: How I become a self? I become a self
by appropriating otherness. By “appropriation” I mean basically to recognize something
as my own thing, not to make mine what is not mine. For that reason, sometimes it may
be better to speak of assumption or affirmation or recognition. In any case, the words that
are chosen are not what matters the most, but the most important thing is to account for
the phenomenon that is the self.
Now it is time to enunciate some of the ontological traits of the self that appear
when we connect ontology with hermeneutics through attestation. First, the self is
attestation, that is, the self is the confidence of existing in the mode of selfhood. This can
be misleading if we interpret confidence as a theoretical certainty. This certainty,
however, is a practical certainty mediated by several expressions of the self: Capacities,
identity and the otherness of the self. Thus, the practical certainty of being a self is the
practical certitude of, among others being capable of speaking, acting, narrating,
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recognizing responsibility, promising, remembering, having an identity, having a body,
responding to the injunction of the other, and having a conscience. Secondly, the self it is
not something that is given once and for all, but it is constructed by the appropriation of
otherness. This relates to Ricoeur’s idea of human existence as an effort of existing that
he borrows from Nabert, who understands existence as a desire to be and an effort to
exist. This desire to be and this effort to exist are expressed, as we will later see, as the
appropriation of the otherness of the self, through the appropriation of its own corporality
or of its own convictions. Thirdly, the idea of the self as an act of appropriation and as an
effort connects with the idea of the self as dynamis that Ricoeur develops in Oneself as
Another. For Ricoeur the right ontology of the self cannot be built on an ontology of
substance, but rather on an ontology of a act/potency, that is, on the idea that the self is an
acting being: The self appropriates otherness in a dynamic way.
The role of otherness in the attestation of the self is radicalized through what was
expressed in the fifth chapter: The idea of recognition. The self must be recognized in
order that it may attest to its own self. This suggests two other ontological layers: The
self as something that is given to the self and the self as a response. There is textual
evidence for this:
This point is that human being has no mastery over the inner, intimate certitude of
existing as a self; this is something that comes to us, that comes upon us, like a
gift, a grace, that is not at our disposal. (Ricoeur 1996b, 455)
Attestation as the inner certitude of existing as a self, according to this text, is not
something that we master but it is rather given as a gift or as a grace. This assertion takes
the idea that to be oneself is to be another – the main statement of the book “Oneself as
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Another” – to its ultimate consequences: The self does not belong originally to the self,
but is given. If selfhood is given to the self, we wonder what the role of the self in that
giveness is. Ricoeur gives such a strong role to passivity in the constitution of the self
that we could even say that the self is pure passivity in the sense that we have a body, a
conscience, a tradition, a culture and a language that is given. Even our most original
thoughts come in a linguistic articulation that is given to us. However, at the same time,
we have to respond in an act of appropriating of what is given to us, insofar as we have to
appropriate our body, the esteem that others have for us, and the values and norms that
are given to us in the form of injunctions. This appropriation can be seen as a response
that has the form of attestation, that is, of a confidence that this is my body, that some
actions make me good, and that some norms and values express my deepest convictions.
Finally, we wonder whether there are different forms of attesting to the self. I
contend that attestation may take different forms, since the self not only attests to its own
self, but it attests to its own self in a particular way. This is especially clear in the idea of
injunction discussed in the fourth chapter, where we saw that conscience, as an instance
of attestation, is basically a response to an injunction. The self, by attesting to its self
through conscience, can respond to that injunction in different ways, as is evident in the
different attitudes that people take regarding moral issues. I can “listen” to the voice of
conscience but not follow that voice or, worse, I can chose not to listen, not to be open to
the injunction of conscience. Thus, attestation has an evident ethical dimension. Indeed,
Ricoeur, as I pointed out in the fourth chapter, states that in conviction attestation
becomes the “conviction of judging well and acting well in a momentary and provisional
approximation of living well” (Ricoeur 1992, 180)

247

3.

Attestation as an ontological key for Ricoeur’s general hermeneutical project

Ricoeur’s hermeneutical philosophy cannot be understood without relating it to
Nabert’s philosophy. In the essay “Nabert on Act and Sign” Ricoeur presents the main
challenge of Nabert’s philosophy:
[To show]…the relationships between the act whereby consciousness posits and
produces itself and the signs wherein consciousness represents to itself the
meaning of its action. (Ricoeur 1974b, 211)
Herein lies a paradox: We want to understand what is the original motivation of our acts
but the only way to understand that is by following the signs and representations of our
original acts. However, we focus on signs and representations not simply to confine
ourselves to that level but in order to understand the original act that is expressed in those
signs and representations. This process is called by Nabert the recovery, the “move from
the representation to the act” (Ricoeur 1974b, 215). Ricoeur’s philosophy takes this task
of analyzing the signs, symbols and expressions as a way to understand the self. This is
the main goal of his own philosophy, as he explains:
…by understanding ourselves, we said, we appropriate to ourselves the meaning
of our desire to be or of our effort to exist. Existence, we can now say, is desire
and effort. We term it effort in order to stress its positive energy and its
dynamism; we term it desire in order to designate its lack and its poverty: Eros is
the son of Poros and Penia. Thus the cogito is no longer the pretentious act it was
initially – I mean its pretension of positing itself; it appears as already posited in
being. (Ricoeur 1974a, 21)
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Ricoeur starts from Nabert’s idea that existence is a desire to be and an effort to exist.205
What is added by him is the need to appropriate our existence by understanding the
meaning of that desire and effort. Secondly we see here the phenomenological
affirmation that we “always already” find ourselves in existence. Thus, our cogito is
already posited in being. This marks an opacity of the cogito that will be essential for
Ricoeur’s philosophical project:
The cogito is not only a truth as vain as it is invincible; we must add, as well, that
it is like an empty place which has, from all time, been occupied by a false cogito.
We have indeed learned, from all the exegetic disciplines and from
psychoanalysis in particular, that so-called immediate consciousness is first of all
“false consciousness.” (Ricoeur 1974a, 18)
The cogito as a transparent truth is empty. The cogito is already posited in the midst of
human endeavors. Moreover, in that cogito we find many distortions that make illusory
any effort of grasping the cogito as the foundation of a philosophical system, à la
Descartes.
Be that as it may, it is still the task of philosophy to make sense of our existence
as the desire to be and the effort to exist. In this sense, Ricoeur’s philosophy is not
different from Heidegger’s ontology of Dasein. Both philosophies try to understand our
being. However, Ricoeur’s stress on the opacity of the self ends up as the main difference
of method from that of Heidegger. For Ricoeur, Heidegger takes the “short route” in the

205

Hall summarizes this idea: “Humans are oriented in existence by desire. My striving toward
selfhood is directed by an intended goal that motivates me” (Hall 2007, 64).
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sense of trying to grasp human existence directly, without following any kind of
mediation, as he explains:
The short route is the one taken by an ontology of understanding, after the manner
of Heidegger. I call such an ontology of understanding the “short route” because,
breaking with any discussion of method, it carries itself directly to the level of an
ontology of finite being in order there to recover understanding, no longer as a
mode of knowledge, but rather as a mode of being. (Ricoeur 1974a, 6)
Ricoeur criticizes Heidegger for breaking with “any discussion of method” going directly
to an ontology of finite being. Precisely, the opacity of the cogito and the fact that the
cogito is always already articulated in the manifestations of the self, such as the works of
culture and language, are evidence for Ricoeur that we cannot have direct access to it. For
that reason, we have to follow the “long route” described by Ricoeur as the “continual
exegesis of all the significations that come to light in the world of culture” (Ricoeur
1974a, 21). Because philosophy can only appropriate existence through an exegesis,
philosophy is hermeneutics. Through an act of appropriation of existence analogous to
the exegetical act of philosophy, we become a self:206
Existence becomes a self – human and adult – only by appropriating this meaning,
which first resides “outside,” in works institutions, and cultural monuments in
which the life of the spirit is objectified. (Ricoeur 1974a, 22)
Language is the principal mediation used to appropriate existence since “It is first
of all and always in language that all ontic or ontological understanding arrives at its
expressions” (Ricoeur 1974a, 11).Thus, all the disciplines that deal with language, such
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Here we can see that philosophy is deeply ethical since self-understanding is a way to fulfill
our desire to be. For more about this topic, see Ricoeur’s article The Problem of the Foundation of Moral
Philosophy (Ricoeur 2000d).
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as semantics and semiology, will be privileged ways of developing this understanding of
human existence. But the social sciences and humanities will also be crucial in order to
make sense of human existence. Thus, Ricoeur against Heidegger and Gadamer, states
that it is not possible to separate truth from method, but on the contrary we must “keep in
contact with the disciplines which seek to practice interpretation in a methodical manner”
(Ricoeur 1974a, 11).
According to Ricoeur the ontology that can be achieved “is in no way separable
from interpretation; it is caught inside the circle formed by the conjunction of the work of
interpretation and the interpreted being” (Ricoeur 1974a, 23). It is an ontology that can be
reached only from a particular interpretation of the manifestations of the self in the world
of culture. It is a mediated ontology, mediated by language and culture, a far cry from
any “strong” ontological effort; and, as a result, it is not “a triumphant ontology at all; it
is not even a science, since it is unable to avoid the risk of interpretation” (Ricoeur 1974a,
23). This ontology, then, is a promised land, as Ricoeur explains in this well known
paragraph:
In this way, ontology is indeed the promised land for a philosophy that begins
with language and with reflection; but, like Moses, the speaking and reflecting
subject can only glimpse this land before dying. (Ricoeur 1974a, 24)
The original motivation for taking the detour through the world of culture is to
understand what it means to be a self. However, once we have analyzed the expressions
of the self, it is not always easy to understand what it means to be a self. A gap appears
between the self and its expressions. For example, when we analyze the actions of the
self, we can always wonder whether those actions really show the motivations and the
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nature of the self. Thus, we need to connect the self and its several expressions in the
world of culture. In other words, once we have covered that road of hermeneutics, we
need to find the way back to the self. It is my contention that attestation is a possible way
back to the self, insofar as attestation – the confidence of existing in the mode of selfhood
– is achieved by the appropriation of the several expressions of the self, such as its
capacities, its narratives, its body, and its conscience. However, attestation not only
allows us to return to the self after the hermeneutical detour, but attestation, at the same
time, shows us that the self is the appropriation of its own expressions. The self, by
appropriating the world of culture, a world that the very self has built, becomes a self.
Thus, attestation does not only allow us to return to the self, but helps us gain a glimpse
into the “promised land of ontology.”
We find here that the biblical metaphor of the promised land falls short. While in
the biblical image the desert that the people of Israel have to traverse in order to attain to
the promised land represents a transitory stage, in the case of the self the “desert” (if we
so understand the “otherness” of the self) is a permanent detour that the self has to take to
reach its own selfhood. There is no self without the detour of otherness.
On the other hand, the biblical metaphor is accurate in the sense that the self is a
“promised land,” not a conquered one. Indeed, the self (as “the land”) is never completely
given (“conquered”), but it can only be glimpsed, in the sense that we never completely
achieve our selfhood. There is a fundamental disparity of the self with itself. This
disparity is in part a consequence of the fact that in order to gain ourselves we have to
“lose” ourselves through otherness in a constant dialectical tension. Since the self can
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only be gained through otherness, the self can never be completely “at home.” We
recognize ourselves in our capacities, in our narratives, in other people, in our body, in
our conscience, but at the same time we experience a certain foreignness in those
manifestations of the self. Recognition, Ricoeur reminds us, always goes along with
misrecognition. Attestation shows well this tension. Since the confidence of existing in
the mode of selfhood (attestation) is gained through the appropriation of otherness, that
confidence is never free of doubt or suspicion.
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